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ADOPTION OF CHILDREN IN NEW ZEALAND. 
[IContributed by D. STANLEY SMITH, ESQ., LL.M.] 
THE object of the New Zealand adoption legislation is, in general, 
to give to the adopted child the status of a child born in lawful 
wedlock to the adopting parent, and thereby to ensure that, during 
the lifetime of the adopting parent, the parent shall not be disturbed 
in the guardianship and control of the child ; and that, upon the 
death of the adopting parent, the child shall be entitled to succeed 
to the property of the adopting parent. Before any statute regu­
lating adoption was passed there had in fact been many instances 
where kindly disposed persons had maintained, educated and cared 
for a child not their own. This relationship was created by the 
act of the parties, and might be broken at any time if the natural 
parents took steps to reclaim their own child. In some cases this 
occurred after a strong affection had grown up between foster parent 
and child, and after considerable sums had been spent on the child's 
maintenance and education. It was stated by the Honourable Dr. 
Grace, a member of the Legislative Council, and a medical practi­
tioner, in the debate in the Council upon the first Bill for the Adop­
tion of Children, that he had frequently seen reputed parents suffer 
all the agonies and pain of actual parents, from the loss of a child 
which had been placed in their hands by some drunken and dis­
reputable father or mother, and very often torn away from them 
solely for the purpose of extorting money, at an important epoch 
in the child's life, and he had seen great injury inflicted on children 
and on the State itself, as the result of this condition of things 
[Hansard [N.Z.], 1881, vol. xxxix, p. 6). In these circumstances 
a demand arose for an inexpensive adoption law, which would give 
security to the relationship between adopting parent and child, 
and a more effective scope for the philanthropic activities of kindly 
disposed people. 
The law exists also for the benefit of the adopted child. An 
orphan or a destitute child has frequently found a better home 
with its adopting parent or parents than such child could have 
found in any other way; since the Court making the order of 
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adoption is charged with the duty of satisfying itself that the welfare 
and interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption. 
These objects are fundamentally the same as those of the provi­
sions of the Code Napoleon, and of the adoption laws of the American 
States; but they differ from the main object of adoption under the 
Roman law, which was, of course, to provide childless persons 
with an heir. 
Legislation.—The first adoption statute was The Adoption of 
Children Act passed in the year 1881, and was the result of a private 
member's bill introduced into the Legislative Council. This statute 
laid down the lines upon which the adoption of children has since 
proceeded, though additional safeguards against the abuse of the 
adoption process have been subsequently provided. Under this 
statute the jurisdiction in adoption matters was confined to the 
District Court, which ranked in importance midway between the 
Magistrates' Court and the Supreme Court. In 1885 an amending 
Act was passed, giving the Magistrates' Court a co-ordinate jurisdic­
tion in adoption, and it was a matter for the party making the 
application for adoption to decide in which Court he should proceed. 
(The Districts were abolished in the year 1909, and the District 
Courts then ceased to exist.) 
The Act of 1881 was in so clumsy a form that it was felt desirable 
to simplify it. This was done in 1895, when a statute was passed 
repealing the previous Acts and enacting the law in a simple fashion. 
Certain amendments were also made : 
(1) The Act of 1881 limited adoption to children under the age 
of twelve years; the Act of 1895 increased the age to fifteen, but 
provided that the judge, before making an Order of Adoption, must 
be satisfied that the child, if over the age of twelve, consented to 
the adoption. 
(2) The Act of 1881 provided for an application to adopt being 
made only : [a) by a married person, or by a person of the same 
sex as the child proposed to be adopted, the applicant to be at 
least eighteen years older than the child; or (b) by any person at 
least forty years older than the child to be adopted. 
The Act of 1895 omitted age restrictions for married applicants. 
(3) The Act of 1881 limited the time within which an Adoption 
Order might be reversed or discharged to three months after the 
making of the order. The latter Act omitted the time limit. 
Further amendments were made in the year 1906. The Adop­
tion of Children Amendment Act of that year provided that an 
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adopting parent should not receive a premium in respect of the 
adoption, except with the consent of a magistrate. This was 
directed against the abuse of the adoption procedure, whereby it 
was used in a few cases, partly as an aid to a livelihood. 
Ss. 2 and 3 of the Statute Law Amendment Act of 1906 also 
dealt with the Law of Adoption. (This statute was passed to give 
effect to the recommendations of the Commissioners engaged upon 
the work of consolidating the New Zealand Statutes.) S. 2 of that 
Act provided that the Adoption of Children Act should not affect 
the marriage law, and s. 3 provided that, upon the discharge of an 
Adoption Order, the rights and responsibilities of the natural parent 
should revive subject to the conditions (if any) stated in the dis­
charging order. 
By s. 21 of " The Infant Life Protection Act of 1907 " a further 
amendment was made by providing that where the magistrate was 
satisfied that the parent or guardian was for any reason unfit to have 
the custody or control of the child the magistrate might, in making 
the Adoption Order, dispense with the consent of the parent or 
guardian. The parent or guardian affected was at the same time 
given a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The Statutory Law of Adoption was then established, as it stands 
to-day in Part III of " The Infants' Act, 1908 " (New Zealand 
Consolidated Statutes), and as it has been explained in this article. 
Kinds of Adoption.—In New Zealand there are two kinds of 
adoption : firstly, adoption of children by private individuals; 
and, secondly, adoption of deserted children by the managers of 
benevolent institutions. It is proposed to consider, in the first 
place, the adoption of children by private individuals and to 
inquire : 
(a) What children may be adopted ; (b) who may adopt them; 
(c) what is the procedure to be followed; and (d) what is the 
effect of an Order of Adoption. 
( a )  What Children may be adopted.—Any child, male or female, 
under the age of fifteen years may be adopted. If the child is under 
the age of twelve years, its consent to the adoption is not required; 
but, otherwise, the child's consent is a condition precedent to the 
making of an Order of Adoption. (S. 18 [1] (i]). 
( b )  Who may adopt Children.—An adopting parent is defined 
(s. 15) as any person who is, by an Order of Adoption, authorised to 
adopt a child, and, in the case of an Order being made in favour of a 
husband and wife on their joint application, means both husband 
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and wife. The statute specifies in detail the persons who may adopt 
children. 
S. 16 provides that a female child may be adopted (i) 
husband and wife jointly; or (2) by a married woman alone, but with 
the written consent of her husband; and (3) by any unmarried 
woman who, in the opinion of the judge, is at least eighteen years 
older than the child, or (4) by any unmarried man who, in the opinion 
of the judge, is at least forty years older than the child. S. 17 
provides that a male child may be adopted (1) by a husband and 
wife jointly; or (2) by a married man alone, but with the written 
consent of his wife; or (3) by any unmarried man who, in the opinion 
of the judge, is at least eighteen years older than the child; or (4) by 
any unmarried woman who, in the opinion of the judge, is at least 
forty years older than the child. 
S. 19 provides that, except by husband and wife, no child shall 
be adopted by more than one person. 
These restrictions are in the nature of moral safeguards. They 
were suggested partly by the provisions of the Code Napoleon, 
relating to the adoption of children, and partly by the provisions of 
the Adoption Laws of the States of New York and Massachusetts, 
though they are not identical with any such. The definition of 
" adopting parent " given above was taken from the Act of 1895, 
which varied the definition given in the Act of 1881. Under the 
definition in the earlier Act, " adopting parent " meant any per­
son who was, by an Order of Adoption made as therein provided, 
authorised to adopt a child ; and, if such person were married, 
included the person to whom such adopting parent was married. 
This phrasing had an important result in the case of Rex v. Stanley 
(23 N.Z.L.R. 378 and 1100.) In that case the prisoner's wife had 
adopted a child with the prisoner's consent under the provisions of 
the Act of 1881. The prisoner had connection with this adopted 
child on two occasions, whilst the child was under sixteen years of 
age. He was charged with incest, and the only defence was that 
the child was an adopted child. The Court of Appeal held that the 
result of the interpretation put by the second section of the Act 
of 1881 upon the words " adopting parent " was that the prisoner, 
through his marriage to the actual adopting parent, was himself 
an adopting parent, and that therefore the relationship of parent 
and child had been established between him and the child for all 
purposes both civil and criminal, and that accordingly he was 
guilty of the crime charged. The present definition of " adopting 
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parent " has apparently altered the law in this respect. Under the 
Act of 1908, where an Adoption Order is made upon the application 
of a married woman with the consent of her husband, no relation­
ship is established between the husband and the child adopted. 
As was said by the Court in the case cited, it may be doubted 
whether the consequences of this alteration in the law were con­
templated by the Legislature. The matter does not seem to be of 
practical importance, as the provisions of the Crimes Act relating to 
rape and indecent assault should be sufficient to cover any such 
case. It is rare to find instances where adopted children are 
improperly treated. 
Procedure.—The first step in the proceedings is an application 
in writing (in the form specified in the rules made under the statute) 
to the stipendiary magistrate by the person or persons applying to 
adopt the child. In accordance with a recently gazetted rule this 
application must now be accompanied by the child's birth certificate, 
the object being to ensure that the child can be accurately identified 
by the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages. The consents of 
all necessary parties must also be filed in the Court along with the 
application. These parties are as follows : 1. The child itself, if 
over the age of twelve years. 2. The parents of the child, whether 
living in or out of New Zealand ; or such one of them as is living at 
the date of the application. If one parent has deserted the child, 
the consent of the other only is required, but the fact of desertion 
must be proved. 3. The legal guardian of the child in cases where 
both parents are dead. The consent of the legal guardian is in these 
cases imperative, and the Supreme Court will, if necessary, appoint 
a guardian for an orphan to enable the proper consent to be filed 
(in re Nash 2, N.Z.S.C. 286, and in re Athey n, G.L.R. 480). 
It will be seen that the basis of the New Zealand procedure is 
the consent of all interested parties. If, however, the consent of a 
parent or guardian were unreasonably withheld, it is plain that an 
adoption in the interests of the child might be prevented. Accord­
ingly, by an amendment of the Act made in 1907, the magistrate 
was granted a dispensing power. If he is satisfied that any parent 
or guardian is for any reason unfit to have the custody or control 
of the child, and that notice of the application for the Order of Adop­
tion has been given to such parent or guardian, the magistrate may, 
if he thinks fit, in making the Order of Adoption, dispense with the 
consent of the parent or guardian. A right of appeal is given ; and 
the aggrieved parent or guardian may, within one month after the 
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making of the Adoption Order, apply to a judge of the Supreme 
Court, on notice to the adopting parent or parents, to discharge the 
Order of Adoption, and the judge may, in his discretion, discharge 
such Order upon such terms as he thinks fit. This is the only case 
in which there is an appeal from the magistrate's decision in adoption 
proceedings. 
Apart from the consents, there are certain other matters upon 
which a magistrate is required to be satisfied before he may make 
an Adoption Order. These are : 
1. That the child is under the age of fifteen years. 
2. That the adopting parent is of good repute, and is a fit and 
proper person to have the care and custody of the child proposed to 
be adopted. The words " of good repute " were not in the original 
bill when first submitted to the Legislative Council in 1881. By 
that bill an adopting parent was required to be a " respectable " 
person; but that word did not satisfy one vigorous colonial legislator, 
who so heaped Carlylean scorn upon the word that the Attorney-
General was glad to pacify him with the well-known legal phrase. 
Evidence of good repute is usually given by the affidavit of a clergy­
man or other well-known resident who is acquainted with the party 
making the application for adoption. 
3. That the adopting parent is of sufficient ability to bring up, 
maintain and educate the child. The evidence under this heading 
is given by the affidavit of the adopting parent specifying his 
occupation, his income per annum, the size of his house and the 
locality, the size of his family and their circumstances, and the 
number of his dependants. 
4. That no premium or other consideration for the adoption is 
being paid to the adopting parents without the consent of the 
magistrate. If a premium is to be paid, the amount thereof, the 
person paying it, and the necessity or other circumstances out of 
which the premium arises must be fully explained to the magistrate, 
and he must consent thereto before an Adoption Order can be made. 
In cases where an infant under the age of six years is adopted, 
and the adopting parents receive a consideration or reward in 
connection with the adoption, the provisions of Part V of " The 
Infants' Act, 1908," relating to Infants' Homes apply (Curtis and 
Anor. v. Johnson, 11, G.L.R. 110), and in such case the adopting 
parent must apply to the Secretary of the Education Department 
for a licence to act as a foster parent; but the Minister of Education 
may, if he thinks fit, exempt the adopting parent from the require­
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN IN NEW ZEALAND. 171 
ments of Part V of " The Infants' Act, 1908 " ; and this is the course 
usually adopted. 
5. That the welfare and interests of the child will be promoted 
by the adoption. 
The magistrate must be satisfied that this is the conclusion to 
be drawn from all of the facts placed before him.1 
Upon the making of an Order of Adoption, the Clerk of the 
Court in which the Order is made is required by s. 8 of " The Births 
and Deaths Registration Amendment Act, 1915," to furnish the 
Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages with full par­
ticulars of the Order. If the child's birth has been registered in New 
Zealand a note of the Adoption Order is made upon the Register; 
but, in any case, a new entry is made on the prescribed form in the 
Register of Births. 
Effect of an Order of Adoption.—The relevant section is s. 21 
of Part III of " The Infants' Act, 1908," consolidating ss. 7, 8 and 
12 of the " Adoption of Children Act, 1895," ss. 7 and 8 themselves 
having but re-enacted the provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the first 
" Adoption of Children Act " in 1881. The purport of s. 21 may be 
summarised as follows : 
1. The first effect of an Order of Adoption is that it confers the 
name of the adopting parent on the adopted child, in addition to the 
proper name of the child—e.g. if the child's name is " Thomas 
Robinson," and he is adopted by " John William Brown," the 
child's name will become, upon the making of an Adoption Order 
" Thomas Robinson Brown." 
2. The second effect relates to the status of the adopted child, 
and it may be stated from three points of view : (1) that of the 
child; (2) that of the adopting parent, and (3) that of the natural 
parents. 
(1) S. 21 (1) provides : 
The adopted child shall for all purposes, civil and criminal, and as 
regards all legal and equitable liabilities, rights, benefits, privileges and 
consequences of the natural relation of parent and child, be deemed in 
law to be the child born in lawful wedlock of the adopting parent; 
Provided that such adopted child shall not by such adoption : 
(a) Acquire any right, title or interest in any property which would 
devolve on any child of the adopting parent by virtue of any deed, will or 
1 Before the application is heard, the adoption papers are handed to the local 
Police Force for inquiry and report:, and the statements contained in the various 
affidavits are in this way verified for the magistrate by a body representing the 
interests of the community. 
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instrument prior to the date of such order of adoption, unless it is expressly 
so stated in such deed, will or instrument; nor 
(5) Be entitled to take property expressly limited to the heirs of the 
body of the adopting parent, nor property from the lineal or collateral 
kindred of such parent by right of representation ; nor 
(c) Acquire any property vested or to become vested in any child of 
lawful wedlock of the adopting parent in the case of the intestacy of such 
last-mentioned child, or otherwise than directly through such adopting 
parent. 
(2) S. 21 (2) provides that the adopting parent shall for all 
purposes both civil and criminal or otherwise be deemed in law 
to be the parent of such adopted child, and be subject to all liabilities 
affecting such child as if such child had been born of such adopting 
parents in lawful wedlock. 
(3) S. 21 (2) further provides that the Order of Adoption shall 
thereby terminate all the rights and legal responsibilities and 
interests existing between the child and its natural parents, except 
the right of the child to take property as heir or next-of-kin to his 
natural parents, directly or by right of representation. 
Two cases have been decided on theeffect of an Order of Adoption, 
viz. in re Carter (1905) 23 N.Z.L.R. 278, and in re Goldsmid, 1916, 
N.Z.L.R. 1124). In in re Carter a married woman who had a son 
of her own by a former marriage adopted, with the consent of her 
husband, the illegitimate son of another woman, under the pro­
visions of the Act of 1881, which contained provisions relating to the 
effect of an Adoption Order in the same terms as those of the Act 
of 1908. The adopting parent and her husband both died, and the 
adoptfed son died intestate. The question then arose whether the 
mother of the adopted son was entitled to succeed to his property 
(as the mother of an illegitimate child was entitled to do under 
s. 35 of " The Administration Act, 1879 ")> or whether the son of the 
adopting parent's first marriage was entitled to obtain it. The 
Chief Justice pointed out that if the legitimate son of the adopting 
parent had died intestate after his mother's death, and had left 
property, the adopted son would not, because of the exception (c) 
set out above, have been entitled to any of the deceased son's 
property, and that if the legitimate son were entitled to any of the 
adopted son's property there was a want of reciprocity. He pointed 
out, however, that there was also a want of reciprocity as affecting 
the natural parents, for by s. 6 the adopted child can succeed to the 
property of his natural parents as heir or next-of-kin, directly or by 
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right of representation, whilst he can also succeed to the property 
of his adopted parent; and, on the other hand, there is no express 
provision that the natural parents can succeed to the property of 
the adopted child. The Chief Justice proceeded : 
The question really turns on what is to be the meaning of the words 
in s. 5, which express the status of the child. The words are, as already 
cited, " that for all purposes, civil and criminal, and for all advantages 
and benefits, and other legal consequences of the natural relation of parent 
and child, the adopted child shall be deemed to have been born in lawful 
wedlock." 
I am of opinion that I must give effect to these words, except where 
they have been cut down by the provisos or by any other clause in the 
statute. Now, none of the four provisos in s. 5 cuts down these general 
words so as to deny to a child born in lawful wedlock the right to succeed 
to the property of an adopted child, who in law is deemed to be also a 
child born in lawful wedlock of its adopting parents. So far as s. 6 is 
concerned, the adopting parent becomes the parent of the adopted child, 
and the Order of Adoption, it is said, terminates all the rights and legal 
responsibilities and incidents existing between the adopted child and 
its natural parent, except in one thing—namely, his right to succeed to 
the property of his natural parents. It is clear that, under this section, 
the natural parent has no liability to maintain the adopted child, has 
no control over the child, and the child is deemed to be a child born in 
lawful wedlock of its adopting parents. 
The Chief Justice accordingly held that the legal consequences 
of the adoption were that the legitimate son was in law the half-
brother of the adopted son, and, as such, next-of-kin of the deceased 
adopted son, and that the right of the deceased's mother to succeed 
to his property had been terminated. This decision was approved 
by Edwards, J., in in re Goldsmid (1916, N.Z.L.R. 1124.) At p. 1125 
the learned judge said : 
I agree with the opinion expressed by His Honour the Chief Justice 
in in re Carter, that under ss. 5 and 6 of " The Adoption of Children 
Act, 1881," the rights of parents by adoption under that Act, and of those 
who claim through them, prevail over the rights of the natural parents 
of the children adopted, and of those who claim through them; but I think 
that this depends more upon the provisions of s. 6 than upon those of 
s. 5. 
And again at p. 1126 : 
In my opinion, therefore, it is clear that parents by adoption under 
the Act, and those claiming under them, have the same rights in the 
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property of children adopted under the Act as the natural parents of 
children born in lawful wedlock have with reference to the property of 
such children. 
The extent to which a New Zealand adoption order is entitled to 
international recognition does not seem to have come up for decision 
by the Courts. According to Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. (Rule 
125) the law of England will not in England allow any status (such, 
for example, as relationship arising from adoption) which is unknown 
to English law, to have legal effects as regards transactions in 
England ; but (Rule 126) any status existing under the law of a 
person's domicile is recognised by the Court as regards all transactions 
taking place wholly within the country where he is domiciled. A 
different question arises where the effect of a foreign Adoption Order 
is to be considered in New Zealand, since adoption is recognised by 
the law of New Zealand. It is submitted that Dicey's Rule 127 
will apply, and that the New Zealand Court will recognise an Adop­
tion Order made in accordance with the law of an adopting parent's 
domicile ; but such recognition will not necessarily involve the giving 
effect to the results of such status. Thus, the extent of the adopting 
parent's authority over the adopted child will be governed wholly 
by the law of New Zealand. If, by the law of the domicile, the 
authority of the father was much more extensive and arbitrary than 
in New Zealand, it cannot be supposed that the father would be 
permitted to transgress the power which the law of New Zealand 
allows. (Johnstone v. Beattie [1843] 10 CI. & F. 42, 114, and Dicey's 
Rule, 131.) 
The extent to which an Adoption Order can confer the nationality 
of a parent upon the adopted child arose in the case of Masemann v. 
Masemann (1917, N.Z.L.R. 769). In that case an Adoption Order, 
assumed to have been properly made in Germany in accordance with 
German law, was used as an argument that the adopted child became 
a naturalised British subject by virtue of the naturalisation of his 
adopting parent in New Zealand, and through the operation of s. 12 
of " The Aliens Act, 1908 " (N.Z.), which provides that when a man 
has become naturalised in New Zealand every child of his who, 
during minority, becomes resident with him in New Zealand shall 
be deemed to be himself naturalised. Chapman, J., held, however, 
that s. 12 does not extend to parentage other than natural parentage, 
and that s. 21 of " The Infants' Act " (N.Z.) defining the status of an 
adopted child applies only to an adoption made in New Zealand by 
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force of that statute. He held consequently that a child adopted 
abroad could not claim the benefit of s. 12 of " The Aliens Act, 1908," 
and that, whatever the international respect to be accorded to a 
foreign adoption might be, it could not bring an adopted child within 
statutory benefits limited to the natural relationship of parent and 
child. 
Variation or Annulment 0! Order.—An Adoption Order may be 
varied, reversed or discharged by the magistrate exercising juris­
diction within the district where any Order of Adoption has been 
made, upon such terms and conditions as he thinks fit. S. 22 
provides that, where the Order of Adoption is discharged, then, 
subject to the conditions, if any, of the Order of Discharge, the child 
and its natural parents shall be deemed for all purposes to be restored 
to the same position, inter se, as existed immediately before the 
Order of Adoption was made; but so that such restoration shall not 
affect anything lawfully done whilst the Order of Adoption was in 
force. 
Since the consent of all interested parties is in general a condition 
precedent to the making of an Order of Adoption, an Adoption 
Order is rarely varied, reversed or discharged. It is somewhat 
surprising to find that an Order conferring such a completely changed 
status upon a child may be varied, reversed or discharged at the 
discretion of the magistrate. No doubt the magistrate would 
hesitate to vary or discharge an Order, particularly where any length 
of time had elapsed since the making of it. Nevertheless, there is 
no right of appeal from the magistrate's exercise of his discretion, and 
it is possible that in this direction difficulties may arise in the future. 
With respect to the effect of an Order it remains to notice that 
s. 26 provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed to authorise 
any marriage that could not lawfully have been contracted if the 
statute had not been passed. Apart from this provision, it is plain 
that an adopted child, after acquiring its new status as the child of 
the adopting parents, might marry its own natural brother or sister. 
II. Adoption of deserted children by any benevolent institution 
or any other institution, established in connection with any religious 
denomination, and not maintained by Government subsidy (s. 24 
of the Act). 
A deserted child is defined in s. 15 as meaning any child who, in 
the opinion of the magistrate, is deserted, and has ceased to be cared 
for and maintained by its parents, or by such one of them as is 
living, or by the guardian of such child ; or by the mother of such 
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child, if the child is illegitimate. A deserted child may, of course, 
be adopted like any other child ; but it is only a deserted child 
which may be adopted by the manager of a benevolent or religious 
institution. 
Application is made in respect of any such child by the manager 
for the time being of the institution averring that he is desirous of 
adopting such child in connection with such institution. Proof 
must be given (a) that the child is deserted, (b) that the child is of the 
same religious denomination as that of the institution whose manager 
makes the application, and (c) that such institution is properly 
conducted, and is capable of properly bringing up such child. On 
being satisfied of these matters, the magistrate may make an Order, 
authorising the manager for the time being of the institution to 
adopt such child in connection with the institution. Under such 
an Order the child retains his or her own name, and in no manner 
inherits or succeeds to any property of the manager or of the 
institution. The institution may receive a premium or reward in 
respect of the adoption without the consent of the judge. In 
practice, the institutions, which are mostly the orphanages and 
social service organisations established by the various religious 
denominations, trace the deserting parent, and oblige him or her (by 
legal process if necessary) to contribute to the support of such 
parent's child when adopted by the institution. 
S. 21 relating to status does not apply to such adoptions, except 
as to the determination of all rights of the child's natural parents, 
and except as to the right of the child to take property as heir or 
next-of-kin of his natural parents, directly or by right of repre­
sentation. 
Such an Adoption Order entitles the child to the support, main­
tenance, and advancement afforded by such institution; and all 
such other rights, benefits and privileges and advantages appertaining 
thereto, all of which it is the duty of the person or body managing 
or controlling the institution to provide. 
Adoption from the Standpoint of Social Welfare.—At the request 
of the writer of this article, the following note upon Adoption as an 
Instrument of Social Welfare has been kindly supplied by W. G. 
Riddell, Esq., the senior magistrate exercising jurisdiction in the 
city of Wellington, who writes from a large experience. 
In estimating the social effect of adoption, one has to consider that 
fully 95 per cent, of the orders made apply to illegitimate children. The 
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adopting parents may have come into contact with the infant through the 
means of an advertisement, or from inquiries at a Receiving Home or 
Salvation Army Home, or by reason of the fact that the mother is known 
to one or both. The adopting parents are, in many cases, childless, and 
by adopting an infant both parties concerned are benefited, and the State 
relieved from the possible burden of maintaining the infant, until such 
time as he or she becomes self-supporting. In the case of an illegitimate 
child, further benefits lie in conferring a name upon the infant, and in 
securing for it a continuous home life. The adopted infant is assured of 
an environment equal to that of an ordinary legitimate child, and under 
these conditions has every chance of developing into a useful citizen. On 
the other hand, the adopting parents secure a child, which is regarded in 
the same light as their natural offspring. The want in their lives is 
supplied, and the added responsibility taken up by them has its own 
reward. The fact that very few orders of adoption are rescinded goes 
to show that sufficient care is taken to satisfy the authorities that the 
proposed parents are suitable persons, and capable of maintaining, 
educating and bringing up the child which they have elected to call their 
own. Speaking from my experience as a magistrate exercising jurisdic­
tion in the capital city of New Zealand, I can say with confidence that 
the system of adoption practised in New Zealand has been a success from 
every point of view. There is no doubt about its benefits, both to the 
infant adopted and the adopting parents, while the State gains in this 
way, that the burden of maintaining destitute persons is lightened, and 
its liability to care for and educate the unfortunate child is lessened through 
the aid of private persons. 
It is agreed by all who are associated with the maintenance, care and 
guidance of destitute children that the conditions and training found in 
Receiving Homes (i.e. Foster Homes licensed by the Education Depart­
ment), although excellent in many ways, fall short of those found in decent 
private family life, and the institution of adoption supplies the means by 
which the best results can be attained, and all parties interested benefited. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 
[Contributed by JOSE P. MELENCIO, ESQ., OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.] 
TECHNICALLY speaking, the Philippine Islands have no constitution 
to-day. In the sense that a Constitution is the supreme will of the 
people of a definite territory, as is the United States Constitution 
which recites, " We, the people of the United States, in order to form 
a more perfect union, establish justice, etc."—in this sense, the 
Philippine Islands to-day cannot be said to have a constitution of 
their own. They have not a concrete tangible document that is 
the expression of the popular will, framed by representatives of the 
people, and deriving its force from the people. 
In the sense, however, that a constitution is " the fundamental 
or organic law of a State," it could well be said that the Filipinos 
now have a Constitution. But it is not of their framing. Neither is 
it one tangible document. It was made for them by the United 
States Congress, and it is embodied principally in three documents, 
of which each is a progressive development of the other. These 
documents are : 
1. President McKinley's Instructions to the first Philippine 
Commission of April 7, 1900. 
2. The Philippine Bill, or the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. 
3. The Philippine Autonomy Act, or the Act of Congress of 
August 29, 1916. 
The Constitution did not follow the Flag.—The Constitution 
comprises, besides, all such Acts of the United States Congress as are 
expressly extended to the Philippines from time to time. 
The United States Constitution does not operate ex proprio vigore 
in the Philippines. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States are emphatic in the declaration that the Constitution did not 
follow the flag into the Philippine Islands. 
This doctrine, however, seems to be qualified by one or two 
exceptions. The thirteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits slavery in the United States, and " in any 
place subject to their jurisdiction." The Philippines, being a place 
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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, would seem to be 
within the scope of the operation of that amendment. The Philip­
pine Legislature, however, has passed anti-slavery laws of its own. 
Treaties entered into by the United States from time to time, 
and expressly applied to the Philippines, would, of course, apply 
to the Islands. Whether treaties not expressly made applicable 
apply or not to the Islands would seem to be a mooted question. 
It is a point not yet adjudicated upon by the Courts. As the 
Constitution, however, did not follow the flag, and as treaties are 
made by the President with the consent of the United States Senate, 
and as neither the Senate nor the President, but Congress alone, 
has, under the Constitution, the power to legislate over territories, 
it would seem that such treaties cannot form a part of the funda­
mental law of the Philippine Islands. 
The same principles hold true with regard to the statutory laws 
of the United States. These laws do not apply to the Philippine 
Islands, except when they specifically so provide. Laws of war, 
however, and those enacted for the protection of the Army have 
been held to apply to the Philippines, even though they do not 
expressly so provide, for the reason that the Army is an agency of 
national sovereignty. 
The Autonomy Act.—Of the three documents comprising the 
constitution of the Philippine Islands, the Jones Law, or the Philip­
pine Autonomy Act, approaches more nearly a Constitution for the 
Islands, not only in phraseology, but also in structure. All three, 
however, have provided for the islands a framework of government, 
a bill of rights, and certain express powers and inhibitions on the 
territorial government. The characteristic feature of all of them is, 
that they are of a temporary nature, evidently because of the 
avowed intention of the United States to relinquish sovereignty 
over the Philippines some day. The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 
for example, is entitled, " An Act temporarily to provide for the 
administration of the powers of self-government in the Philippine 
Islands, and for other purposes"; while the Act of Congress of 
August 29, 1916 is entitled, " An Act to declare the purpose of the 
people of the United States as to the future political status of the 
people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous 
government for those islands." 
The Constitution of the Philippine Islands in its composite form 
bears a striking resemblance to the so-called flexible Constitution of 
England, as will subsequently appear. 
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By virtue of the Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, the Philippine 
Government to-day is practically autonomous. Broad powers have 
been delegated to it by the Congress of the United States. The 
Filipinos are placed practically in control of their local affairs. This 
is in keeping with the intention of the United States to grant inde­
pendence to the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable Government 
has been established therein. In fact, the act is preparatory to the 
withdrawal, of American sovereignty as soon as that stable Govern­
ment is established. 
A Responsible Government exists.—The Philippine Government 
as at present constituted is modelled after the Federal and State 
Governments of the United States. A democratic form of govern­
ment exists, in the sense that there is a Government by the repre­
sentatives of the people, chosen by the people. It is thus a govern­
ment of laws, and not of men. The majority rules, as is the case in 
the United States. The principle of governmental division of powers, 
which is characteristic of the United States system, is maintained. 
The separation of powers is as complete as in every other Govern­
ment founded on that principle. 
Relations between the United States and the Philippines.—The 
governmental relationship between the United States and the 
Philippines is much like that maintained between England and 
her self-governing Dominions. Control over the Filipinos is exercised 
through five channels : 
1. Through the Governor-General, the executive head appointed 
by the President of the United States. 
2. Through the veto power of the Governor-General. 
3. Through the veto power of the Congress of the United States. 
4. Through the control of foreign relations by the United States. 
5. Through the provision for appeal from the Supreme Court of 
the Philippine Islands to the Supreme Court of the United States 
in certain cases. 
With the exception of the third item, substantially the same 
modes of control are exercised by Great Britain over the affairs of 
her Dominions. 
Governmental Structure.—In structure the Government of the 
Philippines is a hybrid between the American presidential system 
and the English parliamentary system. In so far as compatible 
with the organic laws, a responsible government has been created 
by the Filipinos in the exercise of the autonomous powers conferred 
upon them. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is recog­
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nised as a premier de facto, although he is not so de jure. There is a 
Council of State created by the Governor-General which is advisory 
to him. The budget system has been introduced. An intimate 
relation between the executive and legislative bodies exists. The 
two houses of the Legislature have the right to call the secretaries of 
the departments to testify before them. The secretaries of depart­
ments in turn are entitled to be heard by either of the two houses 
of the Legislature. Either house of the Legislature as well as the 
chairmen of the two committees on appropriation can require the 
attendance of officers of the Government for purposes of inquiry, 
investigation and the like. 
Executive Power.—Just as in the British Dominions, the execu­
tive power in the Philippines is vested in an officer known as the 
Governor-General, who typifies American sovereignty in the 
Philippines, just as the Governor-General of the British Dominions 
typifies the sovereignty of the Crown. 
The Governor-General is appointed by the President of the 
United States with the advice and consent of the United States 
Senate. He holds office at the pleasure of the President, and until 
his successor is chosen and qualified. He is under the direct super­
vision of the Secretary of War, through whom he is responsible to 
the President and to the American people for his acts. 
While the duties imposed upon the Governor-General are not 
so great as those imposed upon the President of the United States, 
it has been said that he holds a more responsible position than those 
held by the State Governors. 
In view of the autonomous Government enjoyed by the Filipinos, 
the powers of the Governor-General are now mostly supervisory. 
Important powers and duties, however, are conferred upon him. 
Among these are the following : 
He has to appoint by, and with the consent of the Philippine 
Senate, such officers as are authorised by the organic laws, or whom 
he may, from time to time, be authorised by law to appoint. He is 
responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine 
Islands, as well as those of the United States which are operative 
within the islands. He is granted extraordinary powers in case of 
rebellion or invasion, and, when the public safety requires it, he may 
suspenfl the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to place the 
island^ or any part of them under martial law. He is Commander-
in-Chief of the Philippine Militia and Constabulary, and all other 
military forces maintained by the Philippine Government. He 
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has the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves, and to 
remit fines and forfeitures. He can make reservations for specific 
public purposes of any part of the public domain of the philippines» 
the use of which is not otherwise provided for by law. He can 
veto any legislation enacted by the Philippine Legislature. He can 
exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government 
of the Philippine Islands. He has direct control of the Bureau of 
Audits, the Bureau of Civil Service and all unattached offices and 
branches of the Philippine Government. 
In the exercise of his executive power, the Governor-General is 
assisted by six departments and several bureaux of the Philippine 
Government. These are the Department of Public Instruction, 
the Department of the Interior, the Department of Finance, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources and the Department of Commerce and Communications. 
Under each department are grouped various bureaux and offices. Each 
Department is headed by a secretary assisted by an under-secretary. 
The Secretaries of Departments, together with the President of 
the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
constitute the Council of State, which corresponds to the Cabinet 
of Canada, to the Federal Executive Council of Australia, and to the 
Executive Council of South Africa. The Council of State, however, 
is not a constitutional body, inasmuch as it was created by executive 
order of the last Governor-General. Succeeding Governor-Generals 
are not bound to recognise it. If, however, a Governor desires to 
form another advisory body the act would be justified because of 
precedent. 
Legislative Power.—The legislative power in the Philippines is 
vested in a Philippine Legislature composed of the Senate and House 
of Representatives. The senators are elected for a term of six years 
on the basis of the population, with the exception of two for the non-
Christian peoples who are appointed by the Governor-General with­
out the consent of the Senate, and without restriction as to residence 
or length of office. There are twenty-four senators. 
Of the ninety members of the House of Representatives, eighty-
one are elected for terms of three years on the basis of population, 
and nine are appointed by the Governor-General to represent non-
Christian peoples, Igorrotes and Moros. In thus consisting of both 
appointive and elective members, the Philippine Legislature bears 
closer resemblance to the Senate of the Union of South Africa 
than to any of the legislative bodies of Canada or Australia. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 183 
The Philippine Legislature has practically the same general 
legislative powers in the Philippine Islands as the Congress of the 
United States has over the United States ; as the Parliaments of 
Canada, Australia and of South Africa have plenary authority to 
legislative over domestic affairs. The United States Congress, like 
the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain, does not generally inter­
fere in matters of purely domestic concern. All laws, however, 
that are passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands are 
required to be reported to Congress, which reserves the power and 
authority to annul the same. Acts of the Philippine Legislature, 
therefore, are valid Acts until disapproved by Congress, or held 
invalid by the Courts. 
The Judiciary.—The judicial power in the Philippines is vested 
in the Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, Courts of Justice 
of the Peace, and the Municipal Court of the City of Manila. Unlike 
the Judges of the Federal Supreme Court of Australia, who are 
appointed by the British Governor-General in Council, the judges 
of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands are appointed by 
the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. The judges of the Court of First Instance, however, as well 
as the justices of the peace, are appointed by the Governor-General. 
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands is the highest 
appellate Court in the Philippines. Its decisions are final except in 
cases : 
1. In which the Constitution or any statute, treaty, title, right or 
privilege of the United States is involved. 
2. In which the value in controversy exceeds $25,000. 
3. In which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in 
value the sum of $25,000 is involved or brought in question. 
Territorial Divisions.—The Philippine Archipelago is divided 
into thirty-eight provinces. These correspond to the provinces of 
Canada and to the States of the American Union. Each province 
has an elective Governor, and also an elective Provincial Board 
consisting of three members. 
Foreign Relations.—The Philippines are a part of the United 
States in an international sense. Filipinos, however, are not 
American citizens. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands, 
owing allegiance to the United States, and under the protection of 
the United States. The islands, however, are not an incorporated 
territory of the United States, neither are they a sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign country. 
THE POSITION OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. 
[Contributed by SIR C. HIBBERT TUPPER, K.C.M.G.] 
IT is no disgrace for a Canadian to admit that we have not 
enjoyed, and cannot enjoy the opportunity afforded to select such 
eminently trained and experienced men for the Judiciary as can be, 
and are, secured in England, through the division of the legal 
profession—a system which could never be adopted in Canada. 
Owing also to the fees allowed and the judicial salaries paid in 
England, a far greater proportion of able men are attracted there 
to the legal profession than in any other English-speaking country 
in the world. 
We have, therefore, been unable in Canada to obtain for our 
Appellate Courts the services of the leaders of the Bars in the 
different Provinces of Canada. It has, under these circumstances, 
been fortunate for the Provinces of Canada, both before and since 
Confederation, that Canada has had the services of the Judicial 
Committee. The only reflection is, in truth, that Canada has never 
paid for these services. I am not aware of any serious complaint in 
Canada over this feature of our development of nationhood ! 
In so far as the Supreme Court of Canada is concerned, there was 
great difficulty in its establishment. Sir John Macdonald attempted 
to bring this about shortly after Confederation in 1867, but it was 
not until 1875, when he was leading the Opposition, that the Govern­
ment succeeded, with his co-operation, in passing the bill. 
It is significant that, while the Province of Quebec is now strongly 
in favour of retaining the services of the Judicial Committee (this 
so-called " Link of Empire "), a French-Canadian, when Minister of 
Justice (afterwards appointed to the Supreme Court) introduced 
and carried the Supreme Court Bill. 
It was at that time supposed that the Supreme Court of Judica­
ture, then about to be established in England, would involve the 
transfer of the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee to that body. 
The Minister of Justice personally favoured the abolition of the 
right of appeal to the Judicial Committee. This phase of the 
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discussion evoked vehement opposition from Sir John Macdonald, 
who said it was important— 
that the right of every Canadian, as well as every other British subject, 
to appeal to the Court of the highest jurisdiction should be preserved. 
And again : 
It would be severing one of the links between this country and the 
mother-country if the right of appeal were cut off ruthlessly. 
And again : 
If there was one thing more than another we should preserve, it was 
the right to appeal for final judgment to the foot of the Throne. 
The chief opposition to the bill itself on general grounds came 
from the Province of Quebec, and probably to meet this, the Minister 
of Justice, in later stages of the debate on the bill, said : 
I do hold, and the spirit of the conference at Quebec (to consider the 
Confederation of the British North American Provinces) indicated, that 
the appeal to the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council 
must always exist, even if the Court in question is established. 
Mr. Moss, K.C., a brilliant member of the Ontario Bar, support­
ing the bill, and speaking to a clause that made it necessary to 
obtain leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, said : 
The suitor would still possess the right, which he prized so much, of 
going to the foot of the Throne. 
Mr. Baby, K.C., of the Quebec Bar, moved an amendment to 
the bill, which cited, inter alia : 
That the Privy Council, composed as it is of men acquainted in general 
with the English and French languages, as also with the laws and institu­
tions of England and France, affords much greater security than the 
proposed Court for the safety of the civil and constitutional rights of the 
several nationalities which this country comprises. 
In speaking to this amendment, Mr. Mousseau, also of the 
Quebec Bar, said he was sure the Government were most unwilling 
to abolish the right of appeal to the Privy Council. 
The chief argument in favour of securing Imperial legislation to 
abolish this right to appeal or the right to obtain leave to appeal 
was, as now, doing duty for those who entertained the same views, 
namely, the expense and the consequent advantage given to rich 
suitors. 
Since the Supreme Court of Canada was established there has 
been a gradual weakening of the Bench. Appointments have been 
made for purely political reasons, and this tribunal has lost the 
confidence of the different Provincial Bars. The salaries have not 
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attracted leaders, even if leaders of the Bar were offered appoint­
ments (and this has not been the case) from time to time. In the 
result, the Parliament of Canada, instead of turning its attention to 
legislation for the purpose of abolishing the right to obtain leave to 
appeal to the Judicial Committee, has, for some years, continued 
to provide expenses for sending one of the leading members of the 
Supreme Court of Canada to sit with the Judicial Committee. 
In 1916, in the Senate, the subject was discussed, and, after the 
discussion, a motion in the direction of abolishing appeals to the 
Judicial Committee was withdrawn. 
There are, of course, strong views still entertained on the part 
of some, as there were in 1875, to the effect that, outside of con­
stitutional questions, there should be no appeal from the highest 
Canadian judicial tribunal. The general opinion, undoubtedly, is 
otherwise. The fact is that much unnecessary expensive litigation 
is due to the purely political appointments of some members of the 
Courts of Appeal in the different Provinces, and the consequent lack 
of confidence in the decisions of these Courts. 
The interesting and instructive work of Mr. H. Duncan Hall on 
The British Commonwealth of Nations deals with this subject. He 
is, I think, however, in error in his conclusion, based on the state­
ment that " there is dissatisfaction felt by the Dominions with the 
working of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," so far as 
Canada is concerned. 
There have been many reforms in procedure for the purpose of 
reducing the expense with regard to the Judicial Committee since 
1875, when the Supreme Court of Canada was constituted. The 
value to Canadians of the Supreme Court of Canada has steadily 
declined, while the value of the Committee has accordingly increased. 
I think there is no foundation for Mr. Hall's observation that " in 
the last generation or so, feeling has steadily hardened against the 
idea of appeals from the Dominions being dealt with by any external 
Court," in so far again as this applies to Canada. 
I do not overlook his reference to the late Prime Minister of 
Canada, who expressed the view that the tendency in Canada "will 
be to restrict appeals to the Privy Council rather than to increase 
them," and that one of Sir Robert Borden's colleagues pointed out 
that there was a growing opinion in Canada " that our Court should 
be the final authority.'' 
Mr. Hall gives reference after reference to prove that Canada 
may, at any time, obtain the fullest rights of self-government, and 
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in fact, leave the Empire if it be so desired. Is it not significant, 
therefore, under this head, that one will search in vain in the 
proceedings of Bar Associations, or in the Canadian Hansard, for 
evidence to support his conclusion in regard to appeals to the 
Judicial Committee ? Boards of Trade exist in every Province of 
Canada. No movement has yet begun in this direction in such 
quarters. 
Dealing with constitutional questions, Mr. Hall suggests that 
the record of the Judicial Committee has not been satisfactory. In 
a very few cases of this Court an able legal critic, Mr. Ewart, who 
publishes what were called at first The Kingdom Papers (now 
The Republic of Canada Papers), and whom Mr. Hall cites in 
support of this view, may be able to point to unsatisfactory and 
perhaps inconsistent views expressed by the Committee. Never­
theless, for reasons which have already been given, the results would 
have been infinitely worse if the constitutional cases had been left 
in the hands of a Canadian Court. Doubtless, if Mr. Ewart reviewed 
the Canadian decisions on constitutional questions, he would 
fortify this opinion. May one not go further, and say that the 
Supreme Court of the United States would fare very badly at the 
hands of this eminent critic ? 
The Canadian Confederation has, without doubt, on notable 
occasions been saved from much internal friction by the existence 
of the Judicial Committee, and its decisions on constitutional 
questions. 
Mr. Hall quotes the Australian delegates to the conference of 
1900, as saying: " No patriotism was ever inspired or sanctioned 
by any thought of the Privy Council." 
In Canada it is abundantly true that, whether one calls it 
" patriotism " or not, this portion of the Dominions has avoided 
disruption between the Provinces and the Federal Government by 
the ability to resort to this so-called " external " judicial tribunal, 
where constitutional questions, complex and involved, arising under 
the Act of British North America, have been solved by an able and 
impartial body, far removed from any suspicion of local or political 
prejudice. 
It is difficult to appreciate Mr. Hall's objection to the proposed 
" perambulation " of the Judicial Committee. If it were practic­
able, it would certainly remove one of the most serious objections 
urged against the present system, namely, the expense. Mr. Hall 
refers to such a perambulation by the Judicial Committee as " a 
188 THE POSITION OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. 
quite unnecessary interference with Dominion autonomy in judicial 
matters." 
We have already in Canada a perambulatory Court of Railway 
Commissioners, appointed by the Dominion authorities, and this 
has given general satisfaction. 
If the present conditions do not "chafe"—and I suggest there 
is not the slightest evidence that they do chafe—how would this 
perambulatory Court, which could only exist by Canada's consent, 
so far as Canada is concerned, chafe ? So far as the Bar of Canada 
is concerned, the evidence is that a preponderating majority are in 
favour of the retention of the Judicial Committee as the final Court 
of Appeal for Canada. 
Mr. Gagne, K.C., of the Bar of the Province of Quebec, in a 
most interesting paper (see Canada Law Journal, March 1920, 
page 89, where this Journal reiterates its opinion to the same effect), 
when addressing the Ontario Bar Association on the occasion of his 
paper, says, among other things : 
The Acts determining the right for Canada to go to this appellate 
tribunal are recorded in our history as early as 1763, when Canada was 
ceded by France to England. The Royal Proclamation constituting 
and recognising our Courts reserves to all persons who may think them­
selves aggrieved by the sentence of any of the Courts the liberty and right 
to appeal to the Sovereign. The Constitution of 1791, and the Act of 
Union of 1840, do not bring any change to this right, and in 1867, by the 
British North America Act, the several Provinces were given the right 
to legislate on certain matters of local interest, with power to constitute 
their own Courts of Justice, and to alter their constitution " (p. 92). 
And again : 
The Privy Council is an additional point of contact, and we need more 
of these points to create common sentiments, a common atmosphere, 
and unity of action. And, as far as we lawyers are concerned, it devolves 
upon us to help to maintain those of our institutions which contribute to 
the formation of a national spirit, and of a sense of security amid the 
uncertainties of to-day. . . . 
It is, therefore, up to us to keep in all its glamour, integrity and 
efficiency that splendid and unique Court whose jurisdiction is more 
extensive, whether measured by area, population, variety of nations, 
creeds, languages or customs, than that hitherto enjoyed by any Court 
known to civilisation. 
The finality of judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada was dis­
cussed before the Senate in I9r6, and, although a motion concerning it 
was withdrawn, it may be interesting to know the grounds set forth for 
the restriction of appeals to the Privy Council. One was that the appeal 
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to the Privy Council enabled rich persons or corporations to force poor 
litigants to compromise or to abandon their claims. This is not an argu­
ment of principle, and it may apply to any of our Courts ; it is, moreover, 
one of exception, and the additional provision, enabling poor people to 
plead before the Privy Council in forma pauperis, seems to dispose of that 
objection. 
The other is that men residing in Canada, and familiar with its customs, 
are in a better position to give justice than judges 3,000 miles away, and 
ignorant of our customs. 
This could equally apply to the judges of the Supreme Court. Is a 
judge from British Columbia very much more familiar with the conditions 
of the Nova Scotia fisherman, or a judge from Alberta very intimate 
with the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec, the language of its people 
and its customs ? 
And are we not rather looking for unfamiliarity with conditions, and 
with the parties in a case, when we desire to have an unbiased decision 
on a question of principle ? (pp. 93-4). 
The Attorney-General of Ontario, a member of a so-called 
(recently formed) " Farmers' Government," expressed not long ago 
an opinion along the lines of Mr. Ewart's views in favour of the 
abolition of the right to appeal to the Judicial Committee. It is 
significant that no sooner had he done so than the Benchers of the 
Law Society of his Province passed a resolution condemnatory of 
such views, and appointed a deputation to wait upon the Premiers 
to express the views of the legal profession of the Province on the 
subject. (Canada Law Journal, March 1920, p. 90.) 
The Attorney-General suggested at the Canadian Bar Association 
at Ottawa in September 1920 that the Privy Council had outlived its 
usefulness, but the record of the proceeding adds : "This did not 
meet with the approval of the majority of the members present at 
the meeting" (Report of proceedings published in Canada Law 
Journal, October—November, 1920, page 356). 
THE NAVAL ARTICLES OF WAR. 
[Contributed by SIR REGINALD ACLAND, K.C., Judge Advocate of 
the Fleet.] 
IT is not easy to select a starting-point from which to trace the 
development of the Naval Disciplinary Code. It would be possible 
to spend a long time on the laws of Oleron, which are generally con­
sidered to be the first attempt to define the customs of the sea, and 
from them to trace through Richard I's and Henry VIII's ordinances 
the gradual growth of the present Articles of War. It will be more 
satisfactory, however, to start at a period when there was at all 
events something of a real Navy, and that may be said to be about 
the end of the sixteenth century. By that time the officers in 
supreme command at the commencement of an expedition usually 
issued instructions to be observed by all under their orders, and in 
them, rather than in the earlier efforts of King or Parliament, are 
to be found what may be considered for the present purpose the 
true origin of the Articles of War as we know them to-day. 
Cadiz Expedition's Instructions.—Many of these instructions 
are known, and it will be sufficient to take one early example. The 
instructions and articles, issued by the Earl of Essex and Lord 
Howard of Effingham on the occasion of the Cadiz Expedition in 
1596/ consist of twenty-nine articles, and were in the form of 
instructions to captains and chief officers of the Navy. Of these 
some sixteen or eighteen are concerned with the care of the ships 
and their stores, rigging and victuals, with the movements of the 
ships relative to the Admiral and to each other, with what is to be 
done in the case of a ship of a friendly nation being met with, or any 
ship captured. 
The personal offences mentioned are : " swearing, broiling, dicing 
and such-like disorders as may breed contention and disorders in 
your ships." Picking and stealing, disobedience, landing in any 
country without orders, going from one ship " wherein he is placed 
into another " without his captain's leave, and striking either an 
1 Naval Miscellany, vol. i, p. 51-5, N.R.S., vol. xx. 
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officer or " inferior person." Further, there is to be no report or 
talk raised in the Fleet, whereby any officer or gentleman in the 
same may be touched in his reputation." Lastly, though it actually 
occurs in the first article, must be mentioned " that no man, soldier 
or other mariner, do dispute on matters of religion, unless it be to be 
resolved of some doubts." " If any person shall forget himself 
and his duty herein, he shall upon knowledge thereof receive open 
punishment to his shame, and after be banished from the Army." 
" If anybody should know of such discussions, and not report them, 
he, too, is to be punished and banished from the Army." 
It is worth notice that neither in these instructions, nor I believe 
in any similar instructions before 1644, are there any provisions 
similar to those now contained in the first block of sections of the 
Naval Discipline Act under the head, " Misconduct in the Presence 
of the Enemy." 
Warwick's Instructions. — The last instructions, which I have 
been able to find depending for their authority solely on the Com­
mission of the Admiral, are those issued by the Earl of Warwick 
when in command of the expedition to the Isle of Rhe in 1627. 
They are set out in extenso in an interesting manuscript, entitled : 
Might and Woulde Not. Or, the Observation of the Right Honour­
able the Earle of Warwicke his voadge made upon the coast of portingale 
in the yeir of our Lord God Anne Dom™1627, with the passadges which 
princypally happenede, and the proceedings thereof. But especially of 
the rule and goavernment in the good Shippe called the Hector under 
the Commaunde of Sir Franncis Steaurde Knight Captaine of the said 
Shipp and a true relation of the manner of his Fight with the Vize Admirall 
of Spaine the twelufe daie of Juellie 1627 Three more of the Spanish 
Armado giving her chace beinge neare at hande by William Ball marriner 
clearing himselfe of an aspertion falclie made upon him on the voadge.1 
They are forty-four in number, and are in the main directions 
as to the internal organisation of the ship, and of the movements 
of the ships, in relation to the Admiral, but contain provisions against 
blasphemy, quarrelling, disobedience, desertion, striking an officer 
or an equal, stealing, gambling, cowardice and rape " be she Chris­
tian or Heathen." Ball's copy of these ordinances is interesting in 
that in two or three cases he records in an easily decipherable cipher 
his opinion that the particular article has been broken " wilfullie 
and presumpteouslie " or "by wilful stubbornness." 
The orders issued by Captain Pennington for his ship the Red 
1 S.P. Dom,, Car. I, 80, fol. 7. 
192 THE NAVAL ARTICLES OF WAR. 
Lion, which was one of Warwick's fleet, have survived.1 They carry 
out Warwick's orders, mention the punishment to be inflicted for 
some, but not all the offences, and create four fresh offences : absence 
from or sleeping on watch, smoking below, entering the hold without 
leave and drunkenness. These orders contain two points of great 
interest, in that they provide for a man who strikes an officer being 
tried for his life by twelve men,2 and for a recovered deserter being 
" sent in chains to the Admiralty prison, there to be tried for his life, 
according to His Majesty's proclamation in that behalf." 
Authority of the Admiral.—A few years later the powers of the 
Crown had been greatly curtailed, and it seems to have been con­
sidered that parliamentary sanction must have been obtained before 
the Admiral could be in a position to execute martial law in the 
Fleet. On July 1, 1642,3 Lord Warwick was appointed Lord High 
Admiral " by the Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled and 
empowered to do all acts in as ample a manner as any Admiral hath 
formerly done." Seven months later, in February 1642-3, this 
appointment was confirmed 4 and extended by giving Lord Warwick 
" Martial power as the general now hath on land till an Act of 
Parliament be passed for the further settling of the Admiralty." 
Apparently under the authority of this Act, Lord Warwick in 1644 
issued " Lawes and Ordinances of the Sea established for the better 
government of the Navie." 5 These are the true originals of the 
present Articles of War. They are twenty in number, contain no 
administrative articles or articles in the nature of sailing directions ; 
but form a short but fairly complete disciplinary code. Four sub­
jects, not hitherto dealt with, are introduced, viz. entertaining 
intelligence with the enemy, concealing letters or messages sent by 
him, relieving or harbouring an enemy or known delinquent and 
presuming when any service or action is commanded to stop or put 
backward the service or action on pretence of any arrears of wages. 
Articles of 1647.—Warwick remained Lord High Admiral until 
February 23, 1648-9. Meanwhile, on the fitting out of the fleet 
for the summer of 1647, a committee of which Warwick was a 
member acting under the powers conferred on them by two Acts of 
1645,6 issued orders (a copy of which from the Pepysian MSS. is in 
1 S.P. Dom., Car. I, 56 fol, 101. 
2 There was a trial of a man for mutiny by twelve men on board the Hector in the 
same expedition. He was condemned to death. 
3 Statutes of the Interregnum, vol. i, p. 112. 
4 Ibid., p. 76. 
5 S.P. Dom., Car. I, 503, fol. 77. 
6 Statutes of the Interregnum, vol. i, pp. 644 and 783. 
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the Admiralty Library) for the guidance of "all Captains and 
officers, whatsoever, and common men respectively in this fleet." 
They are similar to Warwick's orders of 1627, were not of general 
application, and are the same curious mixture of matter which would 
at the present time appear in the Articles of War, the King's Regula­
tions and Admiralty Instructions, the Prize Manual and the Fighting 
Instructions. There are only two directly penal articles: one (the 
28th) is against embezzlement, and theft of articles and stores on a 
prize upon the pain of losing the share of the prize, or wages, and 
being further punished according to the nature of the offence. The 
Article adds the following quaint reason for this : "it being an extra­
ordinary privilege for them to have their wages paid, and a surplus 
of the shares cast in." 
The other (the third in order) is comprehensive enough to cover 
most of the offences, other than those under the head of " Mis­
conduct in the Face of the Enemy " in the present Articles of War. 
If any seaman or other person in your ship shall commit murder or 
manslaughter you are to give notice thereof to the Chief of your squadron 
that he may be sent in safety to the gaol and receive trial according to law. 
And if any shall raise faction, tumult, or conspiracy, or shall quarrel, 
fight, or draw blood, or weapon to that end, or be a common swearer, 
blasphemer, drunkard, railer, pilferer, or sleep on his watch, or make 
noise, or not betake himself to his place of rest after the watch is set, or 
shall not keep his cabin cleanly or be discontented with his proportion of 
victuals assigned, or shall spoil or waste them, or any other necessary 
provisions for the ship, or shall go on board or on shore without leave, or 
shall commit any other insolency and disorder, or be found guilty of any 
other crime or offence, you are to use due severity in the precise punish­
ment and reformation thereof without delay, according to the nature of 
the offence and known orders and customs of the seas. 
One great point to be noticed in the above Article is the fact 
that murder and manslaughter were to be tried in the Civil Court. 
Powers of Commissioners of the Fleet.—Early in 1648-9 1 the 
Act of 1645 was repealed, and the powers of the Lord High Admiral 
transferred to the Council of State. In the same year Blake, 
Popham and Dean were appointed by Parliament to be Commis­
sioners for ordering and commanding the fleet. They, or any two 
of them, were given by the Act power of martial law which they were 
to exercise according to such rules and articles " as shall be given, 
allowed or approved for that purpose, and according to the general 
customs and laws of the Sea." Power was given by them by 
1 Statutes of the Interregnum, vol. ii, p. 13. 
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warrant under their hands, and seals to give the like power to any 
officer of the fleet commanding in chief any squadron or part of the 
fleet divided from the rest in the absence of the Commissioners. 
The Council of State added Lord Denbigh, Colonel Popham, 
Mr. Whitelock and Mr. Lisle to the Navy Committee " for reading 
the Admiralty records, and preparing instructions ; they are to 
consider the Articles of War offered by the Commissioners that are 
to go to sea." 1 They did so at once, for two days later the Council 
of State ordered that the laws prepared for the government of the 
fleet were to be presented for the approbation of the House.2 
They were considered and approved on March 5, and will be 
found set out in full in the Commons Journals.3 
They are twenty in number, and, while altering the punishments 
in some cases, in substance reproduce Warwick's articles of 1644 
with the omission of the clauses prohibiting obedience to orders if 
they tended to disloyalty towards Parliament or disservice to the 
State, refusal to get under weigh upon pretence of the want of 
victuals or stores, and certifying a deficiency of stores without 
orders to do so, and with the addition of clauses against motions or 
speeches tending to the carrying away of any ships from the service 
of the Commonwealth, or to the prejudice of the service, and against 
" lying on shore " without leave. 
These articles appear to have remained in force till December 
1652, when new Articles of War were approved by Parliament in the 
following circumstances.4 
Appointment of Commissioners of the Fleet.—Blake had, less 
than a month before, been beaten by Van Tromp off Dungeness. 
There was a general idea abroad that some of Blake's captains had 
not done their duty, and on December 2 the Council of State had 
sent down Commissioners to the fleet with authority to " examine 
the deportment of the several captains and commanders as well as 
of the State's ships as merchantmen in the late fight with the Dutch 
and to remove ' those who had not done their duty.' " 5 As a 
consequence, several captains were removed, and some were com-
1 S.P. Dom., I, 62, pp. 16-20. 
a Ibid., pp. 21-25. 
8 C.J., vol. vi, p. 156. 
4 Up to this time no provision had been made for the constitution of Courts 
Martial. Offenders were punished either by the captain or by a Council of War, 
which consisted of the Admiral and captains. In December 1653 Blake, Monk, 
Disbrow and Penn, " Admirals and Generals of the Fleet," issued instructions 
dealing with the constitution of Courts Martial. 
* First Dutch War, vol. iii, p. 99 ; N.R.S., vol. xxx. 
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mitted to the Fleet prison for trial. There can be no doubt that 
Clauses XII, XIII, XIV, dealing with misconduct in the presence 
of the enemy, which had never appeared in any earlier articles, 
owed their origin directly to the defeat at Dungeness. They reappear, 
redrafted and rearranged, in ss. 2-5 of the existing Naval Discipline 
Act. 
It must not be forgotten that a fleet in those days did not 
consist solely of His Majesty's ships. Many merchant ships were 
what we should now call " requisitioned," and others were " private 
ships of war " sailing under letters of marque, which led to the 
excuse for the behaviour of some of them, which is suggested in Major 
Bourne's report to the Admiralty Committee,1 that " divers of them 
had the greatest part of their Estates engaged in their ships," and 
therefore shrank from risking them. 
The Articles of War, therefore, are not expressly confined to 
persons in the service of the State. The widest expressions are 
used, such as " none," " no person," or " no person or persons of 
the Fleet," which could cover everyone, whether in the pay of the 
State or not. 
I turn now to the actual preparation of the Articles. As soon as 
the Commissioners returned from the fleet the Commonwealth 
Government set to work in earnest to reorganise the Navy, and 
took in hand the necessary work for preparing Articles of War. On 
December 10 " the Committee for foreign affairs " was ordered " to 
meet on Monday to prepare laws of war for the governing of the Fleet, 
Mr. Thurloe to bring in such laws and ordinances of war as have 
been formerly made for land or sea, and Dr. Walker [the Admiralty 
Counsel] to attend." 8 
On December 12 the Council of State ordered 3 that: 
The Judges of the Admiralty and Doctor Walker be sent unto and 
desired upon consideration had of the present state of affairs and such 
papers as are now before them to prepare draft of Articles of War for the 
governing of the Fleet, and to present the same to the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs on Wednesday morning. 
The Basis of the^Articles of War.—The judges appeared to have 
been unusually prompt, for on December 18 a Committee was 
appointed to prepare the Laws and Articles of War for the fleet, 
and " to bring them into the Council on Monday next," and Par­
liament was to be " humbly moved that Tuesday next may be 
1 First Dutch War, vol. iii, p. 394 ; N.R.S., vol. xxx. 
2 S.P. Dom., I, 68, pp. 63-7. 
* S.P. I, 68, p. 73-8. 
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appointed for the taking into consideration ... of the making of 
laws and ordinances of war for the regulating of the Fleet." On 
December 21 the laws and ordinances were read to the Council 
and presented next day to Parliament. They were debated on 
three days, amended to some extent, and finally passed on Decem­
ber 25, 1652.1 The actual preparation and approval of the docu­
ment lasted, therefore, only fifteen days, and only a week from the 
date of the appointment of the committee. How well the work 
was done is evident from the fact that, with a few exceptions, every 
provision contained in them appears in substance, and in some cases 
in the actual words, in the Articles of War in force to-day, more than 
260 years later, and it will be seen that it has only been necessary 
to add to them substantially in a very few respects. They contain 
thirty-nine Articles.2 The first, as is the case to-day, provides, in the 
language of those days, for the service of Almighty God and the 
religious observance of the Lord's Day. The last corresponds almost 
exactly with s. 43 of the present Naval Discipline Act. It is unneces­
sary to go through them all, but it is worth while to point out those 
which doubtless owe their introduction to the political conditions of 
the day. 
Article VI prohibits the harbouring or concealing of any enemy 
or known delinquent or rebel on shipboard, and carrying any such 
persons beyond sea without licence. 
Article VII is worth quoting in full, though it had appeared in 
earlier articles, because of the light it throws on some of the less 
reputable practices of the day.3 
None shall presume [wilfully or wittingly] to injure or wrong at sea 
the known friends or Allies of this State, either members of this Common­
wealth or strangers not in enmity upon pain of such punishment as the 
nature and circumstances of the offence shall require, nor in visiting any 
ships or vessels, either take goods forcibly or by terror extort them upon 
pain of death [or other punishment according to the nature and circum­
stances of the offence].4 
Article XIX is as follows : 
All captains of ships, having once taken any commission for the 
1 C.J., vol. vii, pp. 234-5. 
2 First Dutch War, vol. iii, p. 293 ; N.R.S., vol. xxx. ; 884-9. 
3 It has been said that at the close of the sixteenth century " when the Spanish 
flag was driven off the seas, the men became almost frankly pirates, and would obey 
no one who would not consent to seize neutrals or allies" (Openheim's Notes to 
Monson's Naval Tracts, vol. ii, p. 248 ; N.R.S., vol. xxiii). 
4 The words in brackets were added during the debate in Parliament. 
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taking of prizes according to the Act, Ordinances or Order of Parliament, 
or served as a private man-of-war, or received any pay or impress or been 
otherwise employed from or under the Parliament . . . shall either turn 
to the enemy or declare themselves against the Parliament, or wilfully 
set upon, fight with, surprise, or take any ship or vessels standing in 
obedience to the Parliament or any of their adherents, or shall turn 
robber and use to exercise piracy either upon or against any merchants 
or other ships shall be punished with death. 
Article XXVI prohibited on pain of death the use of any words 
tending to the death of the Admirals or Generals.1 
Article XXVII ran as follows : 
Every captain shall keep the number and complement of men allowed 
his ship full and complete, and take care to have a full proportion of 
mariners and seamen, and to get and keep such as are able and healthful, 
and fit for service, and not boys or infirm persons, but so the ship may be 
well manned for fight, and not be pestered with idlers and boys upon pain 
to be punished as the quality of the offence may deserve. 
Powers of the Commissioners. —Another Act creating Com­
missioners and conferring powers on them, which is not printed in 
the collection of Statutes of the Interregnum, was passed in 1652,2 and 
in July, 1653,3 a new Commission was created by an Act which gave 
the Commissioners power to frame " Articles, Orders and Ordinances 
of War and Military Discipline to be presented to Parliament for the 
better regulating, governing and discipline of the officers, seamen, 
and army at sea." It was to be in force only till December 4, and 
on the third of that month was continued for another year.4 
Parliament must have known that it had passed the Articles of 
War in the previous December, and the power above referred to 
probably did not mean more than that Commissioners could make 
additional Articles of War if necessary. The Commissioners named 
in the continuing Act were different from those named in the Act 
of July, but included Blake, Monk and Disbrow, who afterwards 
issued regulations, which had a great influence upon the constitution 
of Naval Courts Martial. A further Act was passed in 1659,5 con­
ferring large powers on the Commissioners (who were again different 
from those mentioned in the Act of December, 1653). It did not 
1 This had appeared in the Articles of 1644 and 1649, and was no doubt inserted 
in the first instance in consequence of the then existing political conditions in the 
country. 
2 C.J., vol. vii, p. 219. 
3 Statutes of the Interregnum, vol. ii, p. 708. 
* Ibid., vol. iv, p. 12. 6 Ibid., vol. ii, p 1277. 
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include, however, the power of making Articles of War. The 
Act is, however, important, as it recognises the existence of the 
" Articles, Orders or Ordinances of War for the sea." This Act 
was to continue in force till December, 1659. Shortly after its 
expiry another Act was passed on February 2, 1659-60,1 again 
recognising the existence of the Articles of War. This Act was 
to be in force till October 10, 1660. 
Before that time, however, the Restoration had taken place, and 
the whole work which had been done for the discipline of the Navy by 
the Commonwealth Government was swept away; but not for long. 
In 1661 the Act 13 Car. II, c. 9 was passed. In it the Articles of 
War were included almost word for word, with the exception of the 
above mentioned five Articles, and one other, Art. XXX, prohibiting 
embezzlement, which was probably considered to be sufficiently 
covered by Art. XXVIII, and with such verbal alterations as were 
necessary to make them apply to the ships and officers and men in 
the service of the King, instead of the Commonwealth. One Article 
only was added, viz. one punishing unnatural offences with " death 
without mercy." 
Payments to Convoys. — Only one alteration requires any 
lengthened notice. The last sentence of Article XXXV of the 
Parliamentary Articles of War, prohibiting under penalty of being 
cashiered captains who, having been " appointed for convoy and 
guard of merchant ships," should demand, receive, or take, any fee, 
gratuity or reward, in respect of the convoy. This proved quite 
inadequate. Captains of ships would wait about, and then, though 
they had not been appointed for convoy, would exact from merchants 
and others payments for convoying their ships. The words " ap­
pointed for " were accordingly omitted, and the penalty attached 
to taking any reward for convoy whether the officer was formally 
told off for that duty or not. 
There was no general revision of the Articles of War until 1749, 
when the Act 22 Geo. II, c. 33, was passed, but before that date 
certain alterations in the law had become necessary or desirable. 
The thirty-sixth section of the Act of Charles II had expressly 
limited the jurisdiction of the Lord Admiral, and others, whose 
authority depended on his, to— 
such offences specified in the several Articles contained in this Act as shall 
hereinafter be done upon the main sea, or any ships or vessels being and 
1 Statutes of the Interregnum, p. 1407. 
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harbouring in the main stream of the great rivers only, beneath the 
bridges of the same rivers nigh to the sea within the jurisdiction of the 
Admiralty, and in none other places whatsoever, and committed only by 
such persons as shall be in actual service and pay in His Majesty's Fleet 
or ships of war. 
This excluded jurisdiction over men belonging to the fleet, who 
had committed any offence on shore, abroad or at home, and 
accordingly to remedy this defect an Act was passed in 1719 1 which 
provided that persons in the sea service, who committed offences 
against the Articles of War on shore in foreign parts, might be tried 
and punished, as if the offences had been committed on the main sea. 
Conveyance of Merchandise.—Two years later, in 1721,2 a section 
was introduced into an Act entitled " An Act for the more effectual 
suppression of Piracy " to deal with the carriage of merchandise in 
the ships of the Crown, a proceeding on the part of officers com­
manding ships, which had long given trouble to the authorities. 
As early as 1674 Pepys observes that this abuse had grown to 
such dimensions that the captains not only took in and transported 
merchants' goods, but published beforehand their purpose of so 
doing upon terms of trade and other conditions.3 An example was 
made of a captain of good reputation, and regulations were made 
against the practice, but they do not appear to have been very 
effectual. 
Accordingly s. 8 of the Act to which I have referred recited that: 
Great interruptions and inconveniences may attend His Majesty's Service 
by the captains or commanders or other officers of His Majesty's ships 
or vessels of war receiving on board such ships or vessels goods and 
merchandise and trading therewith contrary to instructions which 
strictly forbid their doing the same, 
and officers were prohibited from receiving merchandise on board, 
in order to trade or merchandise with the same, at his own or 
another person's gain, except gold, silver or jewels, goods from 
wrecked vessels, or goods which he may have been ordered to 
receive on board. Any officer offending was to be tried by Court 
Martial, and, on conviction, was to be deprived of his command, 
rendered incapable of service in the Naval Service of His Majesty, 
and lose the pay due to him. Further, the owner of the goods was 
to forfeit their value, one half of which was to go to the person who 
1 6 Geo. I, c. 19, s. 4. 
2 8 Geo. I, c. 24, s. 8. 
8 Tanner's Introduction to Catalogue of Pepysian MSS., p. 193 ; N.R.S., vol. xxvi 
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gave the first information of the offence, and the other half to the 
Greenwich Hospital. Even these drastic penalties did not entirely 
stop the practice, partly because of the difficulty of obtaining 
sufficient evidence, and partly, I suspect, because of the un­
willingness of Courts Martial to convict. 
I have in my possession the printed report of the trial at Ports­
mouth of Admiral Duckworth in 1805 1 for bringing home mahogany 
and all sorts of goods in the Acasta frigate. The charge was pre­
ferred by a Captain Wood, who alleged he had been badly treated 
by Sir John Duckworth. The evidence, in my opinion, was clear 
against the Admiral, an opinion which is supported by that of five 
of the most eminent lawyers of the day, of whom two were after­
wards judges, one was Solicitor-General, and one afterwards became 
Prime Minister. But the Admiral was unanimously and honourably 
acquitted, the charges said to have been " gross, scandalous, mali­
cious, shameful and highly subversive of the discipline and good 
government of His Majesty's Service." The President handed back 
his sword to the Admiral with a laudatory speech, after which " Sir 
J. T. Duckworth and a large party of friends dined with the Com­
missioner, Sir C. Saxton," 2 and doubtless rejoiced over the defeat 
of Captain Wood. 
The Act of 1749. — There were no further alterations in or 
additions to the Articles of War till 1749, when the statute of 
Charles II, and all subsequent statutes which dealt with the 
discipline of the Navy were repealed, and the Act passed which 
governed the Navy till i860.3 The changes made in the Articles 
of War were slight, were chiefly verbal, or dealt with punishments. 
The first alteration of substance was the addition to Article 
XVI of a clause imposing the penalty of cashiering on officers 
who receive or entertain in their own ships deserters from other 
ships. The next was the addition of a new Article aimed at the 
offence of making or signing false musters, upon proof of which 
offence the officer was to be cashiered. A fresh clause was intro­
duced which made scandalous, infamous, cruel, oppressive or 
fraudulent behaviour unbecoming the character of an officer an 
offence. The next article for the first time made mutiny, desertion 
or disobedience to any lawful command in any part of His Majesty's 
Dominions on shore offences, and thus enabled a Court Martial to 
1 Minutes of the Court Martial on Sir J. T. Duckworth, K.B., Portsmouth Mottley 
Telegraph Office. No date. 
2 Naval Chronicle, vol. xiv, p. 84. 
8 22 Geo. II, c. 33. 
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deal with such offences committed in this country. This is, of 
course, the origin of the distinction which appears in s. 46 of the 
present Naval Discipline Act. 
The provisions of the Acts of 1719 and 1721, to which I have 
called attention, were introduced into the Articles of War, but, 
excepting in the respects to which I have already called attention, 
the Articles of War of Charles II were in substance reproduced. 
From the year 1749 to i860 no alteration was made in the 
Articles of War, nor was any new offence created, unless it be that by 
s. 12 of an Act passed in 1853,1 which created a civil offence of 
bringing spirituous liquors on board His Majesty's ships, can be 
said to have introduced the offence of " smuggling " as it is now 
known, which is charged under s. 43 of the Naval Discipline Act. 
During this long period, however, several Acts of Parliament were 
passed, which affected the powers of Courts Martial, especially in the 
domain of punishments, with which, however, this article does not deal. 
The Revision 0! 1860.—In i860 the Articles of War were entirely 
redrafted and rearranged in a much more convenient form than 
before. A very large number of alterations in the language were 
made without in any case substantially altering the sense. It is 
quite unnecessary to refer to the Articles in detail, but attention may 
be called to the additions which were made. They were very few 
in number ; a clause was introduced creating an offence of absence 
without leave. Courts Martial had before this found persons guilty 
of being absent without leave when charged with desertion, but it 
was an irregular proceeding for the purpose of reducing the sentence. 
This addition made such finding legal. A new clause was introduced, 
making it an offence to malinger or to do any wilful act or to disobey 
any order in hospital or elsewhere with intent to produce or aggravate 
disease or infirmity or to delay the man's cure. The only other 
addition of importance was the Article which made masters of ships 
under convoy liable to obey the commands of the captain of the 
convoying ship. No punishment was prescribed, but the com­
manding officer of the convoying ship was authoiised to compel 
obedience by force of arms if necessary. 
It is a wonderful tribute to the excellence of the work done in the 
seventeenth century that so few changes in the substance of the Naval 
Code should have become necessary in a period of nearly three hundred 
years. Of course there was a great modification in the penalties 
during this time, but this belongs to another branch of the subject. 
1 16 & 17 Vict. c. 69. 
PRICE-FIXING IN AUSTRALIA DURING THE WAR 
[Contributed by T. R. BAVIN, ESQ., B.A., LL.B., AND H. V. EVATT, ESQ., 
B.A., LL.B.] 
UNDER the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 
12, authority is given to the Australian Parliament to legislate on thirty-
nine prescribed topics. The powers of the State legislatures to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the respective States 
"in all cases whatsoever " are accordingly restricted ; but restricted 
only so far as power is given to the central Parliament. Thus, by s. 51 
(1) of the Constitution, the Federal Parliament is given power to legislate 
for the Commonwealth with respect to " trade and commerce with other 
countries, and among the States " ; so that the right of the State Parlia­
ments to deal with trade and commerce within their own borders is not 
taken away by the Constitution, and therefore remains subject to the 
limitation mentioned below. It follows that the Federal Parliament is 
unable to control Australian commerce, except so far as that commerce 
is foreign or inter-State. Intra-State trade it cannot touch. Labour 
Governments elected to Federal power on sweeping platforms designed to 
extinguish trade combines, trusts, and monopolies feel themselves hedged 
in by this constitutional position, and attempts were made in 1911 and 
1913 to extend the Commonwealth power to cover intra-State trade. 
Both attempts were made by referendum under s. 128 of the Constitution, 
and both attempts failed. On the declaration of war in August 1914, 
the Federal Labour Party was in opposition, but it was returned again 
to office on the double dissolution occurring in the following month. 
The limitation on the power of the State to control its own trade 
and commerce, referred to above, was not appreciated to the full at the 
outbreak of war. The Commonwealth Parliament is given exclusive 
authority under the Constitution to legislate with respect to the naval 
and military defence, both of the Commonwealth and of the several 
States. And this authority has since been held to be a paramount one, 
giving the Federal Parliament power, in effect, to adopt whatever measures 
could be reasonably deemed necessary for defence purposes (The Bread 
Case, Farey v. Burvett, 21 C.L.R. 433) and denying to the King in right 
of the several States his common law prerogative powers of defending the 
realm, such powers having passed to the King in right of the Common­
wealth (Joseph v. Colonial Treasurer (N.S.W.) 25 C.L.R. 32). 
The Immediate Effect of War.—The Federal Government in power 
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at the outbreak of war probably considered that it lacked the power 
necessary to cope with the evil of high prices, and the Premiers of the 
various States were invited by the Prime Minister to deal with the 
control of food-stuffs and prices. This menace was already apparent 
early in September 1914, as is shown by the report of the N.S.W. 
Necessary Commodities Control Commission dated September 15, 1914. 
Almost immediately after the declaration of war the prices of imported 
commodities were increased by the wholesale grocers from to 20 per 
cent, and in one instance (cream of tartar) by 100 per cent. 
This sudden increase seems [says the report] not to have been the result 
of a calm consideration of the effect upon prices necessarily caused by the 
war ; nor of the duty which the state of public affairs imposed upon the 
importers of taking into account the effect of improvident increases of prices 
upon the mind and well-being of the community. The importers seem to 
have been almost overwhelmed by the fact that their stocks, which they had 
been accustomed to replenish, and in most cases turn over, some nine or ten 
times a year, had been suddenly stopped, without, for the moment, any 
prospect of renewal. They were also troubled by the fact that they had 
consignments in German vessels, indefinitely shut up in various neutral 
ports, and that it might be impossible to replenish certain lines. 
From the outbreak of the war, until July 1916, the control and regula­
tion of the prices of commodities were left by the Commonwealth Parlia­
ment to the various State authorities. It should be emphasised that no 
accepted political theory or dogma stood in the way of such State regula­
tion. The Victorian Prices of Goods Board was an authority by no 
means conspicuous in actual fixation of prices under the Acts of 1914 and 
1915, but even it reported that— 
legislators of all shades and opinions were impressed with the necessity of 
taking steps to prevent the exploitation of the community by means of the 
" cornering " of foodstuffs and undue inflation of prices, as a result of the 
war. This feeling was not confined to Victoria, but was general throughout 
the Commonwealth. 
Australian public opinion is, as pointed out by one of the present 
writers in dealing with New South Wales Fair Rents Legislation (JOURN. 
COMP. LEG., 3rd Ser., vol. ii., p. 10) seldom disturbed by the fear that 
practical legislative proposals may offend against " fundamental 
economic laws " if it is seen that the scheme so criticised is apparently 
fair in its projected operation. 
Consequently the Parliaments of all the Australian States, with the 
exception of Tasmania, passed price-fixing legislation, and within two 
months from the outbreak of war, tribunals were appointed to administer 
the various Acts. The New South Wales legislation and consequent 
control will be referred to later, but the schemes adopted in the other 
States will be shortly outlined in the first instance. 
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Victoria.—In Victoria, the Prices of Goods Act was passed on 
September 9, 1914, notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of the 
conservative Legislative Council. Provision was made for the appoint­
ment of a Board, which should report to the Governor in Council as to 
what should be the maximum prices of all food-stuffs. In 1915, an 
Amending Act was passed, limiting the Board's functions to that of 
reporting with respect to goods, the selling price of which had been 
affected by the war. By the Food-stuffs and Commodities Act passed 
simultaneously, the Board was given power to take a census of stocks. 
The Governor in Council, after recommendation by the Board, could 
declare any price to be the highest selling price, and persons selling at 
any higher figure were liable to a maximum fine of £500. Prosecutions, 
however, could be instituted only with the consent of the Attorney-
General. The Board was composed of five members, the Chairman being 
a Minister, and the four others representing the wholesale merchants, the 
retailers, the producers and the consumers. The operation of the Act 
was for a period of four months only, and it was only re-enacted for a 
total period of twelve months. 
It should be noted that the Victorian Government of the day was 
Liberal-Conservative, and was concerned rather for producers' than 
consumers' interests. The Labour Party has never attained in Victoria 
State politics the power which it has often enjoyed in the other States, 
and in the Commonwealth, and it was quite unable to force the adoption 
of its extensive scheme of price-fixing. Further : 
(1) The Victorian Board regarded its functions as limited in a very 
definite way. In its final report dated September 30, 1915, it says : 
Under the Victorian Act it is clear that no general fixation of prices was 
ever intended or contemplated. What was aimed at was the prevention of 
the undue inflation of prices, and undue restriction of supplies in time of war. 
Apart from this, trade and business generally were to be allowed to flow in 
the ordinary channels in the usual way. If advances in prices were legiti­
mate, the Board was powerless to intervene. In fact, the Price of Goods 
Board could only act when it found, after proper investigation, that prices 
were being unduly advanced or supplies unduly restricted. 
(2) The Act made no provision for adequate staffing, owing to its 
extremely short operation. In contrast with this Act the New South 
Wales legislation was for the duration of the war. 
(3) No action was taken to deal with the prices of general groceries, 
arrangement being made with the wholesale merchants, that each increase 
made by them should be notified to the Board. 
(4) A corner in wheat was prevented by the Board's recommending, 
and the Government adopting, a fixed maximum of 4s. 9d. per bushel 
for wheat in September 1914. Two months later the price was increased 
to 5s. 6d. per bushel. But on December 1,1914, the Board recommended— 
that the price fixed should be taken off altogether, and trade in wheat allowed 
to run in the ordinary way, as the large holdings have been disposed of at 
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fixed prices, and practically the whole of the wheat of the State is held by 
farmers for seed purposes, or by genuine millers, merchants, etc. 
This was done, but the fear of subsequent fixation prevented importing, 
and the Government was forced to provide wheat for the State. This 
was done at considerable loss, each bushel costing 8s. landed at Melbourne. 
(5) The price of flour was fixed on the basis of the price of wheat, and 
increased with the latter. When the fixed price of wheat was removed in 
December 1914, flour was at £11 17s. 6d. per ton, and the selling price rose 
to £17 per ton—the price arranged by the Government with the millers 
who took the wheat imported by the State. 
(6) Owing to stocks of flour being held by the bakers, the Board was 
faced with great difficulty in fixing the price of bread. To fix the latter 
on the low price of flour at which the stocks were bought was equivalent 
to closing down numbers of bakery establishments, which had not held 
supplies. The Board adopted the other alternative, and fixed the price 
of bread on the basis of flour at £17 per ton, the price at which flour milled 
from Government wheat was supplied to the millers. 
(7) The 1915 Act limited the power of the Board to deal with commo­
dities the prices of which were influenced by the war. The drought 
of 1914-15, however, enormously reduced the supply of butter, and the 
large increase in price was due to that, and only in a secondary sense to 
the war. The Board therefore got into touch with producing and the 
trading interests in butter, and the price was fixed from time to time at 
the joint suggestion of those two interests. 
Queensland.—The Queensland Parliament passed the Control of 
Trade Act in 1914, and substantially enacted the provisions of the 
Necessary Commodities Control Act, 1914, of New South Wales. Prices 
were fixed extensively, and included bacon, biscuits, kerosene, tobacco, 
many lines of general groceries, many classes of meat, dairy produce, 
flour, bran, pollard, drugs, candles, patent medicines, infants' food and 
chemicals. The rates, which were constantly amended, referred to whole­
sale selling only ; but it was provided that the retail prices should bear 
the same relation to the wholesale rates as before the war. In Queens­
land, for the greater part of the war, the Government was Labour, and 
the Liberal Government in power at the outbreak of war had less special 
regard for producers' interests than in Victoria. 
South Australia.—In South Australia the Act administered was the 
Prices Regulations Act, 1914. The Act provided for the appointment of 
a Commission of three, one being a Supreme Court Judge. Wide powers 
were given, including that of declaring any commodity a necessary of 
life, and heavy penalties were provided for selling at a higher rate, or for 
refusing to sell at the fixed rate : in the latter event, provision was also 
made for forfeiture of the goods to the Crown. But, though these powers 
were given, they were not exercised, the activities of the Commission 
being confined to periodical returns of prices and special inquiries in 
camera. In their report of July 12, 1915, the Commission point out that 
206 PRICE-FIXING IN AUSTRALIA DURING THE WAR. 
they have kept in close touch with the mercantile and trading community, 
and that they— 
have always realised the heavy responsibility which rests upon them in the 
fixing of prices, a responsibility not shared by the Government of the day, or 
any other body or person. They are charged with duties, judicial in char­
acter, to prevent exploitation of the public, but not with a duty to interfere 
with prices which, in their opinion, cannot be declared to be unreasonable. 
In point of fact, the only price actually fixed by the Commission was 
that of sugar at the request of the Commonwealth Government—a formal 
matter pursuant to agreement. 
This inactivity did not satisfy the war-time demand for more specta­
cular action, and the Vaughan Labour Government, on being returned to 
power in 1916, altered the personnel of the Commission. More frequent 
inquiries were held, and greater publicity given to the work of the Com­
mission. The policy was changed from that of acquiescence or threaten­
ing without fixation to that of publicity with occasional fixation ; and 
prices were fixed for milk, bread, biscuit, flour, tea, sugar, self-raising 
flour, and oatmeal. The effect of the 1914-15 drought had been over­
come by the time the new Commission began active work, and care 
was taken to see that decreases in prices were sufficient as the supplies 
returned to normal. 
Western Australia.—In Western Australia the Act passed was the 
• Control of Trade in War Time Act, 1914. Power was given to the 
Executive to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the prices of 
food-stuffs, and to recommend the adoption of maximum prices to the 
Executive. The Commission appointed did not make as extensive 
investigations as were made by the authorities in the other States, and 
little actual fixation was done. The prices of flour, bran, milk, chaff, and 
sugar were fixed. Drastic provisions were made for breach of the Act, 
but these were amended, and the operation of the Act was also limited 
owing to the duration of the war, so as to terminate on September 30,1915 ; 
and, although a Labour Government held office, the Act was not re-
enacted after that date. 
New South Wales.—In Tasmania no state action was taken, the 
Government being conservative in character at the outbreak of war, and 
remaining so thereafter. It was in New South Wales that the greatest 
activity was shown. In August 1914 a Labour Government was in 
office, supported by a commanding majority. The Act was entitled the 
Necessary Commodities Control Act, 1914, and was introduced by the 
Attorney-General, who modestly described the Act as— 
legislation in order to prevent a certain small section of the trading com­
munity from taking advantage of the present situation and effecting " corners " 
in various articles, or in putting up the prices of those articles beyond what 
they really ought to be. 
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The Act was a short one of eighteen sections. Provision was made 
for the appointment of a Commission of three, one of whom had to 
be a Judge of the Industrial Arbitration Court, the other two being 
appointed by the Governor. The duty of the Commission was " to 
inquire into, and report as to the prices of necessary commodities." In 
such inquiry and report, the Commission was to deal with " what should 
be the highest selling prices, having reasonable regard to market condi­
tions." The Governor (i.e. of course the Government acting on his 
Minister's advice) was empowered to declare maximum prices at a figure 
not lower than that recommended by the Commission, to vary such 
prices, to declare that they should apply to certain localities only, and 
with respect to certain qualities or descriptions or quantities only. Penal­
ties were provided for attempting to sell at an excess price, or refusing 
to sell at the fixed price. Commodities withheld from sale could be 
seized and forfeited, and, incidental to this, was a power of search. The 
Commission was given the powers of the Supreme Court with respect to 
witnessing books, and punishment for contempt. Provision was also 
made for obtaining the returns of necessary commodities, and for the 
appointment of officers. A " Necessary Commodity " was defined in the 
Act, so as to include fuel, gas, any article of food or drink or any article 
which enters into the composition or preparation of any article of food 
or drink for man, or for any domesticated animal: and, as if this were not 
wide enough, the Commission could recommend to Parliament the selec­
tion of further articles as " necessary commodities " and Parliament 
could add them to the list by resolution of both Houses. 
The Commission in New South Wales was provided with an adequate 
staff of officers and inspectors, and the Chairman gave practically all his 
time to the work. It was " more far-reaching in its investigations, and 
drastic in its recommendations, than any other similar body in any 
other State " (Wilkinson, p. 34). 
In addition to the main necessaries of life, the supplies and prices of 
such articles as kerosene, plum puddings, biscuits, coal, gas, rum, brandy, 
whisky, and cigarettes were investigated. The selling prices of pigs, 
bacon, and pork were fixed in order to prevent their export to the other 
States at enhanced prices, the Commission threatening to seize and dis­
tribute if attempts were made to export in that way. An attempt was 
made in September 1914 to fix the price of wheat, but it was found 
impossible to force sales at the fixed price, and the Government thereupon 
acquired the whole of the New South Wales supplies, which were dis­
tributed by the Government to millers and the public, at one price in 
controlled quantities. 
In the case of bread and flour, the scheme adopted was to take the 
prices in force in the various New South Wales towns on August 1, 1914, 
and to grant increases from time to time. This recognised differences of 
production and distribution in the various parts of the State, and worked 
effectively. In the case of bread, the President of the Commission, in 
208 PRICE-FIXING IN AUSTRALIA DURING THE WAR. 
dealing with an application by one of the largest bakers of Sydney, 
said: 
Taking Mr. Gartrell's figures as they stand, he shows a loss of 9?. 2 d. per 
ton with these very large items represented by depreciation and material, 
not to speak of any other. Now, what is your application ? The application 
is for \d. per loaf increase. Of course, in the evidence there were great 
differences in the number of loaves said to be produced by a ton of flour, but 
I think Mr. Gartrell's own figures as to the quantity produced were 1,298 ; 
take it at 1,300 in round figures per ton. If you work out the difference that 
would be represented by the increase of \d. per loaf on an output of 5 o tons 
per week, it would amount to an increased revenue of ^150 per week. So 
that this is an application which, if granted, would return to Mr. Gartrell, 
allowing all his figures for rent and depreciation, /150 per week, which is to 
cover his actual loss ; his loss is under ^30 per week : that is, /120 more than 
his loss. Do you think that we ought to put such a price up to the general 
public as will compel them to give him such a further profit above what he 
receives at ordinary times, which I presume to be fair ? It allows the whole 
of the capital value of his business to be taken into account, his own stated 
rate of depreciation, and he actually asks us to put up the price, so that not 
only will his loss of £30 per week be covered, but that he will get a return of 
£15°-
The price of butter was fixed at a much lower rate than in the other 
States, and the Government was forced to import butter from America. 
Milk, fodders, and many other articles were dealt with. 
Federal Control.—At the time the Federal Government set up its 
price-fixing machinery, the only States actively administering their 
legislation were New South Wales, Queensland, and, to a lesser extent, 
South Australia. Meanwhile, the Fisher Labour Administration had 
considered the time opportune for the grant by the people to the Federal 
Parliament of further powers under the Constitution. Late in 1915, 
proposed laws for the alteration of the Constitution, including a law to 
enlarge the Commonwealth powers as to " trade and commerce," were 
passed by each Federal House, and writs were issued for the submission 
of these to the people. It was felt, however, that it would be inadvisable, 
in face of the war position, to force on a bitter political contest, and the 
Premiers of the States met the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth— 
Mr. Hughes (who had just succeeded Mr. Fisher) in conference in No­
vember 1915. The result was an agreement by the Premiers to bring 
forward legislation in their respective Parliaments to refer and grant to 
the Parliament of the Commonwealth the additional powers sought, such 
powers to be exercised only during the period of the war. The only State 
Parliament which passed the proposed Act was that of New South Wales, 
which enacted the Commonwealth Powers (War) Act No. 65 of 1915. The 
constitutionality of the bargain and of this consequential measure never 
had to be considered by the^High Court, but prominent Australian jurists 
declared that the arrangement was futile, and the Act mentioned a nullity. 
Notwithstanding that New South Wales was the only State which 
PRICE-FIXING IN AUSTRALIA DURING THE WAR. 209 
passed the legislation, the Hughes Government did not go on with the 
referenda, but determined to rely on the war power. The War Pre­
cautions Act was passed in 1914, and amended from time to time ; it was 
based on the English Defence of the Realm Act, and was designed to give 
the Commonwealth Government full power in cases of emergency arising 
out of the war. The Act and regulations were given the widest and 
fullest recognition by the High Court of Australia in a series of cases, the 
first of which was the Bread Case mentioned above. 
Various demands to deal with the question of the cost of living being 
made on the Federal Government, by its supporters in and out of Parlia­
ment, regulations were accordingly passed under the War Precautions 
Act early in 1916. A " Commonwealth Prices Adjustment Board " of 
five members was appointed to make inquiries, and to recommend to the 
Governor-General. The latter was empowered to fix maximum prices, 
and proclaim the areas in which those prices would operate. At first 
only flour and bread were dealt with, but the Board's authority was 
extended in July 1916 to cover food-stuffs, necessary commodities, 
shipping freights, and services. A Price-fixing Commission was appointed 
to each State to make local recommendations and inquiries. These 
Commissions were co-ordinated by a central department at Melbourne, 
which replaced the Board. 
It should be pointed out in connection with the Federal scheme : 
(1) In 1915, before the various State Boards were replaced in any 
way, the Commonwealth Government had fixed the retail price of sugar, 
incidentally to its taking over the sugar industry with the Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company, acting as agent and refiner for the Government. 
(2) In July 1916 a Federal proclamation under the War Precautions 
Act was issued, preserving all the existing determinations of the State 
Boards, so far as they were not inconsistent with a Federal determination. 
(3) Again the prices of bread, wheat, and produce were fixed, numerous 
other articles were dealt with by the Federal authority, and the list 
finally included articles as arrowroot, baking powder, barley, biscuits, 
bran, bread, cocoa, coffee, cornflour, curry-powder, tinned fish, jams, 
mustard, olive-oil, pepper, rice, sago, salt, butter, milk, cream-of-tartar, 
canned fruit, dried currants and raisins, meat, ammonia, benzine, boot-
polish, boracic acid, disinfectants, epsom salts, matches, and soaps. 
(4) At first the price of bread was fixed only in the capital cities of the 
various States, but the greater part of the Commonwealth was sub­
sequently included. The bakers contended that the price fixed was too 
low, but the Federal Government claimed that the policy was a complete 
success, and had saved the consumers of bread £432,566 between March 
and August of 1916. 
(5) On one occasion in July 1916 the grocers of Victoria decided that, 
as the prices of flour, sugar, and butter were fixed, they would " pass on " 
to the public certain increases of wages to grocers' assistants by increasing 
the prices of groceries, not so far regulated. A special order under the 
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War Precautions Act was thereupon made, and prices fixed generally, as 
on July i, 1916. 
(6) In the case of butter, maximum prices were fixed on October 26, 
1916 ; on export, of course, a much higher price was available to the 
factories, and an arrangement was therefore made by which the latter 
should all allocate the same proportion of their output for export. 
(7) Towards the end of 1916 the great increase in the cost of living 
forced on the Government a policy of active fixation. In 1917 greater 
efforts were made to overcome the shortage caused by the enemy sub­
marine campaign ; imports and exports were rigorously controlled by the 
Customs Department. Special subjects such as meat, clothing, boots 
and rents were taken up, and a large amount of evidence taken in connec­
tion with them by the Inter-State Commission. With the exception of 
meat, the recommendations of the Inter-State Commission were not 
acted upon by the Government, as hostilities had ceased before the policy 
of the Government was definitely announced. 
(8) After November 1918 fixed prices were gradually cancelled, and 
restrictions lifted. The low price of sugar was due, as already indicated, 
by taking over control of the whole industry ; but in the case of bread, 
undoubtedly, prices were lower, owing to the action of the Price-fixing 
authority, than they would otherwise have been. 
Price-fixing in Australia during the war was certainly in the nature 
of a temporary expedient, and there was no precedent for policy or 
procedure, when the subject was approached in August 1914. The 
solutions attempted by the Federal and State authorities were not based 
on principle or doctrine, but on the exigency and policy of the moment. 
Control was powerfully maintained in Sydney and Brisbane by the 
State Tribunals up to 1916; in Melbourne, Adelaide and Western Australia 
little was done, and in Tasmania nothing at all. 
In October 1916, before Federal control had assumed very large 
proportions, a bulletin was issued by the Commonwealth Bureau of 
Statistics, giving the purchasing power of money in the six States : the 
figures relate to forty-six items of food, including groceries, meat and 
dairy produce, and give the amounts required in 1915, and in the first 
quarter of 1916, to purchase what would have cost £1 in the year 1911. 
They are as follows: 
Brisbane, Queensland 




£ s. d. 
1 7 11 
1 8 3 
1 7 6  
1 9 9  
1 9 8  
1 8 11 
1916 
£ s. d. 
1 11 4 
1 10 2 
1 11 o 
Perth, W. Australia 
Hobart, Tasmania 
1 11 o 
1 10 1 
1 11 10 
In Sydney and Brisbane, therefore, where every attempt was made 
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to control prices, the increases on retail prices were actually greater 
than in Melbourne, Perth and Hobart. 
Moreover, during the twelve months prior to the first quarter of 1915, 
owing mainly to the full supply of wheat, meat and dairy produce in New 
South Wales and Queensland, prices in Melbourne, Perth and Hobart 
increased to a greater extent than in Sydney and Brisbane. But when 
the supplies available to the two last mentioned cities became exhausted, 
figures indicate that the increase in average prices there was higher than 
in the other States where prices were not fixed. As Wilkinson points 
out (p. 66), the statistics show that— 
as long as stocks of a commodity last, it is possible to keep its selling price 
low by fixing it; but this low price induces a higher consumption and a 
smaller production, and this in turn has a tendency to cause a greater ultimate 
increase in price. 
The statistics, moreover, are far more properly comparable in Australia 
than in many other countries, because of the similar habits and standard 
of living throughout the nation, and of the absence of inter-State com­
petition at the time, owing to the great distances between the capitals, 
and the consequent cost of transport, and also to the restrictions imposed 
by the State authorities. It was on the strength of such comparisons 
that the Victorian Minister for Agriculture arrived at the conclusion: 
I can only say that the experience of all Governments who have tried price-
fixing has been disastrous. The very recent experience of the Australian 
States has not resulted in the benefits that the sponsors of price-fixing hoped 
would be obtained, and certainly injury in many directions has followed. 
After a short experience the (Victorian) Ministry arrived at the conclusion 
that price-fixing was unnecessary. 
It is impossible to agree with such a conclusion stated in these 
unqualified terms. It must be remembered that one of the objects of 
price-control in time of war was to promote economic stability at home 
as a basis of military efficiency abroad ; no doubt this reference to the 
all-important object of defence was not accepted as a principle by all 
the States. In two of the States—New South Wales and Queensland— 
the removal of Federal restrictions on prices has been followed by the 
reintroduction of price control ; the Act in Queensland is termed the 
Prevention of Profiteering Act, 1920, and the New South Wales Necessary 
Commodities Control Act of December 1919 is shortly to be replaced by 
a measure similar in purpose and name to the Queensland measure. 
But in the activities of the other States, and of the Federal authority, 
especially, of course, in the latter case, control was designedly incidental 
to the defence of the country. There are three ways in which it may be 
said that price-fixing in Australia contributed to this object. 
In the first place, local products available, and usually intended for 
export, were regulated so that the Australian consumers should not be 
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asked to purchase on the basis of world parity. The case of butter and 
bread is in point, although it is not quite clear that there was not a con­
siderable injury to the producing interest to be set off against the im­
mediate advantage to the consumer. 
In the second place, the absence of supplies from foreign countries, 
and the smallness of supply available in Australia, made it essential to 
control articles like fertilisers and galvanised iron. It was possible, in 
this case, to fix prices, so that the local industries could be encouraged, 
and the public still protected, and the result was the prevention of inflated 
values. 
In the third place, actual trading profits had to be examined, and a 
fair return given on the basis of capital invested, personal exertion and 
business risk. The best example of this was in the case of groceries, where 
the tradesmen would supply details of their business to the tribunals 
sitting either in camera, or at any rate not disclosing business secrets. 
Exceptional cases were, of course, the Federal control of the sugar 
monopoly, and the organisation of the wheat and wool pools. These 
were not really instances of price-fixing, as the whole supplies were in 
effect bought up and resold by the Government. 
On the whole, the consuming public had their interest safeguarded, 
and, what was perhaps even more important, they thought that they were 
being protected against undue profit-making. Further, the small trader 
was made secure against the danger of markets being cornered, whilst 
the larger houses were protected by the steadying of wholesale markets, 
and the prevention of the buying up of stocks by speculators. The 
statistics referred to rather discount the retarding effect which the public 
understood was being brought to bear on prices by the controlling 
authorities. But the feeling of security was vitally important to Australia, 
and it took some years from the commencement of the war for the word 
" profiteering " to acquire general acceptation and the privilege of being 
printed in newspapers and statute-books without inverted commas. 
NOTES ON THE LAW OF MINES IN SOUTH 
AFRICA. 
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TRANSVAAL.) 
[Contributed by GILBERT STONE, ESQ.] 
THE law of mines in South Africa is in the main the creation of numerous 
statutes which create a system which has proved admirable in practice 
and which is distinct from that of any other country. Many of the 
principles of the law are, however, not dependent for their existence 
upon the various Gold and Diamond Laws, but are to be discovered 
only by an examination of the Common Law of South Africa, especially 
that branch of it concerned with real property. 
The real property law of South Africa, based as it is upon the Roman 
Dutch system, differs to to ccelo from that of England, and as regards 
certain parts has departed somewhat from the principles worked out 
by the Courts of Holland, for, as De Villiers C.J. remarked in Henderson 
and another v. Hanekom1: 
However anxious the Court may be to maintain the Roman Dutch Law 
in all its integrity, there must, in the ordinary course, be a progressive 
development of the law keeping pace with modern requirements. In no 
department of law has this development been more marked than in the 
practice relating to leases, especially of mineral rights. 
Not only does the law differ in some respects from the law of Holland, 
but before the Union there was a tendency for different decisions to be 
arrived at on the same point in different States. A notable example may 
be found in the conflict which occurred on the question of causa, or 
consideration, and the length of time necessary to cause a lease to be 
regarded as a lease in longum tempus.2 
1 [1903] 20 S.C. Cape 513, at p. 519. 
2 The first of these points may perhaps be regarded as settled by the Privy 
Council in Jayawickreme v. Amarasuriya [1918] A.C. 869 ; 119 L.T. 499. It should 
be observed, however, that that case was an appeal from Ceylon, and the South 
African authorities were not considered. See for the South African views, Mtembu 
v. Webster [1904] 21 S.C. (Cape) 326 ; Boshoff v. Lotter, Broome's Dig. 74 ; Waller v. 
Wolder, 9 S.C. (Natal) 55 ; Cawood v. Lane, 5 Searle 264 ; Midgley v. Tarrant [1885] 
5 E.D.C. 57 ; Gous v. Van der Hoff [1903], 20 S.C. (Cape) 237 ; Alexander v. Perry 
[1874] Buch. 59 ; Malan &• Van der Merwe v. Secretan, Boon &> Co , Foord 94 ; 
Shaw Bros. v. Kruger & Elseworth's Executrix [1899] 13 E.D.C. 188 ; Hansen &> 
Schrader v. Quirk [1885] 5 E.D.C. 35. Contrast Rood v. Wallach, 21 S.A.L.J. 137 ; 
Louisa v. Van den Berg, 1 Menz. 471 ; Jacobsonv. Norton, 2 Menz. 218. The second 
of these points was the subject of consideration in Canavan and Rivas v. New Trans­
vaal Gold Farms, Ltd. [i9°4] T.S. 136. 
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It is of course impossible to consider in this article even in outline 
the various forms of holding of lands in South Africa. The kinds are 
numerous. There is found a form of freeholding ; a quit-rent tenure, 
the erfpacht; a holding involving commonage rights ; a limited holding 
for life, the lyfpacht, or usufruct ; and a leasehold system. But it is 
possible and may be of interest to indicate the nature of the prospecting 
and mining contracts and grants or transfers which are so common in 
South Africa. 
The Theory of Dominium.—In principle, and subject to important 
modifications due to the various Gold and Diamond Laws, the owner or 
dominus of the surface of land " is the owner of the whole of the land 
and of all the minerals in it; he is the owner of what is above and what 
is below." 1 But though this be so the Roman Dutch lawyers have 
never developed the theory of dominium so as to permit of the severance 
of the holdings horizontally. It is consequently not possible under the 
South African system for A to have ownership of the surface and for B 
to have ownership of the subjacent minerals in situ.2 It follows that 
layers of the earth's surface cannot, as in England, be separately owned, 
and that strictly speaking there can be no cession or lease of the minerals. 
The so-called lease of mineral rights is really a grant of a quasi-servitude,3 
for, as was pointed out by Innes C. J. in the Coronation Collieries case, 
" every grant or reservation of mineral rights is in truth the constitution, 
by the dominus of the property affected, of a quasi-servitude in favour 
of the grantee." 
The Law of Support.—But although there is here a capital distinction 
between the law of mines in South Africa and in England the law of 
support in the two countries is substantially the same subject to such 
special considerations as are present in the case of diamond mining 
under the claim as distinct from the mine system. Thus the right to 
vertical and lateral support is recognised as a natural right of property,4 
and, apart from statute or custom to the contrary, an owner who leases 
land for mining purposes is entitled to lateral support for his unleased 
portion unless it is clear from the lease that this prima facie right has 
been relinquished.5 Where, however, the surface is not in its natural 
state, as where its weight has been increased by a building or other 
erection, or its self-sustaining power has been weakened by an excavation, 
it is doubtful whether a right to support does or does not exist as a 
1 Per Mason J., Rocher v. Registrar of Deeds [1911] T.P. 311, at p. 315. 
2 Per Wessels J., Neebe v. Registrar of Mining Rights [1902] T.S. 65, at p. 85 ; 
cf. Le Roux and others v. Loewenthal [1905] T.S. 742, at p. 745. 
3 Per Bristowe J., Coronation Collieries v. Malan [1911], T.P. 577. 
4 London and South African Exploration Co. v. Rouliot, 8 S.C. (Cape), 74 ; Mac-
Farland v. De Beers Mining Board, 2 H.C.G. 398 ; Coronation Collieries v. Malan 
[1911] T.P. 577 ; Simmer and Jack Proprietary Mines, Ltd. v. Union Government 
[1915] A.D. 368 (on appeal [1918] A.C. 600) ; C.S.A.R. v. Geldenhuis Main Reef 
G.M. Co. Ltd. [1907] T.H. 270. 
6 London and South African Exploration Co. v. Rouliot, supra. 
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right of property, or whether it can only be acquired by grant, reserva­
tion, or prescription.1 Under the law of South Africa, as under the law 
of England, a grantor is not at liberty to derogate from his grant.2 
Lateral Support.—Owing to the form which diamond mining took 
when first developed in the Griqualand West fields whereby the various 
claim-holders operating under licence or lease from the owner of the 
land dug down by open working from the surface and operated in 
restricted claims, many of which were grouped together, so that many 
separate diggers would be working almost side by side, it was early held 
that the principle of lateral support is not applicable to claims worked 
in such a manner in a diamond field.3 In Griqualand West Diamond 
Mining Co., Ltd. v. London and South African Exploration Co., Ltd.* De 
Villiers C.J., commenting on Murtha's case, said : " I understand the de­
cision in that case to go upon this ground : a person who proposes to be a 
miner enters into an implied obligation with other miners, and by reason 
of so professing is bound to work down." If therefore A works down 
speedily and B is dilatory, so that A causes B's claim to subside partly 
into his, A's claim, A is not liable to B, but B is to A.5 
Usufructuary.—The position of the usufructuary is entirely different 
from that of the life-tenant in English law. The rights of usufructuary 
were worked out by the Roman and Roman Dutch lawyers at a time 
when men believed that many minerals grew and reproduced themselves. 
Consequently the Dutch Courts adopted a rule partly founded on the 
principle that the usufructuary could make use of those minerals which 
fell within the group renascentia, while in the case of minerals non-
renascentia the usufructuary might work the mines, but he could only 
enjoy the interest on the proceeds of their produce.6 It will consequently 
be obvious that the distinction between open and new mines, so important 
in English mining law, does not arise in South Africa. 
Rights of Claim-holders.—As the Privy Council indicated in Union 
of South Africa v. Simmer and Jack Proprietary Mines,1 the Gold and 
Diamond Laws show that the scheme of legislation was to create or 
recognise mining rights, exercisable under a system of licence or control 
which were not dependent on the possession of full rights of ownership 
in the ground worked, but were to be reconciled with the concurrent 
ownership rights of others. As Wessels J. pointed out in Neebe v. 
1 See Coronation Collieries v. Malan [1911] T.P., at p. 591, where the English 
view was followed ; contrast per Morice J. in Johannesburg Board of Executors v. 
Victoria Building Co. [1894] 1 Off. Rep. 43, at p. 46. 
* Witbank Colliery v. Malan [1913] T.P. 836; Coronation Collieries v. Malan, 
supra. 
3 Murtha v. Von Beek [1882] 1 Buch. A.C. 121. 
* [1883] 1 Buch. A.C., at p. 257. 
6 Leo, Kennedy and Murray v. Ramsbottom [1881] 1 Buch. A.C., at p. 46. 
8 See per Wessels J. in Master v. African Mines Corporation, Ltd. [1907] T.S. 925, 
at p. 930. 
7 [1918] A.C. 600. 
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Registrar of Mining Rights,1 when speaking of the Transvaal Gold Law 
of 1898 : " The Gold Law has not entirely abrogated the Common Law, 
but it has modified it to the extent of giving to the State the right of 
disposing of the precious metals. . . . The State confers the privilegium 
of extracting minerals from a certain area upon the person who takes 
out a licence." 
The nature of the relationship created by the State and the claim-
holder has been the subject of consideration by the Courts in nearly all 
the countries in which the claim system exists, and the results arrived 
at are very diverse. In South Africa the contention that the claim-
holder is in the position of either a lessee or an emphyteuta has been 
rejected, and it may be regarded as settled that the tenure under which 
claim licencees hold is one sui generis specially created by statute, and 
the incidents of such tenure must be gathered from the terms of the 
statute which establishes it.2 
A lessee of land who is also a claim-holder is not the owner of the 
claims, though he may fall, within the definition of owner contained in 
the Gold or Diamond Laws. What he owns is the servitude, privilegium, 
or right to dig for and take the minerals.3 
Transvaal Gold and Diamond Laws.—The rights conferred upon the 
claim-holder by the Precious and Base Metals Act, 1908 (Transvaal), 
and upon the lessee from the Government by the Transvaal Mining 
Lease and Mineral Law Amendment Act, 1918, appear, however, to be 
extremely wide and sufficient. The principal Act of 1908,4 which has 
been amended not only by the Act of 1918 above-mentioned, but by 
Acts of 1910, 1911, 1913, 1915, 1917 (3), and 1919, as well as by various 
proclamations which vary and add to Schedule III, relates to both the 
precious and base metals mining ; the mining for precious stones being 
1 [1902] T.S. 65, at p. 85. 
2 Bezuidenhout v. Worcester G.M. Co. [1894] 1 Off- R-> a* P- 251, per Kotze C.J. ; 
Neebe v. Registrar of Mining Rights [1902] T.S., at p. 80, per Innes C.J. ; Colonial 
Government v. London and South African Exploration Co., 3 Juta 344. 
3 London and South African Exploration Co. v. Bultfontein Mining Board [1889] 
7 Juta, at p. 49. 
4 Previous laws relating to mining for precious metals in the Transvaal are 
No. 5 of 1866 ; No. 1 of 1871 ; No. 2 of 1872 ; No. 1 of 1883 ; No. 8 of 1885 ; 
No. 10 of 1887 ; No. 9 of 1888 ; No. 8 of 1889 ; No. 8 of 1890 ; No. 10 of 1891 ; 
No. 18 of 1892 ; No. 3 of 1893 ; F.V.R.R. 313 of 1893 ; No. 14 of 1894 ; No. 19 of 
1895; No. 21 of 1896; No. 15 of 1898. No. 22 of 1898 was the first separate 
Diamond Law, the Diamond Law, until the repeal of Law No. 21 of 1896 by 
Law No. 15 of 1898, having been part of the Gold Law. For two months in 1898 
there was no law relating to mining for diamonds. See Williams v. The Premier 
{Transvaal) D.M. Co. Ltd. and another [1910] T.P. 811. Base metal mining was 
controlled by the Base Metals Law No. 17 of 1895, replaced by No. 14 of 1897, 
which was amended by Ordinance No. 42 of 1903. The F.V.R.R. Art. 1975 of 1898 
dealt with the lapsing of base metal claims. Subsequently by the Precious and 
Base Metals Act, 1908, these enactments, together with the Brick-making, Lime-
burning and Quarrying (Proclaimed Lands) Ordinance 1905, were repealed and the 
mining for base metals, etc., made part of the Gold Law. 
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controlled by the Precious Stones Ordinance 1903, as amended in 1904, 
1908, 1917, and 1919. The general trend of the Gold and Diamond 
Laws has been to give the State more and more control both over mining 
operations and over surface rights.1 The regulation of mines as regards 
safety and health is the subject of another series of Acts which culminated 
in the passing of the (Union) Mines and Works Act, 1911. 
Gold Law.—The general scheme of the gold law appears to leave 
considerable freedom to private persons to prospect their own lands 
and to the public to prospect generally under permit or licence. Pro­
visions exist which enable the State to reward the discoverer ; to recom­
pense the owner or the holder of mineral rights whose interests are 
affected by proclamation ; to proclaim public diggings where there are 
reasonable grounds for believing precious metals exist in payable quan­
tities on the land in question, but not so as to prevent the proper com­
mercial exploitation of the area by restricting development or by excluding 
the possibility of large scale undertakings, which are encouraged by 
the State lease system as improved and extended by the amending Act 
of 1918. 
Under the Gold Law the normal sequence of events in (1) private 
prospecting or prospecting under permit ; (2) discovery ; (3) selection 
of mynpachts ; (4) reservation of owners' reservations and native loca­
tions ; (5) proclamation of the area a public digging ; (6) the pegging 
of claims ; (7) the putting up of mineral leases to tender. A prospecting 
licence under the Gold Law is a " mining title " and entitles the holder 
to peg claims ; a prospecting permit is not a mining title and entitles 
the holder to prospect generally, or, if he peg a specific area, exclusively 
as regards such area. It is similar to the prospecting licence of the 
Diamond Law. The claim licence of the Diamond Law is in turn similar 
to the prospecting licence of the Gold Law. 
A prospecting permit under the Gold Law may be obtained by any 
white person of the age of sixteen years or upwards ; it lasts for twelve 
months, and, generally speaking, entitles the holder to prospect on any 
land open to prospecting. Under the Diamond Law the age limit is 
eighteen and the area is anywhere except certain defined areas or any 
place expressly excluded by notice from prospecting. 
On a discovery being made written notice is required, accompanied 
by a declaration giving the necessary particulars of the nature of the 
discovery. Beacons must also be erected. Investigation may then be 
made, and if it is found that the discovery is genuine and that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that metals exist in payable quantities, 
the prospector may peg certain claim areas free and receives a discoverer's 
certificate. The discoverer now has the exclusive right of prospecting 
1 The right of the Crown to minerals is the subject of a number of Acts as well 
of s. 1 of the Precious and Base Metals Act, 1908, and s. 3 of the Precious Stones 
Ordinance, 1903. See e.g. s. 22 of the Land Settlers Ordinance, 1902 ; s. 28 of the 
Settlers Act, 1907 ; ss. 122 and 123 of the South Africa Act, 1909; s. 5 (5) of the 
Townships Amendment Act, 1908. 
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and mining free of charge on the area pegged for three years; after that 
period has expired his claims become ordinary claims. 
Under the Diamond Law the discoverer obtains in the case of a 
mine the right to one-tenth share, but if the discovery is made on private 
land and such land be proclaimed the discoverer's rights appear to 
merge in those of the owner.1 
Under the Gold Law when a discovery has taken place the holder 
of the mineral rights has the right to select a mynpacht. Mynpachts 
occupy no place in the Diamond Law. The holder of mineral rights, 
instead of selecting a mynpacht, may agree to abandon this right in 
return for a portion of the Government's share of profits under section 
5 (I) (b) of the Act of 1918 or for other agreed consideration. When 
selecting his mynpacht the holder of the mineral rights may apply for 
a grant of a lease of the under-mining rights of an additional area of 
the ground which is contiguous to the mynpacht and which will be 
worked in conjunction therewith. A mynpacht-brief is a document 
evidencing the right exclusively to prospect and mine within the myn­
pacht area. 
Public Field System.—Upon proclamation of a public field the owner 
of the land included therein has the right to reserve certain areas and 
certain rights in respect of water. In the case of diamond mining on 
the proclamation of a mine the owner of the land receives one " owner's 
share "; in the event of a proclamation of a place as an alluvial 
digging he receives so many " owner's claims " free. 
The form proclamation and de-proclamation take is similar to that 
pursued in other countries which have the public field system. On 
proclamation the Governor obtains the right under the Gold Law either 
to throw the whole area open to the pegging of claims (subject, of course, 
to certain limitations, as e.g. in the case of owner's reservations) ; or 
to lease the exclusive right to mine any portion ; or to establish a State 
Mine upon any portion. 
Pegging of Claims.—Elaborate provisions exist relative to the pegging 
of claims. Pegging is done in virtue of a prospecting or claim licence. 
As soon as use is being made of machinery for the crushing or treatment 
of ore obtained from a claim or a claim has been sufficiently developed 
to permit the extraction of ore therefrom a digger's licence is required. 
A portion of the money received in respect of licences is paid to the 
owner if private land is involved. In the case of diamond-mining a 
digger's certificate and a claim licence are required before pegging can 
be effected. A digger's certificate is substantially a certificate of char­
acter and is commonly obtained from a diggers' committee. 
State Lease.—The system of state leases, which at first was not an 
entire success according to the evidence given before the State Com­
mission in 1917, has recently been to a considerable extent recast by 
the Act of 1918 and is too elaborate to outline here. The most essential 
1 Williams v. Premier D.M. Co. and another [1901] T.P. 811, at pp. 821, 822-4. 
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part of the scheme appears to consist in the selection of areas by the 
State Mining Department as areas which can be conveniently worked 
on the large scale, and these areas are put up to tender, the tender being 
accepted which offers the best return to the State and the best develop­
ment of the mineral resources. Combines tend to restrict the amount 
of competition in tendering. 
The payments due to the Government in return for the right to 
prospect or mine are somewhat diverse and have been the subject of 
substantial modification within recent years. The fees and licence 
moneys payable in respect of prospecting permits and licences and 
diggers' licences are small in amount. Under the lease system a share 
of profits is required by the State. Mining taxation was formerly the 
subject of a number of laws which culminated in the Mining Taxation 
Act, 1910, but these have now been repealed by the Income Tax (Con­
solidation) Act, 1917. 
The old 1 per cent royalty on base metals mined is no longer in 
operation, but, of course, royalties may be and usually are reserved in 
private mineral contracts. Special war levies were charged on the gold-
mining industry. 
In the normal case the mining lessee operating by virtue of a state 
tease has to pay (a) a share of profits ; (b) a rent ; (c) the sum due by 
way of taxation in accordance with the law in force relating to taxation 
on mining profits ; and (d) ij per cent, of (a) — [(6) + (c)]. 
In the case of leases or contracts made under the provisions of 
section 52 of the Act of 1908 the liability is somewhat different. Ela­
borate provisions exist relative to surface user, water-rights, and trading 
stands. In the case of proclaimed land a permit must be obtained in 
order that the right to use the surface of such land may be perfected. 
In such cases the Minister of Mines may in his discretion prescribe that 
a rental for such use shall be paid to the Mining Commissioner and may 
fix such rental. No dues or licence moneys are payable in respect of 
the water rights, which must be obtained before any person operating 
in a public digging may use any water in any river, stream, water-course, 
or water-furrow. The extent of the rights conferred depends upon the 
terms of the water-rights granted. 
BALTHAZAR AYALA AND HIS WORK.1 
[Contributed by W. S. M. KNIGHT, ESQ.] 
AMONGST those to whom Grotius particularly refers as precursors of his 
in the exposition of the Laws of War is Balthazar Ayala, the author 
of De Jure et Offiiciis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari. This work, for long 
very rare, has now been made more accessible to the interested public 
by its inclusion in the classics of international law which the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington has been republishing during the past few 
years. As so republished it is presented in imposing and handsome 
form in two large-paper volumes. The first volume is a photographic 
reproduction of the Latin text of the first edition of 1582, to which is 
prefixed an introduction in English by the late Professor Westlake, the 
second being an English translation of the Latin text, specially made 
for the series, by the late Dr. J. Pawley Bate. The introduction describes 
Ayala and his work so well that those few pages alone are sufficient 
reading for all save those who, for some special purpose, must acquire 
a first hand and exhaustive knowledge of the text itself. And this 
latter task Dr. Pawley Bate made possible to anyone who can read 
English. His translation is always accurate, and, moreover, its style is 
singularly easy. And yet it is not the scholarship and art of the 
translator that compel admiration so much as his infinite care and 
patience in dealing with a text replete with obscurities and even other 
greater difficulties. 
Estimates of Ayala.—It is doubtful if this work would ever have 
been republished in these modern times if it had not been for the 
reference to its author by Grotius. And without that reference it is 
highly probable that the name of Ayala, still more certainly his work 
itself, would have been almost entirely unknown at the present day. 
But as it is he and his work have succeeded, by fortunate chance, in 
achieving something of immortality. He is, accordingly, " the most 
illustrious Spanish lawyer of his age," in the view of Lecky, and, if we 
accept the opinion of Hallam, who actually sets out the contents of 
his work in extenso, that work is " the opening " of international law. 
Modern specialists, however, are more restrained in their appreciation. 
1 Balthazaris Ayalae J.C., et Exercitus Regii apud Belgas Supremi Juridici De 
Jure et Officiis et Disciplina Militari Libri III, edited by John Westlake, LL.D., 
with a translation into English by John Pawley Bate, LL.D. 2 vols, 4to, XXVII, 
226; XII, 50. Carnegie Institution of Washington, D.C., U.S.A., and Oxford. 
Humphrey Milford, the University Press, 1912. 
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Westlake finds in him little or nothing that is original—" learning is 
first and the thought second," and in this thought there is nothing 
remarkable, for it " ran on the lines which had been handed down for 
many ages and demanded no rearrangement of the traditional sign­
posts by which its course was marked out." And Professor Holland, 
treating of the precursors of Grotius, finds no need specially to charac­
terise either the man or his work when noting and describing the volume 
now under notice. And the specialists are nearer the truth. Ayala has 
value as a compiler, digesting part of the great mass of scholastic learning 
on his subject, rather than as an original thinker. It might be urged, 
too, that he is entitled to some special distinction if only because he 
did not write more than this one book—a circumstance highly remarkable 
in an age of most voluminous authorship. But for this there is conclusive 
explanation and excuse. He died comparatively young, only two years 
after the De Jure was published. It is probable, too, that he lived 
essentially a practising lawyer, a man of action, rather than one of the 
study and midnight oil. But his book had a quite substantial vogue 
in its day, and its author some celebrity, for in 1597 it attained a second 
edition, and at the commencement of the seventeenth century his 
memory was already being preserved by the inclusion of his portrait 
in a collection of eulogies of illustrious Belgian authors. Yet he was 
never by any means " the most illustrious Spanish lawyer of his day," 
or anything like it. 
His Life.—Of his life there is very little known. He was born at 
Antwerp, in 1548, his father being a merchant there of somewhat dis­
tinguished Spanish family, his brothers and other relations holding 
important positions in the public service of Spain and the Netherlands. 
He himself, after study at Louvain, where he was probably a contem­
porary of Cornelius de Groot, the uncle of Grotius, graduated in law, 
and, in 1580, was appointed to the responsible position of military judge 
to the Netherlands military force of the Prince of Parma, and made a 
member of the Great Council in 1583. His book was written in 1581, 
published in the following year, and he died in 1584, nearly eighteen 
months after the birth of Grotius. 
His Book.—The De Jure is divided into three books, the first alone 
being concerned with the laws of war regarded as a subject of inter­
national law. The second book relates more to politics and strategy, 
and the third treats almost exclusively of what is now known as military 
law. In the first book the subject is discussed in nine chapters, namely, 
on declarations of war, just war and just causes of war, duel, hostages 
and reprisals, capture and postliminy, keeping faith with an enemy, 
treaties and truces, deceits in war, and the law of ambassadors. If, 
however, we have regard to what is said as to sovereigns and their 
rights, as well in the second book as the first, and, amongst other topics, 
to treaties and ambassadors, there is much in this work that would be 
matter for treatment in modern works as part of the international law of 
222 BALTHAZAR AYALA AND HIS WORK. 
peace. But, on the whole, it is clearly the production of a military 
judge and counsellor, whose attention is ever engrossed with the practical 
questions that arise, or are likely to arise, either for his determination 
as judge or for his opinion as counsel. 
Sources of his Work.—Already such a book as this had been pub­
lished, and that less than twenty years before, by one who was also 
a military judge—though in Italy—in the armies of the King of Spain. 
We refer to the de re militari et de hello of Pierino Belli, which Ayala 
would seem to have had in front of him when composing his own work, 
though, as a fact, he refers to this his " precursor " on two occasions 
only. Yet in no sense was Ayala a mere follower in the footsteps of 
Belli, or of the Italian school of writers upon the laws of war of which 
that author was then the latest important representative. More apparent, 
indeed, is his dependence upon the civil and canon law, and the fathers 
and commentators who are summed up by St. Thomas Aquinas, and 
the later theologico-juridical school, known generally as scholastic, of 
Lupus, Arias de Valderas, Vitoria, Alvarez Guerra, Soto, Gines de 
Sepulveda, Vasquez Menchaca, and Covarruvias. And this dependence 
was as real as apparent. This school was then, and had been for about 
a century, completely Spanish, and, for at least another fifty years, 
would so remain, with Suarez as its now best-known name. As Spaniard, 
as judicial officer in the armies of Spain in the Netherlands, it would be 
impossible for Ayala to be other than the product of the Spanish juris­
prudence of war—ethically as enlightened and liberal in its endeavour 
as any the world has known. But Ayala was no merely theological 
scholastic, in the conventional sense of the term, either in his matter 
or his method. Louvain, his alma mater, might alone account for this, 
though there scholasticism was the dominating philosophical influence. 
Influence of Louvain.—It was at Louvain that Gabriel Mudaeus, 
one of the glories of Belgium's academic past, had been teaching law, 
for some sixteen years, until his death in 1560, but a year or two, most 
probably, before Ayala entered upon his legal studies there. Mudaeus, 
a daring innovator as jurist, had succeeded in introducing a critical and 
systematic method, scientific, literary, and particularly historical, which 
exercised a profound influence upon the future law studies of the 
university. Educated at Orleans, when that university was at the height 
of its glory as a centre of legal teaching, Mudaeus had imbibed the 
humanism which, especially through the work of Alciat, Cujas, Baudouin 
and Hotman, was to recreate jurisprudence in Europe. For many years 
there was a struggle between Mudaeus and the authorities of Louvain 
before he was permitted to teach this new method. Success, however, 
came in the end. Scholasticism, then as to-day in the Neo-Scholasticism 
of the same university—this latter the special care of that heroic champion 
of international right, Cardinal Mercier—discovered and insisted upon 
the fact that its basis was wide enough to embrace all human knowledge 
and encourage all true intellectual effort and progress. And the success 
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was clearly justified. The new method could produce not only the 
ardent Romanists, Cujas and Favre, but also a Hotman, who risked his 
life and died in poverty for the cause of Reform, the implacable Gallican 
Dumoulin, and our merely conservative Romanist—though not, one 
concludes from his work, at all bigoted—Balthazar Ayala. 
Historical School.—" Accordingly," he writes, in his dedicatory letter to the 
Prince of Parma, "I have thought it a work worth doing, so far as my legal 
studies and historical reading enabled me, to describe how so great military 
glory was earned, as regards the men and methods employed and the kind 
of discipline resorted to. The result will show that men's qualities are the 
same now as formerly and that the chances and occurrences which befall 
us from day to day are the same as befell men formerly ; so that it will not 
be difficult for one who ponders with diligence on things of old and examines 
them with judicial deliberation to employ the past—appropriate task for a 
wise man—in judging the present, in foretelling the future, and in educing 
from old examples remedies fit (because of the similarity of the circum­
stances) for modern ills. 
And the principle involved in this design is never lost sight of through­
out the work. On the contrary, history, almost quite in its modern 
sense, has so imposing a place, comparatively to that of the sources 
and methods of the Italian school and the old scholastics, that Ayala 
may quite reasonably be hailed as one of the earliest adherents of the 
historical or positive school. Save for references to the Canon and Civil 
Law, to the Roman historians, and, of course, to Cicero, Bodin is drawn 
upon for principles and illustrations most frequently, so that, quite 
certainly, he and his method may be regarded as having exercised a 
profound influence upon Ayala. Nevertheless, the conservatism of Ayala 
is such that his historical sense is so very strongly biased that he cannot 
avoid reference to the days of classical antiquity as of those of a perfect 
or golden age. What is required, he says, is— 
" not the matching of a new truth with an old one, but the adoption of such 
new measures and principles as [are] conformable to the old ones." And so, 
"when, owing to the far-seeing counsel of men of wisdom, matters [are] adjusted 
to the standards of olden times and harmonised with the institutions of 
their forbears, and everything [is] put back into its proper place, the evil 
[begins] to abate and the well-being of days of yore [begins] to return." He 
regards "the expediency of frequently revising the laws and enactments of 
ordinary civil society and of shaping them to the model of old institutions" 
as "admitted." 
In particular, his aim is " the restoration of the worship of the true 
God," and " the re-establishment of the sovereign authority of the king 
(due to him both by divine and human law)." And he makes this 
declaration, it must be noted, as a military judge in the Netherlands 
armies of Philip II, opposed, as such, to the armies of the revolution. 
He, though humanist, is, when he talks of " the worship of the true 
God," the official advocate of the Catholic Church and that mediaeval 
principle that communion with that Church is the criterion of citizenship, 
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opposing himself utterly to the then latent principle of the revolt that 
would entirely dissociate religious obligation from the idea of citizenship. 
So, too, he boldly confronts the rising principle of nationalities with the 
old, though still dominating, principle of sovereignties. His aim is 
that—-
the subversion of all things human and divine which has been brought into 
the Low Countries may by God's aid be checked and at last ended, and that 
the whole of the Low Countries may be restored to their former happy state. 
A little over a year after this was published Grotius was born—in 
the camp of that same revolution. A generation was to pass, and it 
would be only because of a casual reference to his name by Grotius—an 
outstanding figure in that revolt—that Ayala would himself be borne 
in memory by posterity. Such is the irony of circumstance. And 
Grotius was to be acclaimed by succeeding generations as a founder of 
a most important part of a new political philosophy, consonant with 
the new ideas of which that revolution and its fruit were for long to be 
the most perfect expression, while those which Ayala so conscientiously 
expounded were destined, within half a century, to expire, doomed to 
oblivion, in a political blind alley, as it were, with the disappearance 
of Spain as a dominating world power. 
The reasons which Grotius himself afterwards gave for writing on 
the law of war are used by Ayala—that recourse is had to arms by 
Christian nations " for slight reason or no reason," and, when once 
arms are taken up, " all reverence for divine and human law is thrown 
away." So, deeply deprecating this, his object was to bring the practice 
of war, in these respects, within the rule of. right. The only occasion 
on which Grotius seriously criticises one of the earlier writers on his 
subject is, therefore, singular, to say the least, inasmuch as he states 
that Ayala " did not touch the grounds of justice and injustice 
in war." 1 It is difficult to understand how Grotius could have written 
this. 
Just Wars.—In reading Ayala one is immediately and most forcibly 
struck by his profound concern for this very point. It is touched upon 
in his dedicatory epistle, is the main burden of his preface, and is, 
moreover, the leading subject in one of his longest and most important 
chapters. In this relation he warns his prince, on the first page, lest 
" lust and pride usurp the place of self-restraint and fair dealing." 
He combats most strenuously the idea that " war cannot be waged 
without violation of right, and that in war there is no scope at all for 
justice, and that that is right in war which is expedient to the stronger." 
He insists, with every emphasis, that "there are laws of war just as 
much as of peace," and that it is only the prosecution of " just " wars 
that is right. And in the chapter " of just war and just causes of war," 
he begins by clearly striking his note—" Alike in beginning a war and 
in carrying it on and ending it, law has a most important position and 
1 De Jure Belli ac Pads, Prolegom. § 38. 
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so has good faith." Even the subject matter of his second and third 
books is introduced simply because he regards it as necessarily involved 
in the question of the " just " conduct of war. He indicates this in his 
dedicatory epistle, and it at once explains, and to some extent justifies, 
the inclusion of a great part of that subject matter, even if the work 
were designedly one of international law as we understand it to-day. 
And he supports his thesis as to justice in relation to war with a wealth 
of illustration and evidence and closest reasoning. All, too, is expressed 
in plainest language, and—sure sign of his practical character and 
object—in such manner that his conclusions are certain and cannot 
escape even the hasty reader. 
It would, indeed, have been very remarkable if Ayala had not devoted 
special attention to this subject. He and his work were in the direct 
line of the scholastic succession, and he himself was writing as an officer 
of the Spanish monarch's army. And in no literature whatever, not 
even in that of modern international law, has the subject of just war 
and just causes of war been more keenly and exhaustively discussed 
than in the juridico-theological treatises of the scholastic and mediaeval 
writers. Nor, too, has any great Power since been more careful than 
was Spain in the greatest days of her empire to wage war only when 
just and only justly. The office of Ayala, as adviser to his prince on 
this point, was no sinecure, and his book was no merely academic 
production of abstract interest alone. Never since, in relation to this 
point, have the opinions of thinkers, theologians, or jurists had the 
practical weight with their governments that they had, in the age of 
Ayala and his immediate predecessors, with the rulers of Spain. It 
may be quite accurately stated that no war was undertaken by Spain 
even against the heathen of the newly discovered world or against 
European rebels, without an opinion as to its justice and advice as to 
its just conduct being first taken, and then, as far as possible, rigidly 
followed. This book of Ayala was, and was intended to be, a formal 
justification of the operations of Philip's armies against the revolting 
Netherlanders, as, some time before, Vitoria, Soto and Sepulveda had 
advised as to the justice of the Spanish operations against the Indians, 
and, at a yet earlier period, distinguished theologians had been called 
upon by the Spanish Government to decide whether war could justly 
be made against certain rebel peoples of the Philippines, and, if so, 
how it should be justly prosecuted and ended. To-day such questions 
are decided by the politicians alone, notwithstanding Grotius and his 
successors. The jurists and their works may, perhaps, be consulted. 
It may be doubted, however, whether, when in conflict with political 
expediency, they have anything approaching the influence and sanction 
of the old opinions and writings. These latter, based upon Aristotle—• 
who was almost a god—history, the Scriptures, Christian tradition and 
reason, presented an ultimate composition in which the religious 
and ecclesiastical element dominated entirely—for Aristotle was 
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almost Christian too—and enforced the respect even of emperors 
themselves. 
Nor, reading Ayala on this same point, is it easy to discover where­
in there has since been any advance in the theory or principles of 
international morality. Mediaeval political philosophy, especially the 
scholastic, from Legnano to Suarez, has said the last word so far. We 
read and reread Grotius, and study carefully his successors, until we 
reach our own contemporaries, and there is nothing to remark in the 
way of such advance. Only quite recently the world was confronted 
with the problem of neutrality. With the utmost delicacy and infinite 
apology some independent minds, greatly daring, ventured to suggest, 
in the interests of possible permanent peace, that neutrality should cease 
to be regarded as necessarily a just or lawful status. And this was after 
more than three centuries of world departure from the international 
morality of the Middle Ages. Ayala, obscure and ignored representative 
of the old scholasticism, had actually gone almost, if not quite, as 
far. There is, perhaps, some reason for a reconsideration of the abandon­
ment of some things of the older world which might, after all, be worthy 
of modern recognition and development. 
The Sense of Justice.—And we might make a beginning by re-reading 
Ayala. His key-note, as Professor Westlake observes, is the necessity 
of maintaining justice. And, it may be asked,—Has anything been said 
or done since his age which has either made clearer and more certain 
the idea of justice itself or which can indicate that that idea has any 
increased influence in determining political action, whether that of 
individuals within a state or of states as between themselves ? There 
can be but one answer. The idea of justice is, and has been during 
the last three centuries, less certain and clear in the minds of men than 
at the time that Ayala wrote. Nor, during those centuries, has that 
idea had—nor has it now—any such increased influence. The civil 
unrest, the unconscionable class strife, the bloody revolutions of to-day 
emphatically confirm this view as regards individuals and national 
affairs. In the international sphere one need but refer to the great 
war which is not even yet officially ended, the many wars which have 
already sprung therefrom, the diplomacy and past great wars of the 
centuries, and the lawless and savage—at times, horrible—licence in 
almost all these wars. As a fact, a philosophical characteristic of these 
centuries has been the never-flagging attempt to eliminate entirely the 
idea of justice from political science, to regard it as a will-o'-the-wisp, 
an illusion, useful only, if at all, as a rhetorical weapon in the hands 
of the political opportunist. Modern civilisation, it would seem, has lost 
the certain principles, and the ideals, and has thrown off the traditions, 
which did, if nothing more, " maintain," as of necessity, the idea of 
justice. And now, almost before our eyes, the sense itself of justice 
seems to be disappearing also. And what is left ? There is scarcely 
one moral philosopher, still less a politician, who will pledge himself 
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definitely to a certain ethical theory. Nations and classes and indi­
viduals now do what pays them best, in their own sight, and scarcely 
apologise for so doing. 
To-day the international jurist must be a " scientist," and proceed 
according to the methods of the historical school. Ayala, as has been 
already pointed out, was not only " scientist," a pioneer in the historical 
method, but also theologian and scholastic, and thus, because of such 
equipment, jurist in the best sense of that term in his day. If the 
study of international law had continued in the traditions of the school 
of the jurists of the class of Ayala, international law, instead of becoming 
something not unlike an inconclusive historical hotchpot, would have 
developed into a comprehensive and practical system, based upon a 
well-defined idea of justice, and exercising upon men and nations a 
definite and elevating influence, almost irresistible, if only because of a 
dominating tradition and its intimate association with the highest human 
ideals. 
TRIBAL LAWS OF THE MENDI. 
Contributed by LIEUT.-COLONEL C. BRAITHWAITE WALLIS, LL.B., 
F.R.G.S.] 
THERE is no king or other ruler who can claim to be the head of the 
Mendi; nor is there any paramount chief considered as primus inter 
pares among the chiefs. The nation is divided up into what are called 
chiefdoms, and each chiefdom forms a unit of the whole. A chiefdom 
consists of one or more clans occupying a number of towns and villages, 
and contained within a given area. Every town or village has a chief, 
sub or minor chief, called mahawuru, who is assisted in the work of 
administration by the elders, counsellors, and speakers, who also have 
to administer the law. Over the chiefdom presides the paramount 
chief, or mahawa, who is appointed to this position either by the right 
of succession, by election, or, in exceptional cases, by the nomination 
of the British Government. Females are not debarred by Mendi law 
from holding the responsible position of mahawa. 
The paramount chief is supreme in his own country, but, although 
his power is considerable, it is not autocratic. Like the sub-chiefs, he 
is advised by his counsellors and elders, who consist of the free relations 
of the paramount chief, the principal families, and more wealthy of 
the free people in the chiefdom. These form the tribal authority, who 
can vote for and appoint the paramount chief, or sub-chiefs. The tribal 
authority also includes selected members of the lower or working class, 
who need not necessarily be freeborn. By the ancient law 1 no alien, 
or person born outside a chiefdom, can be elected to the office of para­
mount chief. One of the principal officials of the tribal authority who 
always accompanies the chief on his travels and attends meetings or 
palavers, is the lavari, or speaker. This man is selected for his standing 
in the community, for his power of oratory, and for his knowledge of 
law and of the political affairs of the country. The official meetings of 
the tribal authority are usually held in large clearings, just outside the 
most important town, where the paramount chief resides. The meeting 
or palaver place is called the korbangi, which is sometimes formed by 
two, three, or more towns being built round a cleared space. The 
speaker, or lavari, must always be in attendance on the chief at all these 
meetings ; he is the mouthpiece, legal adviser, and sometimes the brain 
of the chief. He has to do most of the talking for the chief, who at 
these palavers usually sits in silence, addressing a few words occasion­
ally to his elders. 
1 This law has frequently been infringed in recent years. 
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If the subjects of the paramount chief are dissatisfied with his rule, 
or have any serious charge to make against him, it is customary for 
them first to bring the matter privately to the notice of one or more 
of the neighbouring paramount chiefs with a view to their unofficial 
intervention. Failing a satisfactory settlement, they can complain to 
the tribal authority of the chiefdom. If the paramount chief refuses to 
reply to any charge or charges made against him, or refuses to allow 
such charge or charges to be investigated by the proper authority, 
or directly or indirectly places obstacles in the way of such investigation, 
the tribal authority can refer the matter to one or more of the para­
mount chiefs of other chiefdoms. If, after investigation of the case, 
by not less than three or more paramount chiefs, the question at issue 
is decided against the chief, he can, subject to the approval of the tribal 
authority in council assembled, be deposed or fined, or both. If the 
action of a person of the status of the head of a family in a chiefdom 
is complained against, and the matter is brought before the paramount 
chief, such person can be summoned before the latter, who can fine him. 
If he fails to answer the chief's summons, he can be sent for and brought 
before him, tied. Any fine so imposed by a paramount chief on such 
person can be recovered by distraint on his property, or, failing satisfac­
tion, upon the property of his family. Where a case comes before a 
Court, and the complainant and defendant fail to produce witnesses, 
the complainant must swear as to the truth of his statement. 
In debt cases, when there are no witnesses, if a complainant swears 
in open Court on the properly constituted " medicine " that the debt is 
due from the defendant, the defendant, after a thorough investigation 
of the case by the Court, will be ordered to pay the debt. Where the 
defendant swears in turn that nothing is owing, the complainant, in 
the absence of witnesses, will have to renounce his claim. 
Paramount and sub-chiefs are subject to the native laws of their 
country. A paramount chief has no right to imprison, chain, or detain 
any member of the tribal authority without trial by the Court. The 
president of such a Court must be of chief rank. 
If any person insults, strikes, wounds, slanders, or acts in a dis­
respectful manner towards a paramount chief, or sub-chief, and is found 
guilty of any or all these offences by the Court, he can be heavily fined, 
flogged, and suffer imprisonment. Formerly he might have been killed 
or sold into slavery. When the election of a paramount or sub-chief 
takes place, no chief from a neighbouring chiefdom has the right to 
witness such election.1 Where the head of a family, or a member of the 
tribal authority, interferes with the affairs of the head of another family 
in a different chiefdom, or a member of the tribal authority in the 
same chiefdom, which might or does cause a disturbance of the peace, 
such person can be brought before the chief, or Court, and fined. There 
is no limit to the amount of suclj fine. 
1 A very ancient Mendi law which has practically now ceased to exist. 
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Prior to the British administration there was no limit to the power 
of the Mendi Courts. They could try any offence and inflict any punish­
ment ; and, as their judgments were sometimes contrary to our ideas 
of morality and justice, the Government had no option but to limit 
their jurisdiction. They are, however, still a most important agent in 
the administration of native law and custom in the country, and have 
full power to try most native cases. 
The following are the principal provisions of the Ordinance which 
dealt with this matter : 
Court of Native Chiefs.—The Courts of the native chiefs shall con­
sist of the native chiefs as now existing according to native law and 
custom ; and such Courts shall have jurisdiction according to native 
law to hear and determine : 
(1) All civil cases arising exclusively between natives, other than 
a case involving a question of title to land between two or more para­
mount chiefs, or of a debt claimed by the holder of a store licence. 
(2) All criminal cases arising exclusively between natives other than 
(a) Cases of murder, culpable homicide, rape, pretended witchcraft, 
slave raiding, dealing in slaves, cannibalism, robbery with violence, or 
inflicting grievous bodily harm, or (b) Matters or offences related to 
secret societies, such as human leopard, or alligator societies,1 or, (c) 
Cases arising out of faction or tribal fights, or (d) Matters made offences 
under the provisions of the principal Ordinance, or any Ordinance 
amending the same. Provided always that such chief shall in no case 
be permitted to inflict any punishment involving death, mutilation, or 
grievous bodily harm, and that the infliction of any such punishment 
by any such chief shall, in addition to any legal consequences, render 
him liable to deprivation of the criminal jurisdiction hereby conferred 
on such chief. Any judgment given by a native chief, who shall hear 
and determine any cause or matter, whether civil or criminal, other than 
matters or causes in which jurisdiction is expressly given under the 
provisions of this Ordinance to the Courts of the native chiefs, shall be 
void and of no effect. The native chiefs shall be personally entitled to 
the fees of civil and criminal Courts, and the fines lawfully imposed by 
them. 
In every town in a chiefdom there are one or more court-houses called 
barri, which consist of a thatched roof supported by wooden posts, with 
thick mud walls, from one to three feet high. A Court can be held in 
any place within the limits of a chiefdom, and the paramount chief has 
the right to request any number of his sub-chiefs, or other persons, to 
sit in Court. There is no law to prevent any man from sitting in a 
judicial position in such Courts, but a person born in slavery is dis­
qualified if he is still unfree. A slave now free would be eligible to 
sit. Native law allows for an appeal against the judgment of any 
Court, although some of the enactments make it difficult if not impos-
1 This ought to be " crocodile societies," as there are no alligators in West Africa. 
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sible for a poor man, or a man without influence, to appeal against the 
decision of a chief or Court. Sub-chiefs, under the jurisdiction of the 
paramount chief of a country, can, subject to the latter's approval, 
hear and determine all matters within their jurisdiction. Paramount 
and sub-chiefs can designate one or more persons, being members of the 
tribal authority, to represent them on these Courts. Appeals can be 
made to the paramount chief against the decision of a sub-chief. If 
the former is unable to decide the matter himself he must refer it to 
the council of elders, or tribal authority. The paramount chief can 
quash the proceedings of a Court of the sub-chief, retry the case him­
self, or order any sub-chief in his country to do so. Such appeals are 
costly, owing to the fact that in every Court new fees have to be paid. 
Where a subject desires to appeal against the decision of a paramount 
chief, or against the decision of a native Court, he has the right to take 
his case to another paramount chief in a neighbouring country. The 
latter would then see the former judge, and have a conference with 
him, and might urge upon him the advisability of modifying or altering 
his judgment. Or, he could refer the matter to the tribal authority of 
his own chiefdom, and have the case retried. When a case has been 
thus retried and the judgment reversed, it is referred back to the tribal 
authority of the complainant, and the former must go into the case 
again. Should they disagree with the judgment of the other court, 
there might, in the old days, have been an appeal to arms if the case 
was important enough. Now, the matter would be referred to the 
British Commissioner. 
In the event of a dispute between two paramount chiefs, the matter 
could be heard and determined by a council of paramount chiefs and 
elders in the country. All proceedings of the Courts are held in public ; 
but during a case the judges have the right to retire for private con­
sultation. In these cases, some of the questions asked by the judges 
of the Court are often most pertinent, and show that they possess a sound 
knowledge of the laws of their country. The chiefs are capable of giving 
excellent judgments when they are not interfered with or corrupted by 
outside influence. The memory of the judges is sometimes remarkable, 
for they can recollect, and quote in minute detail, facts and evidence as 
to events which perhaps took place several years before. The absence 
of literature is responsible for this, for every man is his own historian. 
Important events and facts connected with legal cases are committed 
to memory and handed down from father to son through several genera­
tions. The native Courts have a great deal of power in the country, 
and are capable of unravelling matters and arriving at the real facts of 
a case where a foreigner might fail. The judges are quick at arriving 
at a conclusion as to the reliability of witnesses. 
Then, again, the nature of the oaths which have to be taken by either 
side are such that it is safe to say that no native would be willing to 
swear a false oath upon native " medicine." Oaths are taken upon one 
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or more of the medicines kept for the purpose by the tortor-behor, or 
" country-fashion man," who has to produce them in Court, where the 
ceremony of swearing is administered in presence of all. It is to the 
interest of the tortor-behor that the reputation of his medicine should 
never be allowed to suffer by the indifference of public opinion as to 
its potency, etc. The complainant and defendant will both swear on 
one or more of the medicines in Court. Sometimes the form of oath is 
such that, while in the act of swearing, a part of the medicine or concoc­
tion has to be chewed and swallowed. At other times it is simply the 
holding of a twig or fern or palm in the right hand, taking the oath, 
and then striking an ancient stone of historic celebrity in the tribe. 
Such, for instance, is the ancient stone called Kaikumbar. When a 
witness takes the oath upon this stone he will hold a piece of palm-
branch, or bunch of leaves, in his right hand, and strike the stone several 
times while the oath is being taken. The oath will be something as 
follows : 
" KAIKUMBAR, if I swear falsely upon Thee, 
If I lie now in this Court, 
If I give false evidence, 
If I do not tell the exact truth ; 
Then KAIKUMBAR, Thou deal with me ; 
May my wife never bear any children, 
And if she does, let them die. 
When I eat my food, let there be poison in it, 
And let it make my stomach swell and kill me. 
KAIKUMBAR, When I walk along the road, 
Let a snake bite me, and let me die. 
When I cross a river, let my canoe upset, 
And let a crocodile devour me. 
KAIKUMBAR. I swear upon thee, 
I swear upon thee. 
Before God." 
When trying a certain case some years ago, where the evidence of the 
witness appeared to be unsatisfactory, and where there appeared to be 
a good deal of perjury taking place, I suggested that the Kaikumbar 
stone be brought into Court for the purpose of administering oaths to 
witnesses according to the custom of the country. The oaths were duly 
taken with considerable ceremony, but it was afterwards discovered 
that none of them were considered binding upon the witnesses, as they 
had purposely held the wrong leaves in their hands when striking the 
stone. This was not brought to my notice until afterwards. 
Another oath is taken upon red pepper and kola-nuts, which are 
mashed up and mixed with a little water or vinegar. A witness taking 
the oath will hold a spoon in the right hand, dip it into the liquid mix­
ture, stir it round and round, then swallow the ingredients. The tortor-
behor will watch the litigants and witnesses with great care during the 
course of a case, and, by the time it is drawing to a close, may have 
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formed a fairly accurate idea as to who is telling the truth, and who 
is not. If a witness has been bold enough deliberately to lie upon the 
medicine of the tortor-behor he must be punished for it, and it is 
necessary for the tortor-behor to punish him. He may do this by plac­
ing, or causing to be placed, a little medicine in his food, which will 
make him unwell or perhaps dangerously ill. Or he might so arrange 
matters that some disaster or trouble comes to a member of his family. 
This would at once be put down to the fact that he has sworn falsely 
upon the medicine in Court. The oaths taken in legal matters by 
the Mendi, and other African tribes, are of extreme importance in the 
administration of justice, for they compel both litigants and witnesses 
to speak the truth. It is the fear of the danger involved that prevents 
people from swearing falsely upon these medicines. 
When an important case is being tried in Court and the witnesses 
are being sworn, it is a custom for either side to produce their own medi­
cines ; that is, the complainant A will have his own medicine, upon 
which to swear defendant B, and defendant B will have his medicine, 
upon which to swear the complainant A, and the witnesses will have 
to take the oath on the same medicines. Sometimes a chief will 
compel the medicine-men in Court to swear upon some other medicine 
to the effect that they will administer the oaths in Court in the correct 
manner according to law; will allow the medicine to remain in 
full force upon anyone who dares to break the oath ; and will not allow 
any other person to tamper with the medicine with a view to de­
stroying or modifying its effects. Otherwise the medicine-man might, 
for a consideration, remove the effect of the medicine. That is to 
say, when a person is sworn on a certain medicine, and has not spoken 
the truth, it might be possible for him to bribe the tortor-behor, who 
would cause the medicine to have no effect by some certain mysterious 
and magic process. It would be immaterial what time elapses between 
the taking of the false oath and the administration of the poison by the 
tortor-behor, and, no matter how long afterwards it happened, it would 
be sure to be put down to the power of that particular medicine. It 
can be readily understood, then, what great power is wielded by the 
chief and the priests, who are able to play upon the superstitious minds 
of the people, through the agency of the particular medicines, upon 
which these oaths are taken. 
The laws of the native Courts are different from those of any legal 
tribunal in Europe, and their procedure may be contrary to our ideas 
of a fair trial. Nevertheless, these Courts have many times proved 
themselves capable of just and impartial decisions, and of unravelling 
the truth ; while many of their laws are excellent, and eminently adapted 
to the requirements of the country. For they have been gradually 
evolved after countless generations by a people who possess a civilisation 
and philosophy of their own. The following were some of the punish­
ments inflicted for the infringement of Mendi law, which were rigorously 
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enforced in the country, prior to the passing of the Protectorate Ordin­
ance : 
Murder.—The heaviest fine possible, which might extend to the 
whole family of the accused. If the fine was not paid it would probably 
mean death, or certain slavery. If a fine was inflicted it would be 
sufficiently heavy to ruin the accused, even if he were a wealthy man. 
Thz f t .—Flogging, or placing in the stocks, or both ; the restitution 
of all property, or its equivalent value. A heavy fine. Enslavement, 
or, if a bad case, loss of left hand. A subsequent case might mean the 
loss of the right hand. 
Witchcraft.—The guilty could be burned to death, and the whole of 
his property, and that of his family, confiscated. His family might also 
be sold into slavery. 
Rape.—Heavy fine, and placing in the stocks ; flogging or enslave­
ment, or all three punishments ; compensation to the family or husband 
of the person raped. 
Arson.—Restitution of all property destroyed. Fine, flogging, and 
placing in the stocks ; and, if a serious case, enslavement of the 
offender, but not his family. 
Assault.—Placing in the stocks for a certain number of days, flogging, 
or fine; or all three. In a bad case the offender might be sold into slavery. 
When a case has to be brought into Court the complainant goes to 
the chief, or to his representative, and pays the fee. The fee may be 
in cash or kind, its amount being assessed according to the wealth and 
status of the complainant, and to the importance of the case to be tried. 
When the fee has been paid the chief sends for the defendant. If he 
ignores this summons he can be brought by force, and may be tied, 
and is at once charged with contempt of Court and fined. This is known 
as giving him kassi; and a person guilty of any breach of local custom 
in Court or elsewhere, would be kassied. Upon the appearance of the 
defendant in Court, the chief, or his representative, informs him of the 
nature of the charge, and, if he pleads guilty, judgment can be given 
at once, and the expenses of the Court, together with the fees paid to 
the chief by the complainant, must be defrayed by him. If, on the 
other hand, the defendant pleads not guilty, a kind of betting transac­
tion takes place, and is settled before the case proceeds. In this betting 
transaction the complainant makes a statement to the effect that if he 
is wrong he will forfeit the whole of the money or goods he is about to 
place in Court. He then stakes by deposits, which, if they are in kind, 
often consist of native-made cloths. The defendant has to deposit an 
equal amount. At the termination of the case the person who wins 
the action receives the whole of these fees, and not the Court. The de­
fendant has also to pay court fees to the chief of value equivalent to 
those paid by the complainant. 
The case then opens by the speaker, lavari, addressing the two parties 
and the Court. The complainant then makes his statement, but with­
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out being sworn, and the Court asks for the names of his witnesses. 
The defendant also makes his statement, and gives the names of his 
witnesses. The witnesses play a most important part throughout the 
proceedings, and they are carefully sworn upon the medicines of 
either side. The oaths are taken with great solemnity, and with con­
siderable ceremony. The complainant and defendant, and also all the 
witnesses, usually have to undergo a severe cross-examination by the 
presiding chiefs or members of the Court. The case is really decided 
upon the corroborative evidence of the majority of the witnesses, who 
are called into the presence of the chiefs, one by one. If the evidence 
of the witnesses is equally in favour of both parties the case would be 
either dismissed or decided upon its merits. 
Judgment is given in open Court, and the expenses of the witnesses 
are assessed by the Court, each side having to defray the expenses of 
their own witnesses. These native Courts have done good work in the 
country. Many of the chiefs not only take a great interest in the pro­
ceedings of our own Courts, but have been granted commissions which 
entitle them to sit in Court as assessors and advisers upon native law. 
The chiefs have benefited by the example of the patience and skill shown 
by the British judges in doing their utmost to administer justice to all; 
and several of them make their best endeavours to try their cases with 
strict impartiality. They also sometimes request the assistance and 
advice of the Commissioner in their own legal cases. 
Some years ago, while travelling in the Mendi Hinterland near the 
Liberian frontier, an urgent message was sent to me by an important 
paramount chief to come and assist him to settle a complicated political 
case that had been giving considerable trouble in the country. I com­
plied with his request, and joined him at a large town some two days' 
journey away, where it was arranged his Court should be held. I did 
not enter this Court in the capacity of judge, but was there simply to 
give advice to the native judges, if it was asked for during, or upon the 
termination of, the proceedings. 
The case was a dispute between two powerful and important chiefs 
respecting certain property. Intricate native law was involved, and 
the dispute had been going on for years. The feeling was so intense 
between the parties that trouble was feared by the judges, which caused 
them to send to me to advise and help them. In the old days this case 
would probably have meant an appeal to arms and perhaps a disastrous 
internecine war. The case was an interesting one, and was conducted 
with the utmost decorum, quietness, good form, and order from start 
to finish. I sat amongst the judges, who consisted of seven paramount 
chiefs, and the only suggestion I was called upon to make throughout 
the proceedings was for the removal of one of the judges, who was dis­
qualified on account of his being a near relative of one of the litigants, 
and consequently having a stake in the dispute. The case lasted for 
three days, the Court sitting from early morning until sunset, and was 
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witnessed by a large crowd of interested spectators. There is no 
doubt that the finding in this Court was in every way just, although 
the chiefs had no notes with which to refresh their memories. A difficult 
and complicated case was thus settled by these paramount chiefs in a 
manner that would have done credit to any European court of justice. 
There are three kinds of property among the Mendi: 
(1) Public Property.—This belongs nominally to the chief as head 
of the tribal authority, he being the public trustee for it. It is adminis­
tered through the council of elders. 
(2) Family Property.—This is shared and owned by the members of a 
family, the trustee being the recognised and elected head of the family. 
Should he betray his trust, or prove to be a bad administrator, or misap­
propriate the money or property belonging thereto, or use it in a manner 
detrimental to the trust, the sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters of 
the deceased head of the family have the right to remove such property 
from the trustee. Or they may hand it over to another member of the 
family ; or, failing that, such property can be divided up between each 
member of the family concerned. The trusteeship can also be taken 
away from the head of the family by order of the Court or chief. When 
two parents, being the head of a family, die, and where they have also 
been trustees for any family property, the family in council have the 
right to elect one or more persons of the same family to look after or 
hold in trust such estate. If the family is an important one, and the 
property valuable, it is usual for the family to consult the sub-chief, or 
even the paramount chief, before finally electing the new trustee. The 
head of a family acting as trustee before a trustee is appointed is held 
responsible for any loss or damage to his trust. Property is kept in 
trust until the sons and daughters are legally entitled to inherit it. 
Where the head of a family is a brother, who is also trustee, and he dies, 
or becomes incapable of administering the trust, the brothers and sisters 
of the deceased have the first claim on the property. They are also 
responsible for the maintenance, instruction, and custody of his chil­
dren. Upon the death of all the brothers and sisters of a brother who 
was a trustee, the eldest son or daughter of the family can claim the 
property. If a father marries the daughter of his uncle, the eldest son 
of this marriage has the first claim to the property of his deceased father. 
(3) Private Property.—This is the private possessions of the indi­
vidual. It must have been acquired by his own efforts, by gift, or by 
inheritance. It can be seized for debt, but only after the judgment of 
the Court. Private property can also be confiscated for crime, including 
witchcraft, which among the Mendi is the most heinous offence of which 
a person can be guilty. Persons convicted of witchcraft not only lose 
their own property, but probably their lives as well. The property of 
their family would also be liable to forfeit, even if it were not proved 
to the satisfaction of the Court that they connived at, sheltered, or in 
any way assisted a member of their family, who was found guilty of it. 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. 
[Contributed by G. GLOVER ALEXANDER, ESQ., LL.M.] 
CRIMINAL law has hitherto formed but a small part of International Law. 
Such part of it as is recognised at all by International Law falls under 
the department of Public International Law, and is confined to the subjects 
of piracy, offences against ambassadors, and similar matters. According 
to the system of International Law founded by Grotius, it could not be 
otherwise. Under that system the equality of all States, great or small, 
forming the Family of Nations, was recognised as the cardinal principle 
of the whole system, and it gives perhaps exaggerated importance to the 
subject of nationality and the independence of States. Moreover, under 
that system, there is no common international tribunal to try offenders, 
whether such offenders are States or individuals. The consequence of 
this view is that, with the exception of a few so-called " extra-territorial 
crimes," e.g. piracy, criminal law has hitherto been regarded by us as 
strictly national and territorial, and most nations or States have exercised 
criminal jurisdiction only within their own territories, and have jealously 
guarded that jurisdiction. Of course, each State punishes infractions of 
its own laws by persons within its territories, whether the offenders are 
its own subjects or aliens, provided it can apprehend them before they 
escape into the territory of another State. English Law, it is true, 
punishes certain offences against International Law, e.g. infringements 
of the privileges of ambassadors, breaches of the Foreign Enlistment 
Acts, etc. But it does so only to prevent ourselves being embroiled with 
other nations, and the punishment is administered according to and 
under our own domestic law. On the other hand, the law of each State 
has hitherto taken no cognisance of offences committed abroad, i.e. out­
side its territory and within the territory of another State by subjects 
of that State, being in fact prohibited by Public International Law from 
so doing. The result is that if a subject of one State commits a crime 
within the territory of that State, and then escapes into the territory of 
another State, he cannot be apprehended and punished there, because he 
is not a subject of that State, and did not commit the offence within its 
territory or jurisdiction. In modern times, however, influenced by the 
so-called " comity of nations," and subject to stringent conditions, most 
civilised States have entered into extradition treaties with each other, 
designed to secure the return of fugitives, and so avoid the possibility of 
the non-administration of justice. But apart from such treaties the 
international position might not unfairly be described, so far as regards 
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criminal law, as the negation of law and justice. In passing, it may 
be observed that much more attention has been given to this subject 
on the Continent than in England, probably owing to the influence 
of geographical position, and if it be true that it is difficult for foreigners 
to grasp and understand our legal conceptions and institutions, it is also 
true that it is equally difficult for us to grasp and understand the legal con­
ceptions and institutions of other countries, and to appreciate them fully, 
without special training and greater familiarity with the modes of thought 
and expression of foreign jurists than most English lawyers possess. 
International Criminal Law.—It is now proposed to change the 
position of criminal or penal law, so as to bring it within the pale of Inter­
national Law. M. Maurice Travers, the distinguished French jurist and 
author of several standard books on law, has written a work,1 which is to 
be completed in three volumes (two of which have already appeared), 
with this end in view. The first volume deals with Principes— 
Regies generates de competence des lois repressives. It is a plea for the 
greater recognition of criminal law in International Law, and its more 
extended application by the common consent of: States, or rather by a 
group or groups of States. 
After an Introduction (Avant Propos) in which he deals with the 
Definition du droit penal international et but du present ouvrage, he divides 
the subject into three parts, viz. : 
Part I.—Conception generate du droit penal international. 
Part II.—Droit Positif: determination de la loi au des lois applicables 
a la repression d'un fait determine. 
Part III.—La mise en oeuvre donnee, en droit positif aux regies des 
conflits des lois et au principe de 1'assistance internationale. 
The object of the present work, he says, while including within its 
scope International Criminal Law, is to determine in the first place the 
point of evolution attained by the principal legislations, and especially 
by French Law, then to contribute, in as large a measure as possible, to 
the rejection of principles which have become obsolete (surannes) and 
hurtful (nuisibles). 
Present Conceptions of Subject.—But his object is not only destructive. 
It is constructive, and that in a high degree. He points out that in the 
past and at the present, the conceptions of International Criminal Law 
have fallen under one of the four following heads : 
1. Territoriality (loi penale limitee au territoire) ; 
2. Personality active (loi repressive suivant le national partout ou il se 
transporte) ; 
3. Personaltie passive (loi punissant les faits lesant les nationaux dans 
leurs personnes ou leurs biens quelque soit le lien de perpetration) ; et 
4. Universality ; 
1 Le Droit Pinal International, et sa mise en ceuvre en temps de paix et en temps 
de guerre, par Maurice Travers, A vocal d la cour de Paris, Docteur en Droit, Laureat 
de I'Institut. 
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and he proposes the following tripartite grouping of the principal 
legislations : 
1. Those devoted essentially to the system of universality, e.g. 
Austria, Italy, Russia and Norway. 
2. Those devoted to the system of territoriality, e.g. England and the 
United States of America ; and 
3. Those having a mixed character, e.g. France, Germany and Switzer­
land. But he admits that such classification is arbitrary. 
The English View.—England in paiticular, he observes, is wedded to 
the territorial system [Le droit Anglais prend aussi pour base I'idee de 
territorialitee) ,x and he cites Archbold on Criminal Pleading (ed. 1905, 
p. 21) in support of this statement: 
Le principe general du droit criminel anglais est strictement territorial et 
local. Meme lorsqu'il s'agit de ses propres sujets, le Common Law anglais ne 
connait pas des crimes commis d I'Stranger ; il y a cependant de tres importantes 
exceptions introduites par la loi. 
Example 0! Difficulties to which Present System gives rise.—As an 
example of the confusion and difficulty caused by these conflicting 
systems, he takes the following hypothetical case : 
Prenons I'exemple de I'individu qui, place pres d'une frontiere, tire un coup 
de fusil et blesse ou tue un person dans le pays limitrophe. 
II nous parait difficile de nier que les deux Etats voisins sont egalement 
interesses a la repression, que I'ordre social est, dans les deux, egalement voile. 
Les pays ou se sont produites les consequences de I'acte ou la victime a ete 
soit blessee, soit tuee, ne peut admettre que, sur son sol, la vie humaine soit ainsi 
mise en danger. 
D'aulre part, I'impunite de I'auteur de I'acte produirait dans I'Etat d'ou a 
ete tire le coup de fusil, I'exemple le plus deplorable. 
Proposed Reform.—But how are these principles or systems, which 
are apparently so well and firmly established, to be changed and 
harmonised ? 
It may be said at once that M. Travers does not propose anything so 
heroic and unattainable as the immediate establishment of an Inter­
national Court of Criminal Justice. He leaves to each State the right 
to administer its own droit interne. But he does urge the establishment 
in each State of one or more bureaux de renseignements, and certain 
bureaux centraux internationaux, as a principe de solidarite ou d'assistance 
internationale, and as an improvement (amelioration) on the present 
system. 
It is part of the scheme of the League of Nations that there shall be 
a Court of International Justice ; indeed a workable scheme of such a 
Court was evolved and determined on at the first session of the League. 
1 Phillimore, International Law, ed. par Philipson, 1889, p. 299. 
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Such a Court will, however, for some time, if not always, be concerned 
with questions of la haute politique, between State and State, and will not 
deal with the affairs of individuals, unless they become matters of State, 
much less with criminal matters. And such Court has still to justify 
its existence, and the hopes of its well-wishers. It is not by such means, 
for which the world and the times are not ripe, as regards criminal law, 
that the desired end is to be attained. But he does think that the time 
is opportune for a great advance in our ideas of criminal law, and its 
better administration as between the different systems above mentioned. 
The chief idea underlying his thesis indeed is that criminal law is not a mere 
question of States and nations. It has a wider meaning and aspect. It 
concerns groups of nations, and within these groups it is possible to work out 
a better system of administration, which would avoid many, if not all, of the 
difficulties mentioned above, and render it less easy for a criminal to escape 
justice. Let us see how he develops this idea. In order to do so, it is 
necessary to return to his conception of International Criminal Law. 
Dominant Idea of International Criminal Law.—To begin with, he 
observes that the dominant idea of International Criminal Law is, that 
while every facility ought to be given for the manifestation of truth {pour 
la manifestation de la verite), and especially for the discussion and refu­
tation of charges (tout specialement pour la discussion et la refutation des 
charges), every effort ought equally to be made to reduce to a minimum 
those cases in which the existence of a conflict of laws causes a miscarriage 
of justice (de vient une cause d'impunite) and he asserts that the truth of 
the evidence is a matter that has frequently been lost sight of, particu­
larly in matters of extradition. 
Double Aspect of International Criminal Law.—He points out that 
International Criminal Law has a double aspect: 
Comme le droit international civil ou commercial, le droit penal international 
peut se presenter sous un double aspect. . . . 
II peut soit prendre celui d'une disposition de pur droit interne soit revetir 
celui d'un accord diplomatique. ... 
Cttte derniere forme est la plus parfaite. 
Its Essential Characteristics.—He next inquires what are les carac-
teres essentials du droit penal international, and says ils se deduisent de la 
nature meme du droit penal (interne). 
He rejects the ground of ordre public, which he says is a vague expres­
sion, and also that of defence (des mesures de defense) as those grounds are 
common to criminal law and their legislative dispositions. 
The conclusion at which he arrives, as to the nature of criminal law, 
is: 
Le droit penal apparait ainsi, dans chaque groupement, comme assurant le 
respect des regies considerees officiellement comme essentielles d la vie et d la 
prospSritS du groupe ; c'est, en un mot, au plus haut degre, un droit de defense 
sociale. 
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The true basis of droit penal (interne) is, in his opinion, protection 
sociale. 
He rejects also the idea of culpability or vengeance. 
Droit penal (interne) is therefore droit de defense sociale propre a un 
groupement. 
Its Nature.—Having thus arrived at the nature of droit penal [interne) 
he proceeds to deduce from it the nature of droit penal international, as 
to which he lays down four rules, which, he says, form I'ossature meme 
du droit penal international; as to what these four rules are we must 
refer our readers to the book itself. It is the third of these rules with 
which we are chiefly concerned, viz. : 
La loi penale d'un groupement etant une loi de defense sociale ne doit pas 
cesser d'etre competente par cela seul que la loi repressive d'un autre groupement 
reclame egalement le droit d'agir ; chaque loi penale doit accomplir le role qui lui 
est devolu : les competence legislatives se superposent en principe. 
It is this third characteristic of Droit Penal International that will 
give rise to most difficulties, both with lawyers and politicians. Of it 
he says : 
La troisieme idee, deduite de la nature du droit penal, celle de la superposition 
tout au moins de principe, des competences legislatives concurrentes, imprime au 
droit penal international un de ses caractdres les plus particuliers. 
La Superposition des Competences Legislatives Concurrentes.—This 
rule of the superposition des competences legislatives concurrentes is the 
key-note of the whole system, as advocated by M. Travers. It is a new 
idea, difficult to grasp, and the putting of it into operation (mise en 
ceuvre) will, we fear, be still more difficult, but it is an idea that deserves 
very serious consideration. The term competence seems to mean what 
we should call " applicability " or rather " cognisability " in our termin­
ology. Perhaps " justiciability " would be still nearer the mark, and the 
rule may be described, not inaccurately, as the overlapping or over-laying 
of jurisdictions. The result seems to be that where a crime has been 
committed, partly within the jurisdiction of one country and partly 
within that of another, either country (within the group) should have 
the right to try the offender for the full offence, according to its own laws, 
as if all the facts had taken place within its own jurisdiction or territory, 
or rather, independently of territorial considerations altogether. 
To take the example given above of a man who fires a gun across 
a frontier, while standing in the territory of one State, and kills a man 
in the territory of another State—on this theory of the superposition des 
competences he could be tried for the murder in the State in which he was 
standing (and where presumably he would be arrested), although the 
actual murder was committed in the other State, without any considera­
tion of nationality or territory, and without the trouble and expense of 
extradition proceedings, assuming they were possible. 
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Or, to take another example, also given by M. Travers, of a robbery 
planned in Switzerland, and perpetrated in France, the stolen property 
being received in England. In such a case the guilty parties could, on 
this theory, be tried for all three offences of conspiracy, robbery and 
receiving stolen property in England or Switzerland as well as in France. 
France already acts on this theory. 
But does not this theory itself involve a fiction, viz. the supposed 
abandonment or abolition of the frontiers that actually exist between the 
different States ? Is it not a case in which (to use the words of M. Travers) 
la conception viole ouvertement la realite ? Elsewhere M. Travers, on this 
very ground, viz. that they are opposed to reality, resolutely rejects all 
fictions, of which it must be confessed there are far too many in inter­
national law. 
Of course, under such a system, it would be necessary to adopt safe­
guards  aga ins t  t he  o f fende r  be ing  t r i ed  twice  fo r  t he  same  of fence  (pour  
assurer le respect de la maxime, non bis in idem), and also to avoid the 
accumulation of penalties (a eviter le cumul des peines pour un fait unique). 
The Practical Application of this Rule.—The practical means by which 
M. Travers hopes to see these ideas carried out, or put into operation 
(mise en ceuvre), are not, as has already been said, an Internationa] Court 
or Tribunal, but a Treaty, or series of treaties, between one large group 
of nations, or several groups, each group, large or small, recognising and 
binding itself to observe this rule of la superposition des competences legis­
latives concurrentes. This can only be done by des accords diplomatiques— 
par des traites, par la cooperation consentie, par la coordination, par I'aide 
ou assistance internationale—mais toujours par d'accord diplomatique. 
In fact, as he says : L'idee d'assistance internationale domine la mise en 
ceuvre du droit penal international (par. 36). 
Such a group might conceivably be found in the so-called Allies. But 
it seems more probable that, if the scheme were adopted, England, the 
United States and Canada would form one group ; France, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy, another ; Germany and Scandinavia, a third ; all 
Latin countries of Central and Southern America a fourth ; and so on. 
Reduced to its lowest dimensions, the theory or scheme is, that instead 
of the present chaotic, sporadic system of each nation or State administer­
ing its own criminal law within its own territories, with the help of 
extradition treaties, in the future, the administration of criminal law 
outside the boundaries or territories of each State shall be undertaken 
by a group of nations or States, if possible by one large group, not how­
ever by means of a common tribunal, but by each State (within the 
group) in which a criminal is arrested assuming full powers of juris­
diction. This would make a great change in the basis of international 
law as regards criminal jurisdiction. It remains to be seen how far the 
different States of the world, with their different systems of law and 
procedure, and the ever-present difficulty of diverse languages, will adopt 
it; but the theory is an ingenious and captivating one. 
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As M. Travers says : 
La meconnaissance de ce devoir d'aide internationale, jointe parfois a des 
particularity de procedure, entraine des impunites scandaleuses. 
International Criminal Law in Time 0! War.—" La guerre de 1914-18 
a attire de facon toute particuliere I'attention sur celles (ameliorations) qui 
concerneraient le temps de guerre." 
The German Government and its troops, as M. Travers says, have so 
constantly and so impudently violated the obligations imposed on them 
by international treaties and the laws and usages of war that a current of 
opinion, particularly strong in France, has deplored the suppression of 
facts of this nature, the creation of special legislation, and an inter­
national jurisdiction. The conclusion at which he arrives is : 
Malgre les avantages, I'un certain, I'autre douteux, que nous venons de 
mentionner, I'etablissement d'un tribunal international de nous apparait que 
comme un moyen exceptionnel qui ne peut etre mis en ceuvre qu'au moment de la 
paix. 
Here we enter the dubious region of politics, and opinions may differ 
as to the wisdom or otherwise of the establishment of such a Court and its 
work. But beautiful France lies stricken and still bleeding from the 
wounds inflicted on her by an unscrupulous foe, and our sympathies are 
with her. Upon one question we are all agreed: that it is the duty of 
every good citizen, both as a lover of his own country and as a lover of 
humanity, to do all that lies in his power, not only by lip-service, but by 
personal effort, to create a strong, healthy sentiment in favour of peace 
and the objects of the League of Nations, and so, as far as possible, to 
prevent future wars. 
As to the book itself, the greater part of it is devoted to the exposition 
of the principles above mentioned and illustrations showing how they 
would work in practice. Naturally most of the illustrations are drawn 
from French law and treaties, or other diplomatic arrangements to which 
France has been a party. A feature of the book is the very sparing use 
made of German writers and authorities, and the large use made of 
English and American. Before the war it would have been otherwise. 
In the second volume M. Travers continues the Regies generates de 
competence de la loi penal, and the exceptions to them, including com­
plicity, indivisibility and connexity. He deals also with the acquisition 
and change of nationality and industrial, artistic and literary property. 
Rejection 0! the Terms "State" and "Procedure," and the Division 
into Public and Private Law.—Consistently with the ideas enunciated 
above, M. Travers is of opinion that it is better to avoid, in this connection, 
the use of the word " State " (Nous croyons preferable d'eviter I'emploi 
du mot £tat) though he finds it impossible to do so on every occasion. 
The better term, we suppose, would be " treaty-group" or " treaty-power." 
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He also objects to the use of the word " procedure " (Nous riemployons 
pas le mot procedure, ce terme serait trop etroit; la competence, Vextradition 
rentrent dans cette mise en ceuvre). He rejects the distinction between 
public and private law : 
Cette question est, selon nous, quelque peu oiseuse. Rien n'est plus incertain 
que la ligne de demarcation qui separe les dispositions de droit public de celles 
de droit prive. 
These examples afford sufficient indication of his line of thought, and 
show that the scope of International Criminal Law is wider than that of 
droit penal interne. Should this idea be accepted and acted on there will 
be evolved a sort of super-criminal law, which will occupy a position 
midway between droit penal interne on the one hand, and the so-called 
public International Law on the other. It might be described as droit 
penal externe. 
The work (or rather the two volumes of it so far published), shows 
great originality, industry, power of analysis, and learning, and we wait 
with interest the third volume. When complete it will form a valuable 
addition to the literature, and, we hope, to the authority, of International 
Law. It breaks up new ground, it starts a new theory. It enlarges our 
outlook, and adds to our stock of jural conceptions. The learned author 
advocates an extended application of criminal law as part of Inter­
national Law, and advances good reasons for his view. At the same 
time he does not overlook the difficulties in the way, one of which is, as 
he says, la loi penal est de stride interpretation. 
In his view, Law is an experimental science, and the precedents of 
jurisprudence in a work of this kind ought to play the same role as clinical 
observations ought to play in a treatise on medicine. And finally he says, 
in words which he has prefixed to his book, and which express his method 
throughout: 
II faut, dans un ouvrage de droit, jaire ceuvre de sincerite, rejeter toute 
fiction, toute theorie qui n'est pas strictement conforme d la realite, et ne pas 
hesiter, en cas de necessite, a faire face aux besoins nouveaux par des conceptions 
nouvelles. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF ESTHONIA. 
[Contributed by R. T. CLARK, ESQ.] 
THE independent Republic of Esthonia is composed of the former Russian 
Government of Esthonia, the northern part (to Walk) of Livonia, the 
western corners of the Governments of Petrograd and Pskov and the 
adjacent islands. On the north and west it is bounded by the Baltic Sea 
(Gulf of Finland, Gulf of Riga), on the east by Russia, and on the south by 
Latvia. With an area of 47,500 kilometers, it contains very nearly 
1,750,000 inhabitants, of whom 90 per cent, are Esths, a race akin in 
ancestry and language to the Finns. Protestantism is the practically 
universal faith. The Esths have not been free since the day of heathenism. 
Germans, Danes, Swedes, Poles have all possessed the land as conquerors, 
and finally Russia absorbed the whole of the race into her Empire. In 
spite of age-long servitude, the depressing rule of the German landowners 
(Baits), and intense russification, the Esthonian language and culture not 
merely maintained themselves, but appreciably advanced, fostering, and 
being fostered, by that growing sense of nationalism that characterised 
the two decades before the war. The movement for autonomy was 
already important when the Russian Revolution broke out. On April 12, 
1917, a decree of the Russian Provisional Government provided for local 
self-government, under a National Council, for the Esthonian districts. 
This Council (Maapaew) met for the first time on July 14, and Esthonia 
virtually became a federal State in a Russian confederation. On the 
Bolshevik coup d'etat of November, the National Council declared itself 
the sovereign power in Esthonia until a Constituent Assembly could meet. 
On January 28, 1918, the Baits formally invited Germany to occupy the 
country, to which the Council, after protesting on February 7, replied on 
February 24 by declaring Esthonia an independent State, and constituting 
a Provisional Government under M. Paets. The Provisional Government 
was dissolved by the German invaders, and M. Paets arrested; but the 
National Council maintained itself by missions abroad, and was recog­
nised as a de facto governing body by Britain (May 3), France (May 15), 
and Italy (May 29), a recognition amplified by the British declaration of 
September 10. As soon as the German evacuation began, the National 
Council resumed power, reconstituted the Provisional Government, and 
held elections for the Constituent Assembly, which was opened on April 23, 
1919, and on May 19 proclaimed Esthonia an independent Republic. 
A peace with Bolshevik Russia which recognised the de jure inde­
pendence of Esthonia was signed at Tartu (Dorpat) on February 2, 1920. 
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Finland recognised the republic as de jure independent, and by June 7, 
de facto recognition had been accorded by practically all the Powers. 
Organisation.—The first task of the Assembly was to frame a con­
stitution. The work was entrusted to a Commission of fourteen members, 
representing six parties, and including two ladies. M. Jaan Poska1 
acted as Chairman. A short preliminary constitution—the Organic Law 
—was drafted, submitted to the Assembly on May 21, 1919, and passed 
on June 4. It came into force on July 9, and remained in force till the 
State Assembly elected by the elections of November 27-29, 1920, met. 
Draft Constitution.—The Commission submitted a draft scheme to the 
Constituent Assembly on May 27, 1920, but it was greatly altered in 
particularly keen debates, lasting until June 15, when it was passed in its 
present form. The draft had at least the outstanding merit of being short 
and intelligible, and bears the mark of the politician's handiwork, as well 
as the jurist's. The Commission spent a whole year on it in genuine 
hard work, in which they were assisted by the best jurists in Esthonia in 
exhaustive examination of foreign constitutions, notably those of the 
United States, France and especially Switzerland. The draft scheme 
is simply a bold enough attempt at a democratic constitution on con­
ventional lines. It is, in fact, little more than an amplification of the 
Organic Law of June 1919, and has clear traces of imitation of the con­
stitutions consulted. In its final form, however, it is radically changed, 
and has several important features of deep interest to the student. 
As it now stands, the Constitution contains a preamble stating that 
the Esthonian people has drawn it up and accepted it through the Con­
stituent Assembly. It contains ten parts (89 Articles). 
Part I (" General Description," Arts. 1-5) defines the boundaries 
of the" independent, autonomous Republic of Esthonia," in which " the 
power of the State is in the hands of the people," proclaims the supremacy 
of the Constitution, and declares Esthonian to be the State language. 
Fundamental Rights. —Part II (" On the Fundamental Rights of 
Esthonian Citizens," Arts. 6-26) declares the equality of all citizens, and 
forbids marks of distinction, guarantees the inviolability of the person 
and the home, freedom of religion—there is no State religion—and con­
science, free (and compulsory) education (with guarantees for racial 
minorities), freedom of the press, inviolability of correspondence, the gift 
of petition, freedom of domicile, the right of association, and the right 
to strike, free choice of nationality, the right of minorities to form auto­
nomous cultural institutions, to use their own language before the organs 
of local self-government in districts where they are in a majority, and to 
address petitions to the central authority in their own language, the right 
of private property, a living wage, adequate economic conditions 3 and 
the piotection of maternity, old age, etc. 
1 M. Poska died on March 7, 1920, and was succeeded as chairman by 
M. Anderkop. 
*  C f .  German (1919) Constitution, Art. 151. 
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Part III (" On the People," Arts. 27-34) deals with the position of 
the nation as the governing citizen body. Arts. 27 and 29 are funda­
mental, and must be quoted : 
Art. 27.—The supreme executor of the State power in Esthonia is the 
people itself, through the medium of citizens having the right to vote. 
Art. 29.—The people exercises the State power (a) by plebiscite, (b ) by 
their initiative in legislation, (c) by the election of the Assembly. 
The plebiscite clause requires that a law shall remain unpromulgated for 
two months after the Assembly has passed it, if one-third of the legal 
number of members requires it so to remain. Thereafter, if 25,000 
electors demand a plebiscite, a plebiscite is held, and promulgation or 
non-promulgation is decided by the result. Twenty-five thousand 
electors have the light " to require that a law shall be passed, changed or 
cancelled." The request is submitted to the Assembly, which can either 
pass it as a law or reject it. In the latter case a plebiscite is held, and if 
the request receives a majority acquires thereby the force of a law. If the 
people either reject a law passed by the Assembly or accept a law rejected 
by it the Assembly ipso facto is dissolved and new elections held. Only 
the Budget, some financial measures, declaration of state of siege, mobili­
sation, etc., are not subject to plebiscite. Plebiscites are conducted under 
control of the Praesidium of the Assembly. 
State Assembly.—Part IV (" On the State Assembly," Arts. 35-56) 
lays down that " as the representative of the people the Assembly exer­
cises the legislative powers." It consists of 100 members (but can increase 
that number by a law) elected by universal secret suffrage on the principle 
of proportional representation. Elections take place triennially. It is 
governed by a President and Prsesidium which it elects; 50 per cent, of 
the members form a quorum. Members are privileged and salaried. 
Each member can put questions to Ministers, and 25 per cent, can 
interpellate, when an answer must be given. 
Part V (" On the Government," Arts. 57-67) lays down that " The 
Republican Government executes the governing Power in Esthonia." 
The Government consists of the State Head (Riigiwanem) and Ministers. 
The Assembly forms the Government (Art. 59). Their duties are laid 
down in Art. 60. " The Riigiwanem," says Art. 61, " represents the 
Esthonian Republic, and unifies the activities of the Republican Govern­
ment, presides over its meetings and is authorised " to interpellate any 
individual Minister." The Government (Art. 64) must resign on a vote 
of no confidence being passed.1 The Government establishes the State 
Chancery, which is superintended by the Riigiwanem, and directed by the 
State Secretary appointed by the Government. All acts need the signa­
ture of the Riigiwanem, the State Secretary, and the responsible Minister. 
1 Art. 64 says " the Government or its members," presumably not laying down 
the doctrine of collective responsibility. Members of the Government, be it noted, 
are not required to be members of the Assembly. 
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Courts of Justice.—Part VI (" On the Courts of Justice," Arts. 68-
74) says that the supreme judicial power is exercised by the State Court 
of Justice formed of judges elected by the Assembly. Other judges are 
appointed by the Court. Judges can be dismissed only by the Court.1 
Law of Government.—Part VII (" On Self-Government," Arts. 75-77) 
provides for the creation and election of local self-government bodies. 
This is a mere adumbration of future legislation intended to institute very 
comprehensive local autonomy. 
Defence.—Part VIII (" On the Defence of the State," Arts. 78-82) 
provides for the establishment of defence forces on the basis of universal 
obligation to take part in the defence of the Republic. This will form 
the subject of legislation. 
Taxation.—Part IX (" On the State taxes and Budget," Arts. 83-85) 
ordains an annual budget and provides against illegal taxation. 
Alterations in the Constitution.—Part X (" On the Power of Altera­
tion of the Constitutional Law," Arts. 85-9) declares that this Con­
stitution is " the unshaken rule for the actions of the Assembly, Courts 
and Government institutions." The initiative of alteration belongs to 
the people and the Assembly as laid down in Art. 31. 
The aim of the framers was obviously a constitution for a fully 
conscious and advanced democracy, and it is this aim that constitutes 
the difference, more than terminological, between it and older Constitu­
tions. The first article lays it down that power is in the hands of the 
people, not is vested in (Mexican, Art. 39) or emanates from (Belgian, 
Art. 25 ; German (1919) Art. 1) or resides in (Chilian, Art. 3), and Art. 27 
declares the people the supreme executor of State Power. It is the whole 
people, not merely the electoral body, which is merely the medium of 
expression. The Riigiwanem is Premier, but not President, because the 
electoral body is really the President. It chooses as instrument the 
Assembly which for its own instrument chooses the Government. In 
practice the executive power is exercised by the Government, whose head 
discharges presidential functions. Legislation is initiated by the Govern­
ment, the Assembly, and the electoral body, the latter by the plebiscite 
having final jurisdiction. By the initiative, which applies to all kinds 
of laws, a comprehensiveness existing, in Europe, only in some Swiss 
cantonal constitutions, the electoral body repairs—to quote Professor 
L. J. Johnson—the sins of omission, and by the referendum sins of com­
mission in its agents. The people actually does legislate, but everything 
is done to safeguard public security and the stability of the organs of 
government. Forcing a plebiscite is not an easy matter. The people 
cannot demand a plebiscite on a bill under discussion. The bill is passed 
1 This is interpreted to mean that the State Court judges are appointed per­
manently. It is not laid down that the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority, 
whether a law is constitutional or not. Some Esthonian jurists hold that this is so, 
but, in view of the silence of the Constitution and the Swiss analogy, the probability 
seems that no authority is necessary outside the Assembly itself. 
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and is promulgated as a law, unless one-third of the Assembly requires 
a two-months' suspension. During that time 25,000 electors 1 must be 
found to demand a plebiscite by the result of which promulgation or non-
promulgation depends. If non-promulgation is carried, a vote of no-
confidence is thus carried in the electoral body against the Assembly, 
which is ipso facto dissolved.2 The initiative procedure demands similarly 
25,000 electors. They submit a request that a new law shall be enacted 
or an old one cancelled or amended. The request, in the form of an 
elaborated draft, goes to the Assembly, and the Assembly either passes 
the draft, in which case it acquires the force of a law, or rejects it. If 
rejected the draft is submitted to a plebiscite, and if it is carried again 
the Assembly is dissolved. It is thus the duty of the Assembly, when the 
draft comes before it, to gauge the popular feeling, and act in accordance 
with it. If, having gauged it, the Assembly defies it, or if the Assembly 
gauges it wrongly, the Assembly is judged an unworthy instrument of 
the popular will and dissolution is justified. Dissolution is thus parallel 
to the Government's compulsory resignation after a vote of no-confidence 
has been passed, and the control of the Assembly by the people is analogous 
to the control of the Government by the Assembly. In this very simple 
control-system a President is out of place. To fit him into the system 
would require a further elaboration, which, by confusing the ordinary 
citizen, would weaken his actual grip on legislation, and a President is 
therefore dispensed with, his routine duties being part of the heavy 
burdens borne by the Riigiwanem.3 
Conclusion.—This is democracy of an advanced type, and if it invents 
little that is actually new—the inclusion of the right to strike, even with 
a D.O.R.A. proviso, is, I think, unique—the Constitution carries into the 
printed text more of the implication of pure democratic theory than any 
other, while its rejection of the soviet system shows a stern refusal to 
stray, even so tentatively as the German Constitution of 1919, out of the 
1 Roughly 5 to 6 per cent, of the electors. In the American States the per­
centage varies from 5 to 8 per cent. 
2 There is a difficulty here which further legislation on procedure is required to 
settle. The Government, while it only resigns on a vote of no-confidence being 
carried, in theory apparently perishes with the Assembly. It does not remain in 
office after the Triennium, but is reconstituted by the new Assembly as a new 
Government, even if its personnel is unchanged. This implies a complete absence of 
organs of government, following a dissolution. The Government, it would seem, 
must function until the new Assembly comes into existence, i.e. at the declaration 
of election results. The new Assembly meets automatically, for there is no one 
competent to summon it, and here too amplification is necessary. 
* This fusion of the offices of State-President and Premier is not exactly similar 
to the absence of a President from the Communist system, which can dispense with 
any democratic instrument or institution as easily as could the Thirty Tyrants. It 
s interesting to note, however, that the programme of the Russian " p&rti travailliste 
bourgeois " is identical in name with the Esthonian Liberals and, organised in Russia 
in 1917, foreshadowed in their party programme a Republic without a President. 
(G. Demorgny: Les Partis politiques et la Revolution russe, p. 83.) A similar fusion 
would apparently have been found in Georgia had that republic continued to live. 
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strictly democratic path. The great advantage its framers had was that 
they began de novo, and were not cursed, or blessed, with a constitu­
tional past. They have been able to incorporate freely the latest devices 
of democracy, and interpret in actual words much of the spirit underlying 
the older Constitutions. But, for success, they postulate as essential 
conditions a State of no great size in territory or population, a nation 
imbued with the stern discipline of enlightened patriotism, and an 
electoral body which is fully educated, which is supplied with, which can 
and which will, use all sources of information on a question at issue. 
Happily Esthonia, if it does not fulfil absolutely these conditions, approxi­
mates very closely to fulfilment, and we have therefore a good field for 
the trial of what is a really notable experiment in democracy based on 
complete confidence in a nation with absolutely no experience in national 
self-government, and deriving its inspiration from the old time declara­
tion of the constitution of Massachusetts: " All power residing originally 
in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and 
officers of Government . . . are their substitutes and agents, and are 
at all times accountable to them." 
NOTE.—The text of the Organic Law is printed in the Bulletin d'Esthonie, No. 5. 
No. 10 of the same periodical contains a full summary of the draft Constitution. The 
Constitution is printed in the Baltic Review (Nos. 2 and 3), September and October 
1920. It can, I think, be obtained as a pamphlet. I made a preliminary study of 
it in the New Europe of August 12, 1920. There is no connected account of the new 
state up to date. M. Martha's L'Esthonie is valuable, but its progress can best be 
studied in the documents published by the Reval Government or in La Revue 
baltique (1918-19), Bulletin d'Esthonie (1919), The Esthonian Review (1919-1920), 
The Baltic Review (1920), Esthonia (1919: U.S.A.), M. Gaillard's L'Allemagne 
et la Baltikum and Mr. Ralph Butler's The New Eastern Europe are useful only 
because there is nothing else. I should like to express my thanks for valuable 
help to my colleague, Mr. W. D. Robieson, and to M. Kopwillem of the Esthonian 
Legation in London, to the latter not merely for much information, but also for 
consistent kindness and courtesy to a very troublesome seeker after knowledge. 
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND IN AUSTRALIA.1 
Purposes o! Acquisition.—With the exception of the State of South 
Australia, all the States of the Commonwealth have empowered the 
central executives, or in some cases specific ad hoc bodies,2 to acquire 
land compulsorily for " public purposes." These latter purposes appear 
to be, though there exists no explicit statutory definition, any purposes 
which may be authorised by any particular Act to be carried out by any 
executive functionary or body on behalf of the central Government. In 
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, a similar power is 
extended to local authorities incorporated by statute.® In the case of 
Victoria, this general power of local authorities is limited by the necessity 
of obtaining the consent of the Minister concerned.4 In New South Wales 
a similar detailed consent by the Legislature is necessary before a local 
authority may proceed to acquire land compulsorily.5 An exception, 
however, is made in the case of the municipality of Sydney, which may 
for the purpose of " town planning " and " housing reform " exercise 
these powers without any recourse to the Legislature.® 
In South Australia no general power of resumption has been granted. 
In the case of crown lands under perpetual or any other lease, there is 
a power of resumption for any public purpose.7 In the absence of any 
specific definition of " public purpose " it must be assumed that this also 
means any purpose authorised by statute. In the case of any other 
land, a specific power of acquisition must be included in each Act, which 
authorises any activity necessitating the exercise of such power. 
This withholding of executive authority is in marked contrast to the 
attitude of the other States. So far, specific powers of acquisition have 
been granted for the purpose of the Adelaide Sewers Act (No. 6 of 1878, 
s. 25), the Water-works Act (No. 269 of 1882) and the Water Conservation 
Act (No. 392 of 1886), and the Railway Commissioners Act, 1887. 
The Commonwealth Parliament has not granted general powers of 
1 Contributed by students of the Law School in the University of Melbourne : 
Messrs. E. G. Coppel, A. R. Henderson, H. P. Levy, B.A., R. J. Lowenstern, B.A., 
L. Mann, P. D. Phillips. 
2 E.g. Closer Settlement Acts (Vict.), 1915-18. Public Works Act (Vict.), 1915. 
Public Works Land Resumption Act (Queensland), 1906-16. 
3 Local Authorities Act (Queensland), 1902. Lands Resumption Act (Tasmania), 
1910. Western Australia, 2 Ed. VII, No. 47 and Amending Act 6 Ed. VII, No. 8. 
* Land Act (Vict.), 1915, s. 286. 
5 Public Works Act (N.S.W.), 1912, s. 37. 
• Sydney Corporation Amendment Act, 1905. 
7 Crown Lands Act (S.A.), 1915, s. 81. 
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acquisition for any of the purposes which it is empowered to execute 
under s. 51 of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
In addition, however, to these powers, each State has passed several 
Acts which give a power of acquisition for specific purposes.1 In most 
cases these Acts preceded thelater Acts instituting the more general powers, 
and hence there has been a duplication in the granting of such powers to 
the executive. The Closer Settlement Acts present, however, a par­
ticular form of activity, which is somewhat different from the usual 
" public purpose " and is dealt with separately.2 
No provision has been made for Closer Settlement in Western Australia. 
The only peculiar specific power of acquisition in this State is that extend­
ing to any land within twelve miles of the route of any new railway which 
may be constructed.3 
In Queensland the Closer Settlement provisions are limited to those 
estates valued at £20,000 or more. The total annual expenditure is not 
to exceed £500,000.* 
In South Australia the value of the estate is the same. But no such 
limitation exists in the resumption for irrigation and reclamation of land 
adjacent to the river Murray.5 
In Victoria there is no restriction on the value of the particular estates 
—the only limitation being that imposed by the grant of a limited appro­
priation for the purpose indicated.6 
In Tasmania the minimum value of the estate is £i2,ooo.7 
In New South Wales the minimum is £20,000, but it is necessary 
to obtain the approval of both Houses of Parliament before the power 
can be exercised.8 In all the States where powers of acquisition exist 
under Closer Settlement Acts, the powers have been extended by addi­
tional Acts to the settlement of returned soldiers and sailors on the land. 
In relation to the Commonwealth Government, two powers of com­
pulsory acquisition only have been granted. Under the Defence Act, 
1903-17, the Governor-General may give general or particular authority 
to resume lands for any naval or military purposes. 
By the Lighthouses Act, 1915, the Commonwealth Government may 
acquire compulsorily any lighthouse or marine mark or property used in 
connection therewith from any State, if it has failed to acquire the same by 
agreement. 
1 E.g. Railways Act (Queensland), 1914. Railway Construction Act (Tasmania), 
1919. Railway Land Acquisition Act (Vict.), 1915. Housing Act (N.S.W.), 
1912, No. 7. State Forests Act (N.S.W.), 1909, No. 7. State Coal Mines Act 
(N.S.W.) • 1912, No. 70. 
1 Closer Settlement Act (Queensland), 1906-17 ; (Tasmania), 1913 ; (Victoria), 
1915 ; (N.S.W.), 1904, No. 37. 
3 Railways Acts (W.A.), 1906 and 1915. 
4 Closer Settlement Act (Queensland), s. 2. 
# Crown Lands Act (S.A.), 1915. 
• Closer Settlement Act (Victoria), 1915. 
T Closer Settlement Act (Tasmania), 1913, s. 17 
8 Closer Settlement Act (N.S.W.), 1907, s. 4. 
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In regard to the postal service, a power of compulsory use of land 
for purposes incidental to the service has been granted without any power 
of acquisition. 
Who is authorised to acquire.—Where the compulsory acquisition 
of land is authorised, the power is ordinarily exercised by the authority 
charged with the execution of the purpose tor which the land is required. 
In undertakings of the central Government, the acquiring authority will 
be the Governor-General or Governor in Council (e.g. Commonwealth 
Lands Acquisition Act 1906, New South Wales Public Works Act, 1912) 
of the Minister in whose department the particular act of administration 
falls. In some cases, as in the acquisition of land for closer settlement, 
the advice of a Board possessing some independence is required (e.g., 
N.S.W., Closer Settlement Act, 1904 ; South Australia, Crown Lands 
Act, 1915 ; Tasmania, Closer Settlement Act, 4 Geo. IV, No. 39). In 
Victoria, the acquisition of lands for closer settlement is by the Closer 
Settlement Board itself (Victoria, Closer Settlement Acts, 1915, 1918). 
Where land is to be acquired for carrying out any work, the con­
structing authority or the promoters of the undertaking will exercise 
the power of acquisition (Queensland, Public Works Land Resumption 
Act, 1906-16, s. 4 ; Victoria, Public Works Act, 1915). 
Mode of Acquisition.—Broadly speaking, there are two modes of 
acquisition: by publishing a notification in the Government Gazette, or b}' 
serving a notice on the owners of the land required. In many instances, 
to the notification in the Government Gazette is added a similar notification 
in the local newspapers. Publication in the Gazette is sufficient to vest 
the title in fee simple in the Crown ; and all estates and interests in the 
land are thereby converted into claims for compensation. 
Under the Public Works Act (1912) of N.S.W. acquisition by notice 
to the parties interested is an alternative to the method outlined above, 
and is to be used where it seems possible to acquire the land required by 
agreement (ss. 42-47). 
In Queensland notification in the Gazette is provided for in the Closer 
Settlement Act (1906-17), and in the Discharged Soldiers Settlement 
Act (1917). This latter Act grants perpetual lease selections for farming 
(s. 4). 
Under the Public Works Land Resumption Act (1906-16), if the Crown 
is not the constructing authority, the latter shall lay before the Governor 
in Council a memoi ial of the land required, giving security for compensa­
tion to be paid, and a statutory declaration by the chief executive officer 
that all the provisions of this Act have been complied with, and that the 
constructing authority is of opinion that the said land is required. 
The Governor in Council then acquires the land by proclamation 
(s- 7)-
It is provided by the Railways Act (1914) that the Commissioner shall 
serve a notice of resumption on all persons having any estate or interest 
in the land to be acquired. This notice serves to vest the title in the 
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Commissioner m fee simple (ss. 48-9). The Land Act (1910-18) deals 
only with grazing leases. Notice of resumption is to be published in the 
Gazette, and a copy served on the lessee. Resumption shall take effect: 
( a )  In cases of resumption for public purposes, one month or later 
after service of notice. 
(b) In other cases in which compensation is not payable, six months 
after service or later. 
(c) In cases where compensation is payable twelve months after the 
final determination of the amount of compensation (s. 150J. 
Tasmania follows the model of N.S.W. as regards notification in 
the Gazette, and has also the common provision that a copy of this notifica­
tion is to be laid before Parliament. But by s. 18 of the Lands Resuma-
tion Act (1 Geo. V, No. 11) either House may within thirty days, by 
resolution, declare the notification void. This grant of parliamentary 
control is rather exceptional. 
In Victoria notice is given to the parties interested, under the Public 
Works Act (1915), and if they refuse to convey or show title the pro­
moters of the public undertaking, after depositing the purchase money 
and executing a deed-poll, become owners of the land (ss. 121-2). The 
Local Government Act (1915) combines both methods of acquisition, 
publication in the Gazette being followed within seven days by service of 
a notice on the owners, who may appear before the Municipal Council 
to support their objections. If the Council finds it necessary to take 
the lands compulsorily, the finding of the Council and all relevant docu­
ments are forwarded to the Minister, who may confirm or disallow the 
order. If he confirms the decision of the local authority, a notice to that 
effect is published in the Gazette (ss. 465-7). 
Notification in the Gazette is the method employed under the Closer 
Settlement Act, but the first step is a resolution of both Houses, indicating 
the land to be acquired (s. 35). 
In acquiring land for railways the Governor in Council may, if there 
is no township in the neighbourhood, declare in the Gazette that specified 
land, not exceeding 200 acres, should be acquired for township purposes 
(Railway Lands Acquisition Act, 1915, s. 36). 
In Western Australia publication in the Gazette is the method employed 
(Public Works Act, 1902). But notice of resumption may be annulled 
within ninety days. 
In South Australia the position is governed by the Crown Lands Act 
(1915). For resumption for general purposes three months' notice must 
be given (s. 56). In the case of Closer Settlement lands a full statement 
must be placed before Parliament within thirty days (s. 153). Notice 
to acquire large estates must be made in writing two years before the 
date of intended acquisition—and one year before in the case of irrigation 
land adjacent to the river Murray (s. 165). If, within six months, the 
price agreed upon has been paid or tendered, and the ownei has refused 
to sign a conveyance or transfer to the Crown, it shall be lawful for the 
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Government, by proclamation in the Gazette, to declare the land com­
pulsorily acquired (s. 170). 
In the case of the Commonwealth the Governor-General, having 
directed that land shall be acquired compulsorily, a notification is inserted 
in the Government Gazette, declaring that the land has been acquired for 
some public purpose expressed, and a copy of the notification is laid before 
Parliament. The publication in the Gazette operates to vest the land in 
the Commonwealth, free of all incumbrances, and all rights are converted 
into claims for compensation. Notice must be served on the owners, or 
such of them as can be found. The effect of the notification in the Gazette 
may be nullified by a resolution of either House of Parliament " where 
the land is Crown land of a State which is dedicated for a public park, and 
for the recreation or amusement of the public," and in all cases except 
where (a) moneys have been appropriated by Parliament for the purpose 
for which the land was acquired; (b) where the Government has sanctioned 
the proposed work, and money is legally available therefor ; or (c) where 
the Minister certifies that the estimated value of the land does not exceed 
£100. If the notification is so nullified, the owner has a claim for com­
pensation for damage suffered. (Lands Acquisition Act, 1906, ss. 14-19.) 
The Award of Compensation.—In the matter of the tribunals which 
assess compensation for lands acquired by compulsory process, various 
methods are met with in the several States. Although no one method 
can be laid down as common to all, each State has some such system as 
this : the person whose land has been compulsorily acquired, and the 
authority which has taken the land, each choose an arbitrator 1; the 
arbitrators, before they commence their sittings, appoint an umpire2 to 
whom disputed points may be referred ; the arbitrators then set about 
the determination of how much compensation is to be awarded.3 
Under Commonwealth Law,4 in the absence of agreement, claims for 
compensation are determined in Federal or State Courts, and may not be 
referred to arbitration by such Courts without consent of parties. 
The trial is by a judge without a jury.5 Interest at the rate of 3 per 
cent, is payable on the amount of compensation, as from the date of 
acquisition.6 
In New South Wales the owner can make a claim for compensation 
against the constructing authority and the Crown Solicitor, and, if 
1 In South Australia, if estates are " large " (i.e. of a value over £20,000), there 
is a third arbitrator, who is a judge of the Supreme Court (Crown Land Act, 1915, 
s. 172). 
2 In Tasmania the umpire—who is a judge of the Supreme Court—is a third 
arbitrator sitting with the other two (Closer Settlement Act, 4 Geo. V, c. 39, s. 36). 
Similarly Western Australia, if the disputed compensation is over ^500 (2 Ed. VII 
c. 47, ss. 48, 50). 
3 South Australia Crown Lands Act, 1915, s. 292. Victoria Public Works Act, 
1915. 
4 Lands Acquisition Act, 1906. 
5 Ibid., s. 37. 
• Ibid., s. 40 
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compensation cannot be agreed upon,1 the claimant can bring an action 
against the constructing authority 2 in the Supreme Court before judge 
and jury of four (or twelve if demanded). 
In Queensland3 compensation may be determined4 by the Land 
Appeal Court5 (consisting of the District Court Judge and two members 
of the Land Court). Under the Railways Act a claim can be made 
against the Commissioner of Railways, and if there is failure of agreement 
the compensation is to be determined by the Land Court6 with an appeal 
to the Land Appeal Court.7 Similar provisions appear in the Public 
Works Land Resumption Act, 1906-16, which Act is invoked by the 
Soldiers Settlement Act, 1917. 
In Victoria, under the Public Works Act, a Court of Petty Sessions 
determines claims for compensation under £50. If they are larger 8 they 
may be determined by a jury (or if called for a special jury) presided 
over by the sheriff. 
Under the Local Government Act, 1915, when the claim is under 
£500, it is to be determined by a police magistrate—whose decision is 
final—sitting as a Court of Petty Sessions; or, if the claim is over £500, 
by a County Court Judge from whom an appeal lies to a Judge of the 
Supreme Court9—without a jury—whose decision is final.10 
Basis of Award.—Generally speaking, the basis on which the award of 
compensation is made for the land resumed is the same in all States, 
though, in the case of South Australia, there is not the same definiteness 
that we get in the legislation of the other States. The Public Works 
Act, 1902, of Western Australia, s. 63, provides that, in determining the 
amount of compensation, four matters only are to be taken into account: 
1. The probable and reasonable price at which the land with improve­
ments on it, or the estate or interest of the claimant might have been 
expected to sell at the date of resumption, without regard to the increased 
value occasioned by the proposed public work. 
2. The damage sustained by the severance of the land from other 
adjoining land, or by such other land being injuriously affected. 
3. The Court may award an amount which it deems proper, not 
exceeding 10 per cent, on the amount ascertained under the provisions of 
this section for compulsory taking. 
1 Within ninety days after making the claim. 
2 In Tasmania, against the Minister (Public Purposes Act, 1 Geo. V, s. 112). 
3 Under the Closer Settlement Act, 1906-17. 
* Ibid., s. 19. 
6 Ibid., s. 17. 
® The Land Court is a permanent body, consisting of three expert land valuers. 
7 Railways Act, 1914, s. 60. 
8 Say over ^50. 
9 In Western Australia by 2 Ed. VII, c. 47, ss. 48 and 50, the police magistrate 
or Supreme Court Judge sits as President of the Compensation Court. 
10 Similar provisions appear in the Closer Settlement Act, 1915, where compensa­
tion is assessed only by the Supreme Court Judge. Also in the Railway Lands 
Acquisition Act, 1915. 
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4. To the compensation shall be added the rents and profits received 
form the land from the day of taking to the making of the award, allowing 
for the cost of collecting, or, at the Minister's option, interest on the 
amount of compensation at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum. 
The first two of these provisions appear in all the other States with 
minor variations, such as the Victorian provision in the case of land for 
railways, that the compensation is to be limited to the value of the land 
on the day of the commencement of the session of Parliament during 
which the Act authorising the construction was passed. In Victoria and 
Queensland compensation is to be paid up to the value of the land, but 
the Acts do not provide how the value is to be reckoned. However, the 
Queensland Land Act, 1910-18, dealing with leaseholds for grazing, 
provides that the total amount payable for the value of the land to an 
incoming lessee for a term of years shall not exceed, exclusive of what 
is payable for improvements, a sum equal to 6d. for each sheep or 4s. 
per head of cattle on the carrying capacity of the holding multiplied by 
the number of years, up to ten, comprised in the remainder of the term. 
The Tasmanian Lands Resumption Act, 1900, 1 Geo. V, No. 11, enacts 
that the assessment of compensation shall be based on the valuation of 
the land on January 1 preceding the acquisition. Victoria and Tasmania 
provide for regard being had to enhancement or depreciation in value of 
the owner's land adjoining that resumed, owing to the carrying out of 
the work. This enhancement or depreciation is to be set off or added 
to the amount of compensation. Queensland has the same provision in 
the Railways Act, 1914, s. 256, and in the Public Works Land Resumption 
Act, 1906-16. Western Australia and South Australia make no provisions 
for this, and Western Australia appears to be the only State, providing 
specifically for 10 per cent, being added at the discretion of the Court for 
compulsory acquisition. 
In Western Australia the compensation Court may award easements 
over the land acquired, and take their value into account in awarding 
compensation. 
The position in N.S.W. follows the general plan. There are no 
provisions for enhancement or depreciation being taken into account. 
The value of the land at the time of notification in the Gazette, without 
reference to any alteration in value arising from the establishment of the 
public work or railway thereon, is the measure of compensation. Special 
provisions exist for compensation for damage caused by severance, or for 
damage to the surface caused by underground sewers or tunnels ; though 
in the latter case no compensation is to be paid unless the surface is 
damaged. Where land is resumed within five years of alienation, the 
compensation shall be the price paid by the grantee, together with a sum 
not exceeding 100 per cent, of that sum in addition to compensation for 
improvements. 
THE PLEBISCITE, NATIONALITY AND THE STATE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. 
[Contributed by D. P. HEATLEY, ESQ.] 
FOR some years, even before the stupendous revelation that international 
law might be only an archaic law, a process of disintegration of thought 
had been going on, touching the principles that underlie the organisation 
and well-being of a State. Sovereignty was coming to be looked upon 
as a spent force. Too little heed was being taken that in both fact and 
right sovereignty, as Spinoza insisted, is a relationship, and that there 
is a true, as well as a false, absolute in political authority. We have to 
think both, and at once, of the capacities of the patient and of the powers 
of the agent or the wielder of authority. The State, we were, and are 
still being, told, is invited to retreat before an advancing trade union, or 
guild, or church. The residuum of right or power thereby left by the 
ascendant economic energy of the age to " the State," as a moderator 
and adjuster, becomes so petty, and is so precariously founded and so 
obviously retained on sufferance, that the road, though it may be 
perilous, is not long to the doctrine of Bakunin, that in the past the 
State was an evil, but was an historical necessity, and it must, just as 
necessarily, sooner or later disappear altogether. 
Facts—the significance of which consists in the relationship of thing 
to thing—are the parents of theories, and the historian's most fruitful 
field lies in the inquiry into the relation of what is thought to what is 
done in the course of political development. If we have need to-day of 
a Grotius, we have at least equal need of a Bodin, rather than of a Hobbes ; 
and the great works of both Bodin and Grotius were the children of wars 
—of civil wars for one, of international wars for the other. Bodin was 
the precursor, rather than the spiritual ancestor, of Grotius, not in time 
only, but also in thought, for it was necessary to define and secure the 
State before it was possible to define due relations of State to State in an 
international system. 
Bodin's Definition of the State.—With high courage Bodin defined 
State or Commonwealth in the very first words of his elaborate treatise, 
De Republica, and in the eighth chapter of the first book—the key chapter 
of the whole work—we see his special pride in defining sovereignty, which, 
he says, no jurist and no philosopher had hitherto defined. Respublica es 
familiarum rerumque inter ipsas communium summa potestate ac ratione 
moderata multitude>. Except for one attribute, the definition is not more 
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helpful than that of Cicero, when he is explaining respublica as the interest 
of the people: populus autem non omnis hominum coetus, quoquo modo 
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et communione utilitatis 
sociatus. The association of supreme power and reason is the charac­
teristic and troublesome feature in the first of these definitions, as the 
association of a community in right and advantage is the characteristic 
of the second. But Bodin's definition requires especially that there be 
sovereignty in the State. In the French version of his work he defines 
sovereignty (souverainte) as la puissance absolue <§- perpetuelle d'une 
Republique. In the words of the better-known Latin version, sovereignty 
imaiestas) is summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta potestas. The 
attribute permanence, although it is omitted from the definition in Latin, 
is essential for Bodin. It is insisted upon in the exposition that follows 
in the same chapter. Maiestas vero nec maiore potestate nec legibus ullis 
nec tempo/e definitur. If absolute power be given for only a short or a 
fixed time to one or many, they are not thereby invested with sovereignty. 
They are merely men put in trust. 
The Permanence of the State.—It is this attribute of permanence of 
constituted authority that came to lie at the root of the conception of the 
State. It was imperative to guard against the fluctuating and the 
transient in authority. The acceptance of this attribute led in normal 
reasoning to the minute, and almost morbid, solicitude of political 
thinkers for the " right institution " of a commonwealth. In the extreme 
it led to the advocacy of raison d'litat, which Machiavelli had required 
rather than justified. Whether the sovereign should be the sovereign 
one or the sovereign many does not affect the necessity for the principle 
and the quality at stake. The value of a sovereign authority clearly 
and not precariously constituted ; that is what was being sought and 
emphasised. Althusius, the ablest and most suggestive of Bodin's critics, 
a thinker who presents much of the wisdom of the Middle Age in politics, 
and almost the whole of the root idea of a school of thought far from 
silent in our own days, admitted that there is an authority in a State that 
is or should be permanent, although he would prefer to say that it is the 
kingdom or the people, rather than the king or the kingship, that is 
immortal. It is, however, to the authoritarians and absolutists, and not 
to the " monarcho-machic " school, that we look appropriately for 
insistence on the quality of permanence in sovereignty in a State : the 
king never dies ; the kingship never dies ; and the kingship is for the 
State. There were reasons, especially in the interaction of religion and 
politics, and in the painful choice for many between orthodoxy and 
loyalty, why the quality should be looked upon with suspicion, when it 
was given a constitutional, a formally constituted, embodiment; and the 
instruments devised and used for its enforcement were at times extra­
ordinary and arbitrary, not conforming to a rule of law. The leading 
domestic problem for States of the main European state system in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries impeded the general acceptance of 
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this quality of the State. An inalienable sovereignty, such as Althusius, 
long before Rousseau, required for the people and for the people only, 
might be an uncontrolled tyranny in the hands of one, with or without a 
council ; in the hands of the many it might be, as Burke was to point out, 
a multiplied tyranny. " Who are the State ? " is both a harder and 
usually a more pertinent question than " What is the State ? " 
It is this quality of permanence of constituted authority, standing 
for rights and obligations, that gives political force to the impressiveness 
of Hooker and to the grandiloquence of Burke: 
As any man's deed past is good as long as himself continueth, so the act 
of a public society of men done five hundred years since standeth as theirs, who 
presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortal: we 
were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still. 
Society, for Burke, who is of kin to Hooker, is " a partnership, not 
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born." We are only life-
renters of this England, not absolute possessors. We lose not only the 
significance and permanent wisdom of the politics of Burke, in their 
height and in their depth, but even the meaning of history as the life-
presentation of peoples in their living bodies politic, if, presuming to be 
plainly practical, we say that all this is merely mysticism forced into 
politics. The first duty of the State, once it has being and fruitful activity, 
and authority, is to provide for its own conservation. That is an im­
perious command on every high conception of the State. It is the teaching 
of continuity. It may have issue in its excess. It may lead to the 
doctrine of prescriptive rights and to the call for the exercise of sym­
pathetic, which may be arbitrary, powers for its enforcement. But, 
short of its excess, it is the teaching of a genuinely political conservatism 
of rights for the securities and advantages of civil society. It is a declara­
tion that there is a civil interest to be cherished ; that there are con­
stitutional instruments and rights and powers for cherishing that interest; 
but that all institutions are means, not ends. It is not the teaching of 
the conservatism of mere inertia of orthodoxy in forms and ritual and 
hierarchies. 
The Sovereignty and Continuity of the State.—It was pre-eminently 
in international relations that this idea of permanence of life and 
authority imparted an essential quality to the State, and it was im­
parted in that century when, in England not least, the quality seemed 
to be threatened in the conflict of home politics concerning sovereignty 
and the balance of parts in the Constitution. In the vast negotiations 
and great congresses, and the definitive treaty-making of the seventeenth 
century, the conception came to stand out clearly that a State is more 
than a government or a sovereignty or a people of the day merely— 
that it is to be regarded as a body politic with a past, present and 
future ; that it is the inheritor and the actual bearer and transmitter 
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of rights and obligations. It has sovereignty ; or within it there is 
a supreme power—power over its own subjects, although great may 
be the peril in the character and capacity of the power. Also, it has 
its rights and its obligations toward its equals—other States with like 
attributes. This quality of permanence was required, and had to be 
assumed, for stability and the fulfilment of contracts in international 
relations. Without it there could be no security either in the actual 
dealings of people with people, or in the reasoning of writers on 
public law. 
What is the State?—In politics the terms that are essential and in 
every-day use are the very terms that are least clearly defined. " A 
people," " nationality," " sovereignty," " the State " : a formula can 
easily be invented, and has too readily been invented, to cover each of 
these. But formula has to wrestle with realities. Political science has 
as its theme " The State " ; and yet it is possible to point to expositions 
of political thought and of constitutions and of governmental procedure 
and power that would be clearer and more consistent and helpful if the 
writers did not use the term " State " at all. Certainly in the study of 
the politics of history, as distinguishable and even distinct from a vague, 
discretionary or arbitrary political philosophy, with an arrogated preroga­
tive of the mind, we have to think of and come to know States before we 
begin to assign attributes to " The State." We must ask: Whose State ? 
Who are the people you are thinking of ? Of what quality, of what 
political aptitudes, are they ? What is the nature of the Constitution in 
which the people in question find part of the expression of its life and 
character—part at least of its identity as a people ? How comes and how 
is expressed that quality which is more and greater than the mere sum of 
the individual members of every group of men, and yet is essential to each 
of them as a true member—their common purpose and spirit, a general 
will, a will directed to a good that each member, in loyalty, should feel to 
be his own, and to which he must in his social self contribute ? " England 
could not tolerate this from Spain in 1589 ": perhaps we can define our 
" England " there and then. " France in 1789 had to recover herself." 
" France ? " Who or what is the France that is in the mind for 1789 ? 
What " self " ? 
These root questions are not viewed, and should not be viewed, from 
the same standpoint by politician, lawyer, historian and political thinker, 
although each can contribute to the approximation of success in deed to 
truth as tested by principle and ideal—an approximation which is the end 
of all politics. We see the difference in standpoint if we distinguish, as 
we should, between constitutionality and constitutionalism. Constitu­
tionality is a quality that, as Selden might have said, and wished us to 
say of prerogative, can be told what it is : it is for the lawyers and judges 
and a court of reference to tell, with a risk of legalism and rigidity. But 
a people is a living body politic. Constitutionality was largely with the 
King and the Crown lawyers under Charles I of England; constitutionalism 
18 
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was then very largely with the Parliamentarians. Constitutionalism is 
process, not result—not something or some quality that has developed 
to completeness and realised its end. It marks the spirit of the polity 
of a people, a spirit that has to work out its meaning and to acquire 
strength through the struggles of that people: and such is the view of 
the historian. It proceeds along several lines ; there is not a uniformity 
of thought, or of action and endeavour ; and thus arises the sphere of the 
politician and his justification. The justification has its limits, since 
party exists for the State—the whole. Public law knows nothing of party. 
A party as soon as it is placed in power, a party man become minister 
(a healthily expressive word) is an instrument of the State. Even an 
Opposition should be " His Majesty's Opposition "—an Opposition in the 
interest of His Majesty ; and the majesty of the State, and the interest of 
the whole, are compelling and transcendent. There is, again, a constitu­
tionalism which may be presented to the mind in deference to an ideal 
for " the " State in general, and to the claims of a system of political 
thought. Such is the sphere of vision of the political philosopher; and 
where, endowed with the historical sense, he has regard to the books 
of life of the several great political peoples, and thinks of actual processes 
pursued and going on, and does not precipitately draw up the table of the 
law, he may do much to ally the present and actual with the ideal, much 
to ally the severity of the historian with the aspirations of the idealist. 
Just as legislation is necessary to correct and supplement laws, so con­
stitutionalism is necessary to correct and supplement, and by con­
tinuous and silent revolution change and adapt, the constitution by law 
established and accepted. 
It is illogical, and in the practice of politics it may be disastrous, not 
to distinguish these habits of mind, and the function of each. But it is 
sound and useful to assign to each its sphere and function. Each by 
holding fast to its own can help the whole. The philosopher does not 
allow us to lose sight of the general will; the politician and the historian 
have to think of the will of all, and may have to question the reality both 
of the " will " and of the " all." The historian may have in due time 
to record that the doctrine of the general will has been equalled in effect, 
subversive as much as creative, by the formula, " the right of a people 
to self-determination "—a formula which, in its English style, more than 
in its French,x is majestic and captivating. The doctrine is old, because 
the problem is old. But the opportunity has lately seemed glaring for 
its obtrusive enunciation. In every part of its texture the formula calls 
for analysis and scrutiny : right, and how it is to be secured, and how 
translated into power, and maintained as rightful power , people—what 
it is or who they are ; the self, if there is one, and the means present or 
available to the people, or to those who wish to stand forth as a people 
among the peoples, of expressing the will or of manifesting the claim of 
right to live a life that is their own ; and the relation of that people and 
1 Le droit des peuples de disposer d'eux memes ; le droit de libre disposition. 
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of that life to the sum of peoples, and to the whole, more than sum, 
that we term the community of peoples, or the Society of Peoples (or 
Nations) which accept international law, and do not disavow an inter­
national morality. Here is no place for the dogma that gives fervour 
to a sect. But here is much need of the penetration and circumspection 
whence comes security in thought and for action. 
What is Nationality ?—If we are asked who or what, in a scientific 
sense, are the " nations " of Europe and of the world to-day, we say that 
the question is absurd. But, if we are asked who are the " peoples " in 
fact, we point to those aggregates of population that live together, and 
for many generations may have lived together under common laws and 
institutions, and in the cultivation of interests and ideals in common, 
and have a constituted government; all of which possessions and attri­
butes make up what we term " State." Expressions like " the American 
nation," " Canada a nation," are loose and inaccurate expressions. We 
must go further and say that the factors of race and nationality in 
historical and political problems are, in general, uncertain factors. They 
cannot be ignored, but they are not calculable. Is the evidence of race, 
in political analysis to-day, to be anatomical—the form of the skull, and 
bodily traits like the colour of the hair and the eye, and are we to agree 
with those who conclude that there are corresponding differences in the 
direction of the thought and in the aptitudes of the representatives of 
the race ? Even if one people, or a branch of a race, excels or seems to 
excel in exact science and in practical affairs as well, while another people, 
a branch of the same race, excels in poetry and in works of the imagination, 
are we therefore to draw conclusions political in their character, and, in 
obedience to general principles and " laws of nature," provoke schemes 
of national reconstruction ? Or, is not the better view that we have 
moved far away from the time and regions of the primitive racial types, 
that they have become material for the palaeontologist, and that what 
we now call races are large communities of peoples that have a kinship in 
civilisation more than by blood ? And yet we may all agree that, even as 
there is something of truth in the claim, " The soil is the nation," since 
the soil is a substantial part of the environment which helps to determine 
what man does, so there is something of truth in the view that race, as 
a primary and durable factor, helps to determine what man is—what men 
in their several large groups are. It is still refreshing to read in Bodin— 
and here, and not only here, Bodin was the father of Montesquieu—that 
" in old times, when nations were not so mingled as they have become, 
they did know a northern man by his flaxen hair and his green eyes." 
But, at least, let us not pass unheeded the author's note of caution ; and 
let us add to it a political reserve. Unless we do, we may, with not less 
reward, found our politics upon a Wordsworthian contemplation of 
Nature. 
In all questions of politics we have to fix the mind as closely and 
definitely as possible on the facts that go to make up a " case," as the 
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lawyer says; a " situation," as the political historian says. In questions 
international in character that is pre-eminently the desideratum, and it 
is pre-eminently the difficulty owing to the variety of the regions from 
which we have to draw the material for our survey. It is necessary to 
eschew facile generalisation. One of the best safeguards against such 
fatal facility is found in impartially presenting to the mind the points 
of view, as of a Castlereagh and a Mackintosh, that are politically 
pertinent, and that have been historically disclosed, on any international 
question. 
The Vienna Congress.—The discussions, for example, on the transfer of 
Genoa in 1815 against the wishes of the Genoese are fruitful in lessons for 
the historical and political inquirer; and Sir James Mackintosh's reasoaing 
may be commended to many who hold themselves to be his political repre­
sentatives to-day. He detested " the modern doctrine of rounding 
territory and following natural boundaries, and melting down small States 
into masses, and substituting lines of defence, and right and left flanks, 
instead of justice and the law of nations, and ancient possession and 
national feeling : the system of Louis XIV and Napoleon, of the spoilers 
of Poland, and the spoilers of Norway and Genoa."1 According to 
Mackintosh, the security of all States was the essential principle under­
lying the balance of power, and was its justification. The statesmen of 
the Congress seemed to him to be guilty of the stupendous mistake of 
arrogating to themselves the power to make nations, and to make them 
of irreconcilable elements, just as the authors of the French Revolution 
were guilty of the gross error of thinking that human skill could make a 
government. We may not agree with the speaker's high tribute to what 
he called " the ancient principle " ; but we can all, at least, support his 
plea, that nationality has often been preserved by the very variety of 
irregularities of frontier and inequalities of strength that are often dreaded, 
as well as by the diversity of character that is to be looked for and wel­
comed among different peoples, each contributing in the resources of 
material wealth and of mind to the sum of civilisation. 
The Principle of Nationality.—The principle of nationality has been 
a considerable welding and conserving force in society. That is the 
central argument for it, as was emphasised by Mr. Balfour in a noteworthy 
address at Oxford about a year ago. " The basis of the principle of 
nationality was that people who had this consciousness of nationality 
could naturally and easily work together as one community." In so far 
as political order and continuity are thereby promoted, nationality 
furthers the true interest of a State. But too much must not be read 
into the rough and crude generalisation from the history of politics, that 
the State which is founded on nationality is the strongest and most 
durable. There is a nationalism that is exclusive, and that separates, as 
well as a nationalism that unites and incorporates. Like religion, it may 
be peace-bearer and militant; it may both unite and divide. In so far as 
1 Hansard (for April 27, 1815), vol. xxx, 919-20. 
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nationality does not detract from, and helps towards, the identity and 
durability of a State, and to the sense of the whole consciously felt through­
out its members, including those who are not of pure descent, it is all for 
good. But nationality, at its best, is after all only a factor towards the 
building and the maintenance of a State—only one, although it is a main, 
contribution towards those living memories and feelings, the successes 
and the failures of men living together as a society, that have gone to 
the making of the State, for that society of men. It may assert itself 
out of proportion, both within the State and beyond its boundaries. There 
is a spurious, unrestrained nationalism, as there is a spurious, unrestrained 
internationalism. There is the nationalism of enthusiasm, partly fed by 
pride in the past, and there is the internationalism of emotionalism, largely 
fed by superabundance of faith in the future. A nationalism of this type 
can contribute little to a true international understanding, and may 
hinder much. The spurious internationalism despises and overrules even 
the true nationality that has helped in the building of stable States, 
which it is the function of International Law to protect. The true interest 
of a State, which is itself the meeting and harmonising of parts in relation 
to a whole, points to the recognition and acceptance of an abiding interest 
of a Society of States ; and this larger interest must look to and depend 
upon, even while it should give colour and tone to, the interest of the part. 
We may take, as a helpful analogy, an Assembly of Estates, and a repre­
sentative Parliament. In the first, interests are regarded as separate, 
and are even antagonistic to each other, and, with no provision for arbitra­
ment, a deadlock is the natural consequence. But where there is a 
representative Parliament the interests are mingled and combined. They 
are viewed together in relation to a whole : a general interest is recognised 
although it may not always prevail. It is the argument for an Inter­
national High Court; and we are not unmindful of a conciliar movement, 
which has been described as the last hope of mediaeval Christendom. 
Nationality and Democracy.—The advocates of the doctrine of nation­
ality have usually spoken in the language of democracy. The change, said 
Cavour in April 1861, which had just been accomplished in Italy had been 
inspired by the principle of liberty (like, he said, the English Revolution 
of 1688) ; it had also been founded on the right of nationality, from which 
it derived additional force. It has seemed necessary to show that a 
people has been conscious of being a people, and can strive towards " self "-
expression, and is prepared to submit to sacrifices for it. But we must 
not conclude that " the people," with a continuous declaration of the 
opinion of the majority, and of successive and changing majorities, is to 
direct and control the State thus founded. These are different problems 
—the assertion of a people as distinct from others, and it may be in 
opposition to one other in particular ; and the manner of rule which 
that people is ready to accept and according to its wisdom applies for its 
own internal well-being. We must not confuse, as if they were a political 
identity, Horatius keeping the bridge and Brutus driving out the tyrant; 
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and a Stein may appeal to and use the people against the national 
oppressor, and be no democrat when that oppressor has himself been 
crushed. The nation is the whole body of citizens ; the " will " of this 
body is sovereign ; we accept the will of the numerical majority as the 
will of all, and we trust that the will of all may be the general will—the 
will for the general good. That is only one line of reasoning. There is 
another. The general interest may not be appreciated and expressed 
by the numerical majority, and yet it is the general interest, and not of 
to-day merely, for which the State stands, and for which it is endowed 
with instruments and officers. The problem of democracy is a problem of 
the historical endowment of a people, and of its political aptitude. Peoples 
who have to break with their past are forced to take refuge in rationalism, 
and in the over-mastering sway of principles. Political principles are 
historico-ethical, but not for all peoples, and not similarly for any two 
peoples. We seek in customary laws evidence of the life of a people, and 
the explanation of what has gone to the building up of a people out of a 
population. Customary democracies are as yet few, but they are the 
only true democracies. In an article written many years ago, on the 
publication of Mr. (now Lord) Bryce's The American Commonwealth— 
and one does not forget that a proposed blessing on " our nation " was 
transformed into a blessing on " these United States "—Mr. Woodrow 
Wilson remarked that the task still remained of explaining democracy 
" by " America with a view to supplementing the admirable explanation 
of democracy " in " America, and he remarked further that the English 
alone have approached popular institutions through habit. These are 
highly suggestive remarks, whether they are well and truly founded or 
not. Democracy cannot be the same for all peoples: as the people, so 
in large measure its constitution and government. We have to be toler­
ably sure of making democracy safe for the world before we press it, or its 
adaptation (for there is no one-and-only democracy), upon the world— 
the several peoples of the world—for acceptance. The doubts in regard 
to democracy are more instructive than the certainties, for it is only the 
ardent disciples who have worked out all the sums and heed not the 
sacrifice of the principle of liberty to mere quantity. But the doubts are 
still many and grave. The right, apart from the expediency, of the 
ascendancy of the numerical majority is not generally accepted, and, if 
right carries with it power, still there is no justification of tyranny merely 
through possession of the power to tyrannise. That the majority has a 
right (in Locke's phrase) to conclude the rest has come to be a working 
convention, but it is subject to grave qualification in principle, as well as 
to much and unavoidable violation in practice. How and when are we 
sure that we have the deliberate will or considered opinion of " the 
majority " ? Does democracy depend upon the vote and ascendancy of 
" the odd man " ? Is the appeal only from the odd man drunk to the 
odd man (we hope) sober ? What is the sphere of the boss and the caucus, 
and of a party press or a controlled press ? What (and it is an essential 
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question) is the proportion of active to passive opinion ? Does democracy 
require an economic community in sympathy with it, " empire," in the 
seventeenth-century phrase, following the balance of property, or, as 
the phrase now is, economic power preceding and controlling political 
power ? Or, is government an empire of laws, and not of men—not of 
present-day erring men merely ? Are these fundamentals that it is well to 
agree upon, and well to secure in a written and rigid constitution ; and 
why ? On the reasoning of democracy and of nationality, what right has 
one people, or the constituted sovereign of that people, or of more than 
one, to prescribe what shall be the constitution and the consequent 
manner of life for another people ? 
The Plebiscite and " Sell-determination."—Questions of this 
character take us to the very heart of public policy to-day. 
They are, for example, intimately involved in the application of the 
plebiscite. The plebiscite holds a not insignificant place for the 
student of the history of modern Europe, as well as in present-day inter­
national politics. It has received much attention from writers on the 
Continent of Europe, but very little in Britain. Lately it has been 
made the subject of two useful works by American writers.1 Their 
publication should do good by inviting attention to the circumstances 
in which plebiscites have been used in questions of separation, cession and 
annexation. The lesson is the expected one, that circumstances alter 
cases ; and, as Sir John Macdonell said in the discussion on a paper 2 
dealing with this subject read before the Grotius Society, whereas on the 
Continent of Europe the disposition is to start from general principles, 
in England the disposition is to start from a particular case; and he 
doubted whether it is possible to formulate general rules. As in most 
questions, differences are more worthy of inquiry—they are more striking 
and more instructive—than resemblances. In answer to a question put 
by Lord Rosebery at the time of the proposed cession of Heligoland to 
Germany, Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
said that he saw no necessity of taking a plebiscite of the inhabitants, 
and that the plebiscite was not " among the traditions " of Britain. A 
1 (a) A Monograph on Plebiscites, with a Collection of Official Documents, by 
Sarah Wambaugh. Prepared under the supervision of James Scott Brown, Director 
of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920, pp. xxxv. (including a biblio­
graphical list of six pages) + 1088, of which pp. 1-169 give a well-presented study 
of the theory and practice of plebiscites in relation to national self-determination 
and changes of sovereignty, and pp. 173-1072 give a valuable collection of historical 
documents, extending from the period of the French Revolution to the separation of 
Norway from Sweden in 1905. There are useful footnotes. 
(b) The Employment of the Plebiscite in the Determination of Sovereignty (Johns 
Hopkins University Studies), by Johannes Mattern, Assistant Librarian in the 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920, pp. ix -f 214. 
The work is well planned, and the design is skilfully carried out. The three con­
cluding chapters show much discrimination and insight. 
1 Plebiscites and the League of Nations Covenant, by Dr. Paul de Auer, Avocat, 
Budapest: Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. vi, 1921. 
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plebiscite might be "an awkward precedent " for other parts of the 
Empire—that multi-cellular British " State " to which it has taxed the 
acumen of jurist and statesman to fix a label from the laboratory of 
politics. 
The meaning of things historical and political is found in their origin 
and in their end. The origin of the plebiscite as a rough-and-ready 
political instrument was the imperfectly representative character of 
government as constituted in Continental States in the eighteenth century, 
and the growth of a body of political doctrine subversive of the very 
foundation of such States. Prescription, in part outworn, had to yield 
to reason, aspiring and unrestrained. Even in England the system of 
representative government was not representative. The end that was 
sought was government by consent. Rousseau inspired ; and Rous-
seauism, in its dominant pre-requisites of civic education, and a high 
social purpose for men in small self-sustaining communities, could not be 
complied with. " Sovereignty belongs only to the people. . . . Every 
people has alone the right to give itself its laws, and the inalienable right 
of changing, its laws." This historic declaration was of profound signifi­
cance for both the internal and the external politics of revolutionary 
France. But the definitive in word is often the inconclusive in fact. 
When Bonaparte asked Cambaceres what a law is, and what could be 
settled by law, and how much the consuls could do in their Council of 
State by reglements, without calling in the Legislature, Cambaceres 
answered that a reglement is only the particular application of the law ; 
the law is the general rule made by those who have the right and the 
power to make it. Bonaparte smiled ; and he did not pursue the 
inquiry further. 
It is necessary for representative government to combine capacity 
and consent, to add the merit of aristocracy to the hypothesis of demo­
cracy. The modern democracy for large communities must be mediate. 
It cannot be direct'; and yet the direct vote of the whole body of citizens, 
or of the whole adult population, as well as the approval of a second House, 
may be an additional security; and one may support the Referendum 
while rejecting the Initiative. Much of the opposition to the adoption 
of the plebiscite has been due to the preference of a mediate and better-
informed manifestation of opinion to an immediate and worse-informed, 
and much of it has been due to the way in which revolutionary or post-
Revolution France applied the doctrine of the plebiscite at once to 
encourage secession from an old allegiance in favour of France, and to 
discourage, by threat of the death-penalty, the proposal to cede any part 
of the soil of France to a foreign Power. 
The former of these grounds of objection to the plebiscite—that of 
the preference for a mediate democracy—is only in part tenable. In 
some of the best-known votes—for example, the Italian plebiscites of 
1848, i860, 1866 and 1870—the vote was practically that of the whole 
adult male population. In other cases, however, not only has the 
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vote been taken on a limited suffrage, but the vote has been a vote 
for delegates with instructions to an assembly convoked ad hoc. 
In the early case of the union of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin 
with the French Republic,1 in 1791, we are brought to the very root of 
most of our doubts and inquiries. The discussions turned chiefly on the 
following questions : Is the vote free ? Is it sufficiently expressed under 
legal and solemn forms ? Is it to the interest of France to accept the 
union ? Is it to the interest of both Avignon and France that there be a 
union ? Will other States accept it ? 
If the doctrine of the plebiscite is open to question and grave limitation 
in the internal affairs of a State, it is even more liable to question in 
external and international affairs. It is now exceptional not to safeguard 
the fundamental, constitutional law of a State by placing it beyond 
the immediate range of majorities. That fact should of itself suggest the 
need for insisting on the most deliberate procedure before disturbing the 
being and stability of a State, in the light of its own sovereignty and in 
the eyes of other States, by inducing the loss of part of its population 
through secession or transference. The methods of the wire-puller 
and the caucus are far from being appropriate to the determining of these 
questions; and while a Charles Albert is collecting votes, a Radetzky 
may be collecting men. A vote, " popular," well-informed, is useful 
and in certain circumstances may be necessary as an expression of opinion 
and as a help towards a decision. But there are important factors, not of 
the moment only, to be brought into the reckoning, and, whereas in a 
question of internal politics the decision may be temporary, and may be 
revoked (for a minority has a right to work to become a majority), in a 
question of sovereignty over a number of people, part of a population 
forming the living representation of a State, the decision is meant to 
be final, is a matter of the loss of a member—a matter, it may be, of life 
and death—and is justified, if justified it be, only in the success of the 
settled fact. In general, the conclusion must be that a State, having 
regard to its own constituted authority, cannot concede to part of the 
population within its territorial sovereignty a right of secession based 
upon a right of self-determination. That is almost a truism. But it is 
sufficient. We have to protect the State against its own dissolution, and, 
as a minimum, and for a beginning, we fix the canon against self-slaughter. 
In seeking to pay deference to the principle of nationality, and in striving 
to represent the nation, we must not dissolve the State. 
But the receiving of allegiance carries with it the duty of protection. 
Even the master of absolutists laid down that the obligation to obey 
continues only so long as the power to protect and to provide contentment 
through good laws ; and, according to one whom Hobbes's contemporary 
statesman-critic held to be a better philosopher than the author of the 
Leviathan, securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est. Where the incon­
veniences of allegiance seem by well-proved experience vastly to out-
1 Wambaugh, ibid., pp. 173-268. 
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weigh the advantages men will rebel: there remains the ultimate " appeal 
to Heaven," whether it be to the sword or to an International High Court 
of Justice. All may conclude, with the apologist of the Revolution not 
made but prevented, that to teach that there is this ultimate right to be 
acted upon by men in a State is far from laying a perpetual foundation for 
disorder, although great was the influence of the apologist for 1688 upon 
those who, almost a century later, dissolved " the political bands " that 
connected them (they did not thus express themselves) with their own 
people, and proceeded " to assume among the Powers of the earth the 
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's 
God " seemed to entitle them. Every Declaration of Independence should 
show a decent respect to the opinions of mankind, and of men, and not 
of one generation only. But the lessons of July the Fourth are lessons of 
the failure of members of one people, with faults on both sides, to preserve 
attachment to a larger loyalty, rather than lessons in the "right of a 
people to self-determination." 
The Aalands Islands Question.—In the Report of the Committee of 
three jurists 1 to whom was referred the question of the Aaland Islands, 
with the majority vote of the islanders in favour of union with Sweden, 
there is a statement of the principle of self-determination and of the rights 
of peoples that may well be admitted to a source-book for the under­
standing of the international politics of to-day : 
Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an important 
part in modern political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be 
pointed out that there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. The recognition of this principle in a certain number of inter­
national treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same 
footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations. 
On the contrary, in the absence of express provisions in international 
treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute 
of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not 
recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the 
State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more 
than it recognises the right of other States to claim such a separation. Gene­
rally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of 
determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method is, 
exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively 
constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, 
under normal conditions, therefore, bears upon a question which International 
Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. 
Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a 
State, and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability 
which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in the term 
" State," but would also endanger the interests of the international com-
1 See Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, No. 3, October 
1920. For some criticism of the Report see Professor Vlught's La Question des ties 
d'Aland (pp. 82), and Rtponse au Livre Bleu du Gouvernement de Sudde (pp. 29) : 
Leyden, 1921. 
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munity. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, 
neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be 
attached, nor by any other State. 
That is a concise, clear and helpful statement. But it is followed, 
at a short interval, by a statement concise enough, but neither helpful 
nor clear : 
If one part of a State actually separates itself from that State, the separa­
tion is necessarily limited in its effect to the population of the territory which 
has taken part in the act of separation. Though the political projects 
leading to the separation may be manifested in different ways in different 
parts of the territory, nevertheless these projects all have an equal value as a 
foundation for the new legal order, though of course only in so far as those 
who adopt them are able to maintain them. It may even be said that if a 
separation occurs from a political organism which is more or less autonomous 
and which is itself de facto in process of political transformation, this organism 
cannot at the very moment when it transforms itself outside the domain of 
positive law invoke the principles of this law in order to force upon a national 
group a political status which the latter refuses to accept. 
In this statement (1) the opening words are questionable in expression 
and in political thought, since there is a confusion between population 
and State ; (2) an attempt is made to distinguish the various motives of 
parts of the population that agree in making a change of political status, 
but due allowance is not made for the fact that it is through that concerted 
action of the parts that the change is effected ; and (3) we are being 
invited to transport, for a time, the subject-status of at least part of the 
population to thin air 01 to dreamland or fairyland. The Finlanders claim 
to have been autonomous since 1809. Even, however, if Finland be 
termed a full State only from the Russian Revolution, we have to reason 
from the controlling facts that, after proclaiming her independence, she 
had her status as an independent sovereign State recognised by other 
States, including Sweden,1 and that the population of the Aaland Archi­
pelago is within that State, unless and until a change of sovereignty should 
be determined for it. A very large proportion—over 90 per cent.—of 
the Aaland Islanders declared in favour of a union with Sweden. But 
with this expression of a preference must be taken the fact, which is 
referred to in the Report of the Jurists, but with striking lack of perspec­
tive, that the Swedish element in the population of the Aaland Islands 
is only a small part of the total Swedish population in Finland. The 
Aaland Islanders number only 22,000 (obviously—as all admit—no fit 
1 M. Branting to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, July 9, 1921 : 
" Le 4 janvier 1918, le Gouvernement Suedois a reconnu la Finlande comme un 
litat independant et souverain, cette reconnaissance etant sans reserve, mais il est 
evident qu'un acte de ce genre implique seulement la reconnaissance d'un Gouverne­
ment 16gal et constitue, mais nullement celle des frontieres de ce meme £tat. Des 
conflits peuvent toujours surgir au sujet des frontieres entre des fitats voisins. . . ." 
The worth of this statement ceases at the words " sans reserve." But there is 
significance in the words that follow. 
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body for an independent State), whereas there are 320,000 Swedes in the 
Abo Archipelago and on the mainland, subjects of Finland, and forming 
about 11 per cent, of the total population of Finland. 
The question, accordingly, of the Aaland Islands seemed to resolve 
itself into a question of the protection due within and by the State to 
an exceptional element in the population from which the State, as an 
economic and political whole, claimed allegiance ; in other words, a 
question of guarantee of settled rule and of satisfying legitimate aspira­
tions towards comfortable, commodious living. In the words of the 
Commission of Rapporteurs appointed by the League of Nations : " The 
separation of a minority from a State of which it forms a part and its 
incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether 
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or 
the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees." The 
Finnish State has shown readiness to provide guarantees of this quality 
touching language—" the very soul of the people "—and civil and 
political rights and powers. The decision of the Council of the League 
in June last should have influences for good. It should put a check to 
lax interpretations of what constitutes a " people," and to a tendency, 
begotten of domestic politics, and a disease of the times, to undermine 
the quality of the State, while it utters a warning against rule that is 
arbitrary and oppressive. 
THE NATIONALITY OF COMPANIES. 
[Contributed by LIEUT.-COLONEL F. NORRIS.] 
THE grounds on which the nationality of a company ought to be decided 
form admittedly one of the most important legal problems which have 
been brought into prominence by the war, and M. Pepy's work1 appears 
to be a serious contribution to the study of the question. Briefly, the 
problem to be solved seems to be the following: Is the nationality of a 
company to be determined by that of the majority of its shareholders 
and directors, or by that of the locality of its place of incorporation or 
registered office ? 
So far as French legislation is concerned, neither the Code of Com­
merce, the laws of 1857, 1867 or 1893, the Decrees of January 22, 1868, 
nor that of July 10, 1901, referring to Insurance Companies, deals directly 
with this question. Even the law of November 22, 1913, which enables 
changes to be made in the articles of a company at a general meeting of 
the shareholders, while prohibiting any change in its nationality, is silent 
as to how this nationality is to be determined. This question has, how­
ever, been constantly before the French Tribunals since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. A problem, for instance, that has often arisen is 
that of whether Articles 13, 14 and 16 of the Civil Code, which deal with 
the rights of foreigners to sue and be sued in the French Courts, are 
applicable to companies. 
A decision of the Civil Tribunal of Lille of May 21, 1908, seems to 
summarise the attitude of the French Courts to this question prior to the 
war. 
Attendu que les societes de meme que les individus ont une nationalite 
. . . ; que la plupart des auteurs et la j urisprudence . . . se sont mjs d'accord 
pour admettre que la nationalite d'une societe s'etablit par son siege social, 
pourvu qu'il soit serieux et non fictif, parce que l'on ne peut avoir, malgre 
les difficultes d'appreciation, qu'un domicile tandisque le lieu de l'acte con-
stitutif de la societe ferait dependre la nationalite de la volonte des parties, 
ce qui donnerait trop de facilites a la fraude ; que la nationalite des fondateurs 
ou des actionnaires est sujette a des variations constantes, et ne peut etre un 
criterium a propos d'une societe qui constitue un etre independant doue d'une 
personalite propre, et souvent d'une societe de capitaux a I'intuitus personal, 
ne joue aucun role; que la lieu d'exploitation peut se repartir entre plusieurs 
pays et par suite ne pas etre unique. 
1 La Nationality des Societes. Andre Pepy, Librairie de la Societe du Recueil 
Sirey. 
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However, when, on the outbreak of war in 1914, all the belligerents 
enacted special measures, dealing with the persons of enemy subjects, 
and their property, the question arose almost immediately as to whether 
a company with a majority of enemy shareholders and directors should be 
deemed to enjoy the benefits of French nationality, solely because its 
registered office happened to be situated in French territory. Why, 
indeed, did it follow that the accomplishment of the formalities necessary 
for establishing the registered office of a company should bring into 
existence, not only a legal being, but one endowed with all the advantages 
of nationality ? 
A French decree of September 27, 1914, prohibited commercial rela­
tions between Frenchmen and the subjects of Germany and Austria, and 
a further decree of November 7,1915, extended the prohibition to dealings 
with Bulgarians, while a law of April 4, 1915, had already imposed penal­
ties for the infringement of the former decree. 
The application of these decrees soon forced the French Courts to 
modify their former decisions that French nationality was conferred on 
a company, whose registered office was in France, independent of the 
nationality of the majority of its shareholders and directors, and the real 
object of its activities. A start was made in this direction by the seques­
tration of the shares and interests belonging to alien enemies, although 
the companies themselves, as separate entities, were still regarded as being 
of French nationality. This solution of the difficulty did not, however, 
by any means satisfy either public opinion, or indeed appear to be based 
in the circumstances on any equitable grounds, and the Tribunals soon 
began boldly to overrule their former decisions, and to decide the question 
of the nationality of a company according to its origin, sources of capital, 
personnel and the real aim and object of its activities. Indeed, a distinct 
tendency towards this change appears as far back as October, 1914, in a 
judgment of the Civil Tribunal of Le Havre. 
Attendu que nous estimons qu'il est dans l'interet de la defense nationale 
de saisir—arreter toutes les marchandises de quelque nature qu'elles soient, 
appartenant a la maison N. et Cie qui jusqu'a preuve du contraire, parait 
avoir ete constitute uniquement avec des capitaux allemands, qu'il est de 
notoriete publique que cette maison est administree exclusivement par des 
capitalistes de cette nationalite. . . . 
There were, naturally, however, many cases before the Courts which 
were difficult to decide, owing to the intimate and far-reaching effects 
of German financial operations, as, for instance, that of the Aron Elec­
tricity Meter, Ltd., of London and Navarre (Civil Tribunals of the 
Seine, May 8, 1917 ; Revue de droit international prive, 1917, p. 316). 
In this case the Meter Company Aron of Levallois-Perrett had been 
sequestrated, and the Aron Electricity Meter Company applied for the 
order of sequestration to be rescinded on the ground that they were in 
reality the owners of the company's capital. It was, however, shown 
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that at the last general meeting of the French company a majority of 
the shares were in German hands, that the Managing Director who 
exercised a preponderating influence in the conduct of the company's 
affairs was a German, and that in fact the different British and French 
companies which had been constituted to exploit the Aron Meters were, 
according to a German Prospectus, affiliated to the Elektrizitatzahler-
fabrik of Berlin-Charlottenburg, although it must be stated that the 
company's property in Berlin had been sequestrated as being that of 
an enemy company. The French Tribunal affirmed the sequestration 
order while acknowledging "que les rapports entre la societe allemande, 
anglaise, frangaise, sont incertains." 
In many cases the French Tribunals appear at first, however, as in the 
case of the Conserves de Lenzbourg (Revue de droit international prive, 1916, 
p. 248), to have deliberately avoided directly overruling former decisions 
as to what conferred French nationality on a company, and to have 
enforced the Decree of September 27, 1914, sequestrating the property 
of companies with a preponderating enemy influence, while admitting, 
as the Lyons Tribunal did in this case, " qu'il parait difficile de lui 
contester de titre de Societe frangaise." 
The guiding principles in these cases seem indeed to be well summed 
up by M. l'avocat general Godefroy in the Freitag (Cour de Paris, 
February 27, 1917, Clunet, 1917, p. 1457) and " Societe des mines de 
Carberry " cases (Journal des Soc., 1917, p. 94), cases in the following 
phrases: 
Actuellement et depuis le decret du 27 th Septembre, 1914, la j urisprudence 
d'avant-guerre ne saurait plus etre invoquee utilement, et il faut admettre 
des principes tous difierents . . . ce ne sont plus les principes du Droit Prive 
mais ceux du Droit Public qui doivent triompher en la matiere et nous guider. 
These principles are also expressed in almost the same language in a 
circular of the Garde des Sceaux, which was intended to assure the applica­
tion of the law of 1916 respecting the declaration of property owned by 
enemy subjects in France, and are reproduced in a circular of December 11, 
1918, concerning the sequestration of enemy property in Alsace and 
Lorraine. These two circulars state that, as far as declarations and 
sequestrations are concerned, " les personnes morales " must be assimilated 
to individuals; but, 
il ne saurait etre fait etat, a l'egard des societes, de leur nationalite d'apparence. 
Les formes juridiques dont la societe est revetue, le lieu de son principal 
6tablissement, la nationalite des associes, gerants ou membres du conseil du 
surveillance, tous les indices auxquels s'attache le Droit Prive pour determiner 
la nationalite d'une societe sont inoperants alors qu'il s'agit de fixer au point 
d'une du Droit Public, le caractere reel de cette societe. 
Coming to the present time, it would appear that, in the view of French 
jurisprudence, the decisions given during the war as to the grounds on 
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which the nationality of a company should be decided ought still to be 
maintained. In fact, it would appear that France is to-day searching for 
a formula which will completely prevent the establishment within its 
frontiers of a company whose activities, in spite of its apparent French 
nationality, are in reality opposed to the political and commercial interests 
of the country. It is even maintained by some that the right of foreigners 
to float a company in France, or even to become a shareholder in an 
existing company, is in question. The general trend of suggested legisla­
tive measures is to view the activities of foreigners in this connection 
with grave suspicion. 
There are some interesting comparisons in M. Pepy's book between 
French legislation and that of other countries, and reference is naturally 
made to the decision of the House of Lords in the Daimler Co. Ltd. v. 
Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (Great Britain) Ltd., reported in 1916 
2 A.C. 307, in which it was held by a majority, reversing the majority 
decision of the Court of Appeal, that in spite of the incorporation of the 
respondent company in England, the circumstances were such as to 
require investigation in reference to the control and management of the 
company. Lord Halsbury held that the company was in substance 
a hostile partnership, and that any payment to it would be illegal, as 
trading with the enemy. The similarity of this decision with that given 
by the French Tribunals seems to require no further demonstration. 
The evolution of Egyptian jurisprudence in the same sense is also 
touched on, and also shows a resolution to abandon the old theory of 
looking solely to the registered office of a company to determine its 
nationality, instead of taking into consideration the nationality and civil 
domicile of the shareholders, and especially that of the directors and 
management, who, if they constitute a foreign element, should determine 
the national status of the company. 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that a pamphlet has just been 
published by M. Carlo Piola Caselli, entitled La Nazionalita delle Societa 
Commerciali e il Registro dei Commercanti, which deals with the same 
question as M. Pepy's work, and contains references to the latter. 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 
[Contributed by R. FEETHAM, ESQ., K.C.] 
THE full title of the volume of Tagore lectures, delivered in 1918 at 
Calcutta by Mr. Ghose, who is a vakil of the High Court, is Comparative 
Administrative Law, with special reference to the organisation and legal 
position of the administrative authorities in British India.1 The lecturer 
deals with Administrative Law in the sense in which that term is used in 
Professor Goodnow's work, which was published with a similar title in 
1897. The present work, however, takes in some respects a wider range 
than Professor Goodnow's, which was limited to a study of the administra­
tive systems of England, the United States, France and Germany. Mr. 
Ghose includes other European countries in his general survey, while 
making India his central theme. He also enters at some length into a 
consideration of the theoretical and constitutional implications under­
lying administrative law ; his work thus claims attention, not only as a 
legal textbook by an eminent Indian lawyer, but also as a political treatise 
parts of which have a bearing, more or less direct, on the new Government 
of India Act, and the scheme of constitutional reform which it embodies. 
It is right to pay a tribute, not only to Mr. Ghose's learning and 
industry, but also to the wisdom and sanity of the political comments 
which are to be found in his pages. 
" The aim of a sound system of administrative law," he says, " should not 
be to cripple the powers of the State, but to provide effective guarantees that 
these will be wisely exercised. ... A sound body of administrative law must 
therefore be a compromise between the claims of extreme autocracy on the 
one hand, and extreme legalism on the other." 
He lays down that " Administration implies the performance of a 
trust " and proceeds : 
Administrative law, rightly viewed, is the body of rules and principles by 
which Governments seek to discharge this trust with efficiency, and yet without 
avoidable injury to individual rights and interests. A sound body of ad­
ministrative law can grow only on a double foundation of the recognition 
by the State of the worth of each individual citizen for his own sake, and of a 
corresponding recognition by the citizens as a whole of the indispensability 
in their own interest of a living, working, and efficiently organised Govern­
ment, animated by a single desire to fulfil its trust. 
In examining how this trust has been fulfilled by the Government of 
1 Calcutta. Butterworth & Co. (India), Ltd., 1919. 
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India in the past, Mr. Ghose recognises the two important limitations on 
the autocracy of that Government which have arisen (i) from the fact 
that in its corporate character it has been liable to suit, by any private 
individual; and (2) from the fact that, though charged with plenary 
powers, it has laid down very strict rules regulating its own activities, 
and thus, as it were, by a series of self-denying ordinances, restricted its 
liberty of action. Mr. Ghose comments on the extent to which Indian 
legislatures, both central and provincial, had, up to the date at which 
his lectures were written, remained under official control, but points out 
that this fact must not be allowed to obscure their importance and the 
effect they have had on the tone and temper of the administration : 
There is, it is true, hardly any law which the Government may not get 
passed in any of the Legislative Councils in India, or which it may not pro­
hibit or veto if it so wills. But, for all that, it cannot and will not act without 
the sanction of a rule of law formally passed and promulgated. The Execu­
tive, in other words, has to, and does habitually act in the open, and according 
to set rules, and not arbitrarily and in secrecy. The laws passed by Legis­
latures so constituted may not always be unexceptionable as laws, but they 
are none the less laws which, being laws, must place some limitations on 
the arbitrary exercise of powers. 
In this latter connection reference is made to such enactments as the 
State Prisoners Regulations and the Internment Ordinances under the 
Defence of India Act, and the Rowlatt Bill, which was passing through 
the Indian Legislature at the time when the book was in the press. As 
to this, Mr. Ghose comments : 
The number of statutes which have thus proceeded to make the Executive, 
in certain matters, " a law unto themselves," far-reaching as some of them are 
in their operation, is, I believe, not yet very numerous. 
Though regretting the provisions of such exceptional laws as are 
referred to above, Mr. Ghose sums up thus : 
Not only, therefore, is there in India the " rule of law," but it is of the 
same kind as that obtaining in England. It is this that has given stability 
to an alien Government. Those who aver that Orientals have no appreciation 
for any but personal rule, and that the one solution of the growing difficulties 
of administration in India is to erect Collectors of districts into petty despots, 
unchecked even by the administrative control of the higher Executive and 
unhampered by law, misread both history and human nature. The stability 
of British rule in India is best explained by the contrast it presents to the 
Oriental rule which preceded it. It was personal, it was arbitrary. It was, 
as the early English administrators justly complained, " not based on written 
rules and plain principles." 
This recognition of the essential merit of British administration in 
India by an Indian lawyer may fitly be set side by side with the following 
statement contained in the final paragraph of the report of the Joint 
Select Committee of the two Houses of Parliament on the Government 
of India Bill, 1919 : 
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The Government of India has accomplished great things for India's good, 
and one of its greatest services has been the introduction into India of a reign 
of law to which the Government itself is as much subject as the people it 
governs. 
Mr. Ghose deals with two points of special interest in relation to the 
reforms scheme, to which reference may be made. 
(1) The limit which past conditions have necessarily imposed on 
provincial autonomy ; and 
(2) The method of controlling the distribution of powers between the 
Central Government and the provinces. 
As to provincial autonomy, Mr. Ghose touches the root of the matter 
when he recognises " the necessary relation between measures of adminis­
trative decentralisation and the establishment of local representative 
institutions." 
" The conclusion," he says, " to which an impartial study of administra­
tion, English and foreign, seems to point is that a close supervision on the 
part of a central administration is inseparable from the delegation of large 
discretionary powers to individual agents. Governments of continental 
Europe (starting from conditions closely similar to those obtaining in India) 
were in fact unable to effect administrative decentralisation until after they 
had learned to associate the representatives of the people in the localities 
with agents of the Government in the work of administration." 
This is, in fact, a recognition of the position as stated by Mr. Montagu 
in expounding the scheme of Indian reforms, that the two alternatives 
between which a choice has ultimately to be made in the government 
of India are—government by despatch under the control of the British 
Parliament, and government by vote of the Indian electorate. One of 
the main objects of the Government of India Act, 1919, as recognised in 
its preamble, is to give to the provinces " in provincial matters the largest 
measure of independence of the government of India which is compatible 
with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities "; the 
new Act has, for the first time, rendered possible the attainment of this 
ideal of provincial autonomy by the creation of a new source of authority 
in the new provincial legislatures, and the extended electorates to which 
the provincial governments must henceforth look for guidance and 
support. 
As to the distribution of powers between the central and provincial 
governments, and the central and provincial legislatures, Mr. Ghose in 
his ninth lecture refers to the essential features of federal unions, among 
which he notes, in common with other writers, " that there must be a 
common tribunal empowered to interpret the prescriptions of the federal 
constitution, to judge of the respective spheres of the Union and State 
Governments, and to hold in restraint the tendencies of each to encroach 
upon the domain assigned by the Constitution to the other." 1 In India, 
1 Cf. Professor Dicey's Introduction to eighth edition of Law of the Constitution. 
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as he says, the distribution of powers between central and provincial 
authorities was, prior to the Act of 1919, entirely a matter of executive 
arrangement, and was not provided by law. 
Rules made under the new Act have for the first time classified the 
various powers of Government as central or provincial, according as they 
are to be exercised in future by the central Government or by provincial 
governments; but this classification remains a matter of domestic arrange­
ment, as between the Governments concerned, and cannot be made the 
subject of legal decision in the Courts. The distribution of powers is still 
in effect left to executive authority, which has to interpret and apply the 
rules laid down; but the executive authority, which is ultimately respon­
sible for seeing that the frontiers, as marked out by the rules, are not 
overstepped, is an executive authority which exercises its control from the 
outside, namely, the Secretary of State for India.1 
Under the new system of government, this distribution of powers 
between central and provincial authorities has become a matter of far 
greater importance than in the past, because it no longer affects merely 
the conventions of official Governments, but the powers of elected legisla­
tures, and the ministers responsible to such legislatures. It is a notable 
fact that in the quasi-federal system, now in operation in British India, 
an external executive authority is to take the place of the legal tribunal, 
which in ordinary federations is regarded as essential for the purpose of 
enforcing the division between central and provincial powers. 
1 Rule 4 made under Government of India Act, 1919, s. 1, provides that, in case 
of doubt, the Governor-General in Council is to decide whether a particular matter 
does or does not relate to a provincial subject; but s. 33 of the " principal Act "— 
the Government of India Act—requires the Governor-General in Council " to pay 
due obedience to all such orders as he may receive from the Secretary of State." 
ROMAN-DUTCH v.  ENGLISH LAW OF SALE. 
[Contributed by SIR MACKENZIE D. CHALMERS, K.C.B.] 
MR. MACKEURTAN, K.C., of the South African Bar, has written an admir­
able monograph on the Roman-Dutch law of sale, or, as he calls it, the 
" Sale of Goods in South Africa." Apart from its intrinsive merits, his 
book presents several aspects of interest to the English lawyer. It is of 
interest to see how the old Roman law of the Digest and the Institutes 
can adapt its rules to the changing requirements of modern life and 
commerce. But the way in which Mr. MacKeurtan has done his work 
gives a more practical interest to his book. Where rules of Roman-
Dutch and English law are in accord he freely cites English reported 
cases, and freely and frankly criticises them when occasion arises. Through­
out the book he is not content with merely recording rules and decisions, 
but he raises and investigates doubtful points and gives his opinion 
thereon. As he puts it in his preface, " Where these opinions are right, it 
is time they were recorded ; where they are wrong, I anticipate speedy 
correction." When an English lawyer runs up against a difficulty in 
dealing with the law of sale he would often find it helpful to see how the 
point is dealt with in the Roman-Dutch law. Roman law is the founda­
tion of Scottish law, and an inexhaustible store of legal principles : 
" The Roman law," says Tindal, C. J., in a well-known judgment, " forms 
no rule binding in itself on the subjects of these realms ; but, in deciding a case 
upon principle, where no direct authority can be cited from our books, it 
affords no small evidence of the soundness of the conclusion at which we have 
arrived, if it prove to be supported by that law—the fruit of the researches of 
the most learned men, the collective wisdom of ages, and the ground-work 
of the municipal law of most of the countries of Europe" (Acton v. Blundell 
(1843), 12 M. & W. at p. 244). 
As the English Sale of Goods Act merely enunciates and epitomises 
the principles of the Common Law, reference to Roman law to elucidate 
doubtful points is no less useful than it was when Tindal, C.J., delivered 
his judgment. 
From the point of view of comparative jurisprudence, the Roman-
Dutch law is of curious interest. On a given state of facts, a South 
African Court and an English Court would probably arrive at the same 
conclusion in forty-nine cases out of fifty. But in many of those cases 
the conclusion would be arrived at by a different route. Some salient 
examples may be given to illustrate this position. 
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For practical purposes a sale in South Africa is on the same footing 
as a sale in England or elsewhere. The seller parts with the goods, and 
gets the price, the buyer pays the price and gets the goods. But the 
underlying theory of the transaction is different. In England, sale is the 
transfer of the property in the thing sold from seller to buyer for a price. 
In Roman and Dutch law, adhering to the rule of Roman law, sale is " a 
mutual contract for the transfer of the possession of a thing in exchange 
for a price," plus a guarantee against eviction. Mr. Mackeurtan criticises 
this theory as being contrary to modern ideas, and inconvenient, and 
shows that it owes its origin to historical and not to utilitarian reasons 
(pp. 2, 170-2). 
In England, when there is a contract of sale, and nothing is expressed 
as to the amount of the price or mode of fixing it, the buyer must pay a 
reasonable price. This doctrine of implied 01 reasonable price seems to 
be an original development of English law. In Roman or Roman-Dutch 
law the price or the mode of fixing it must be specified. Suppose a man 
goes into a shop and selects an article without asking the price. In that 
case Mr. MacKeurtan suggests a qualification of the rule which goes very 
near our rule of reasonable price. " It is submitted," he says, " that 
where the seller has a usual price—as in the case of a tradesman—there 
is a sale at that price," for the price is ascertainable. 
Apart from any statutory enactment, there is a curious anti-
profiteering rule in South Africa, founded on the Roman doctrine of 
Icesio enormis : 
Where a seller has sold movable property of appreciable value for less 
than half its true value at the date of sale, or a purchaser has similarly bought 
for more than double such true value, the party damnified is entitled to a 
rescission of the contract or a correction of the price at the option of the 
other. The remedy exists quite independently of fraud, and the reasons for 
its existence may be summed up in the necessity for the frustration of human 
cupidity " (p. 17). 
Such a rule in England would spread consternation among horse-
dealers, and many other respectable tradesmen. 
In South Africa, as in England, capacity to buy or sell is determined 
by the general law concerning capacity to contract. But the law relating 
to personal status differs in many details from English law. For the 
most part the Roman-Dutch rules as to minors seem to work out pretty 
much as do the English rules, though the reasons given for them differ, 
but three points of divergence may be noted. First: 
A male minor becomes a major by marriage, and remains a major, though 
the marriage be dissolved before he attains twenty-one. A female ceases to 
be a minor proper, and comes under the quasi-guardianship of her husband 
(P- 79). 
Secondly, the Roman-Dutch, like most of the continental laws, recognises 
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the infant trader openly carrying on business on his own account. Thirdly, 
a minor, who expressly or impliedly represents himself to be of full age, is 
bound by his contract. The rules as to married women are complicated, 
but there is nothing corresponding to the English rule which confines the 
liability of a married woman to her separate estate free from restraint on 
anticipation. In addition to lunatics, Roman-Dutch law recognises the 
prodigal. The spendthrift may be judicially declared a prodigus, and 
interdicted from alienation or purchase without the leave of his curator 
(p. 98). The rule seems a sound one. There are many persons who, 
though sane for most purposes, are financial lunatics. 
South Africa, for the comfort of its inhabitants, and the discomfort 
of its lawyers, has nothing corresponding to the Statute of Frauds: 
There are no formalities prescribed by law in South Africa for the sale of 
corporeal movables in general, though the disposal of certain special com­
modities (e.g. firearms, poisons, etc.) is regulated by statutes to which the 
reader is referred (p. 128). 
In England the celebrated seventeenth section of the Statute of Frauds 
(29 Car. II, c. 3) is reproduced by s. 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, with 
a proviso that it shall not extend to Scotland. That country apparently 
has never had any similar enactment, and has never felt the want of it. 
Contracts for the sale of goods of the value of £10 and upwards are regu­
lated by the same laws of evidence as contracts in general. In England 
the construction of the short seventeenth section has given rise to more 
litigation than any other branch of the subject. Mr. Benjamin, in his 
work on sale (ed. 5) devotes 160 pages to discussing the reported cases. 
Decisions are still accumulating, but perhaps some day we shall free our­
selves from this incubus. It may be noted also that South Africa draws 
no distinction between contracts under seal and contracts not under seal. 
Contracts under seal have no sacrosanct character, and a body corporate 
can contract in the same way as a natural person. 
In Roman-Dutch law a contract of sale must be completed by delivery. 
There is nothing corresponding to the English rule that, in the case of 
unascertained or future goods, the contract may be implemented by the 
appropriation of goods to the contract, either by the seller with the 
assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the seller. But 
the divergence between Roman-Dutch and English law is more apparent 
than real. If the English cases be carefully examined, they can all be 
explained as instances of constructive delivery, or, as it is called in Roman 
law, traditio brevi manu. When English judges invented the doctrine of 
appropriation of goods to the contract to pass the property, the recogni­
tion of constructive delivery had either not developed or had been 
overlooked. If delivery, actual or constructive, were substituted for 
appropriation to the contract in s. 18 of the Sale of Goods Act, the old 
Scottish rule would be restored ; and the English rule would be made 
more intelligible. 
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As regards defects in the thing sold, Roman-Dutch and English law 
practically reach the same conclusions. The Roman law rule is re­
spondeat venditor. The ancient English rule was caveat emptor ; but, 
as Lord Campbell said in 1851, " the exceptions have well-nigh eaten up 
the rule," and ss. 13 to 15 of the Sale of Goods Act are in substantial accord 
with the Roman-Dutch law, though in the latter the rule is rather more 
broadly stated. 
The true rule is, not that the seller is only bound to warrant against latent 
defects, and not against patent ones, but that he is bound to warrant against 
all defects. But where the purchaser makes an inspection at or before the 
purchase which did disclose or ought to have disclosed a defect, he cannot 
afterwards complain, not because the seller, as a general rule of law, does not 
warrant against patent defects, but because by his conduct the purchaser is 
deemed to have waived his right, and to have bought the article subject to the 
disability, which, but for his laches, he would have discovered, or which he did 
discover, but considered of no consequence (p. 188). 
The English rule of market overt is an anomalous survival, and there 
is nothing that resembles it in Roman-Dutch law. As the custom of 
market overt prevails in the City of London, if a man buys a stolen watch 
in Fleet Street, he gets a good title to it, liable only to be defeated if the 
thief is caught and prosecuted to conviction. But if he buys the stolen 
watch in the Strand, a few yards outside the City boundary, he gets no 
title to the watch, and can give none to anyone else. Scotland and 
South Africa do not indulge in these illogical exceptions to the general 
rule nemo dat quod non habet. 
The question whether the right of stoppage in transitu exists in South 
Africa seems to have been much debated. Mr. MacKeurtan examines 
the question at length, and contends that it does not (pp. 248-53). But 
there are cases where the unpaid seller can recover his goods, although 
he has delivered them to a carrier for transmission to the insolvent buyer. 
After dealing with sales for cash, Mr. MacKeurtan goes on to say : 
If the sale is on credit, the vendor may, where delivery to the carrier is not 
delivery to the buyer, withhold delivery where the purchaser is insolvent in 
the English or South African sense, and where delivery to the carrier is 
delivery to buyer, he may stop in transit or recover from the buyer, or parties 
in possession, if the buyer becomes insolvent in the South African sense 
immediately after. 
It seems, then, that in some cases the South African seller has a 
right of revendication, which exceeds the English right of stoppage in 
transitu. 
Most of the theoretical, and some of the practical differences between 
English and South African law owe their origin to the Roman doctrine 
that sale is not a transfer of the property in goods, but merely a transfer 
of possession with a super-added guarantee against eviction. 
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But a gift in South Africa, like a gift in England, transfers the property 
in the thing given to the donee. This divergence between sale and gift 
gives rise to some rather curious and interesting developments, which 
Mr. MacKeurtan sums up in the following terms : 
First, where a sale at an inadequate price, or at an adequate price which 
is not intended to be exacted, is concluded between persons between whom 
gifts are prohibited by law. In such circumstances the Courts will, upon the 
transaction being challenged, inquire into the adequacy and exaction of the 
price, and, if satisfied that it is colourable, will declare it to be a gift. Secondly, 
when a sale is made for an inadequate price. In such case the transaction 
may, for that reason, be invalid as a sale, but valid as a gift; as where, for 
instance, the price is so low as to bear no appreciable relation to the value of 
the article, but the seller has fixed it on the ground of his affection for the 
purchaser. Where the price is not so low as to warrant the conclusion that 
the whole transaction is a gift, the transaction may be regarded as the sale 
of the article, with a gift of the amount by which the price is inadequate, 
and the paramount intention being that of sale, the contract will be treated 
accordingly. 
This comes out very near the English rule that the Courts will not 
inquire into the adequacy of any bona fide consideration. 
Probably enough has been said in this short notice of a very suggestive 
book to show that England and South Africa might each, with advantage, 
borrow certain principles from the law of the other country. 
CARGOES IN THE PRIZE COURTS OF GREAT 
BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND GERMANY1 
[IContributed by C. J. COLOMBOS, ESQ., LL.D.] 
Contraband of War and the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage.—There 
is no subject of international law that has aroused, during the last 
century, so much discussion and controversy as the question of 
what is, and what is not, contraband. The Second Hague Peace 
Conference, 1907, succeeded, after much effort, in reaching an 
agreement as to the articles which should always be deemed abso­
lutely contraband, and this classification was reproduced unaltered 
in the Declaration of London, 1909, and further completed by a 
free list and a list of goods conditionally contraband. Experience 
has, however, shown that these artificial classifications could not 
stand the test of war, and that much time and ingenuity had 
been vainly expended in attempting to define what was not capable 
of exact definition. The progress of science in utilising things on 
the free list for the production of munitions, the advance of State 
authority and the development of all kinds of comprehensive 
transport, have all tended to modify the accepted rules of inter­
national law in its relation to contraband. The distinction—more 
specious than real—between absolute and conditional contraband 
practically disappeared in the Great War by the adoption of the 
practice of considering goods of conditional contraband either to 
be subject to State control in the enemy country, or else bound 
for a port of naval or military equipment or a base of supply, all 
enemy ports being of this character. 
Sir Samuel Evans held in the Thai 2 that it did not matter whether 
the goods were absolute or conditional contraband. If they were 
conditional contraband they were going to Hamburg, which was 
an enemy base; and in the San Jose 3 he decreed condemnation of 
1 With reference to ships, vide J own. Comp. Leg., vol. ii. (October, 1920), p. 289. 
2 March 9, 1917. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
3 October 16, 1916. Ibid. 
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the cargo on the ground that it was destined for a place in Germany, 
which was either Hamburg or was, like Hamburg, used as a base of 
supply. 
Such a big centre of international commerce as the port of 
London was considered by the German Prize Courts, in the Medea, 
a base of naval and military equipment.1 
The Italian Prize Court has, likewise, decided that, in the present 
circumstances of the war, the doctrine of continuous voyage must, 
indiscriminately, be applied to conditional as well as to absolute 
contraband.2 
Neutral destination has also been assimilated by the French 
Prize Court in the Angelike and the Athenes 3 to hostile destination, 
when the enemy Power has organised, on the coasts of the neutral 
country, bases of supply for its naval forces. 
One of the direct results, on the other hand, of the measures 
taken by the belligerent States for ensuring the general control and 
distribution of nearly all the commodities existing or imported 
into their territory, has been to render these goods confiscable on 
the assumption that they were destined for the enemy State or 
its administrations (French Prize Courts in the Sibilla; the 
Harrovian).4 This argument bears a striking resemblance to that 
advanced, as far back as 1793, in the British Memorandum to 
Neutrals : " The enemy Government has taken control of the corn 
supplies, and thus the trade is no longer to be regarded as a private 
mercantile speculation, but as the immediate operation of the very 
persons who have declared war." 5 
According to the Privy Council's decision in the case of the 
Hakan, even if the goods were meant for civilians, the general 
scarcity of food in Germany had made the victualling of the civil 
population a war problem.6 
The German Prize Court invoked the same consideration in 
the Niobe for confiscating a cargo of food-stuffs bound for 
Bordeaux on the presumption that, in the presence of the great 
scarcity of food prevalent, no less in France than elsewhere, 
the French Government would have taken possession of the 
goods immediately on their arrival at Bordeaux, and would 
1 (1916) ; Grotius, Annuaire International, 1916, pp. 153, 161. 
* The Kyzicos (1916), Gazetta TJfficiale, May 24, 1916, No. 122. 
1 (1918) Journal Officiel, May 21 and 22, 1918, pp. 4464 and 4491. 
* (1916) ; (1921) ibid. March 18, 1916, p. 2132 ; May 5, 1921, p. 5498. 
s Mr. Hammond's letter to Mr. Pinkney, 2 State Papers, 391. 
8  (1917) 34 T.L.R., p. 11. 
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then have used them, at its discretion, for the army or the civil 
population.1 
The two elements, constituting the notion of contraband, viz. 
objects susceptible of a belligerent use and an enemy destination, 
have both received, during the Great War, an abnormal develop­
ment and extension. The guiding principle followed, in fact, by the 
Courts, has been to condemn all goods capable of affording any 
help in the prosecution of hostilities—however remote that help 
might be—when conveyed, not only by direct transportation, but 
even by one or several and subsequent transits through neutral 
countries, to the enemy's territory. Proof of knowledge, or inten­
tion on the part of the shipper, was not deemed necessary. The 
general criterion was the real ultimate destination. 
As Sir Henry Duke held in the Pacific,2 transactions which 
have for their inevitable end the supply of contraband to a belli­
gerent cannot be protected merely because the mind of the con­
signor was an innocent one. The question that has to be answered 
is : " Where would these goods have gone ? " 
The German Prize Court has, equally, decided in the Norden 
that hostile destination was of an objective character, and totally 
independent of the intention of the claimants or interested parties.3 
Even if the goods are sent to the enemy country by the exercise of 
the charterer's arbitrary powers, and against the express will of 
the shipper and the consignee, they will not escape condemnation 
(the Kiew).* 
A novel point arose in the last war on the question whether 
the doctrine of continuous voyage should be extended to apply 
to raw materials imported into a neutral country, for the pur­
pose of being treated or manufactured there, and subsequently 
exported to the enemy territory. In one of the first cases 
before the British Prize Court Sir Samuel Evans held that " it 
was immaterial whether afterwards the refined article would 
have been sent to Germany, if it was at the time of seizure 
on its way to Denmark to a purchaser who intended to put it 
through a manufacturing process.5 In the Balto, however, he 
decided that leather sent to a neutral country for the object of being 
1 Hamburg Prize Court (1917), Grotius, Annuaire International, 1917, p. 302. 
2 Nov. 3, 1920. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. Cf. Lord Stern-
dale in the Noordam (1918), 120 Law Times Reports, p. 249. 
3 Hamburg Prize Court (1917), Grotius, Annuaire International, 1917, p 272 
* Ibid. (1918) Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, 1918, p. 640. 
8 The Kim (cargo of lard to Shaub & Co.), (1915) 32 T.L.R., p. 22. 
GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND GERMANY. 289 
turned into boots for the enemy forces was confiscable.1 But the 
inverse case of goods despatched to the enemy territory to be manu­
factured there for consumption in a neutral State was held not to 
apply : "If contraband is at once traced and captured on its way 
to the enemy territory, a Court of Prize will not embark upon 
inquiries as to what will ultimately become of it. Captors would 
be unduly puzzled or hampered in their action if they had to con­
sider what the future history of a dealing with the goods might be " 
(Sir Samuel Evans in the Axel Johnson).2 
Enemy Character.—It is often a matter of difficulty for Prize 
Courts to determine to whom goods seized as maritime prize 
actually belong, since there is no distinct and generally accepted 
fundamental principle as to the test to be applied. There is, in 
fact, an opposition between the British and American criterion of 
domicile, and the French and Italian criterion of nationality. At 
the London Naval Conference, 1909, the question of enemy character 
was discussed, but, owing to the lack of unanimous opinion, no 
fixed rule could be arrived at. Art. 58 simply laid down that the 
enemy character of the goods must depend on the enemy character 
of the owner, but it did not specify on what the enemy character 
of the owner was to depend. The question at issue has not been 
determined by the Declaration of London, nor by any other Inter­
national Convention. Under the circumstances we may, therefore, 
expect a diversity of practice between the French and Italian prize 
decisions which strictly adhere to nationality (the Martha-Bockhahn ; 
the Moravia),3 and the British decisions which consider the domicile 
of the owner as the determining factor : 
" It appears reasonably certain that the question, whether a 
particular individual ought to be regarded as an enemy or otherwise 
depends, prima facie, on his domicile, and domicile is, according to 
international law, a matter of inference from residence" (the 
Privy Council in the Anglo-Mexican).4 
Property—how determined.—In countries where the civil code 
is more strongly the basis of municipal law than it is in Great Britain 
the evidence derived from the ship's papers outweighs all other 
considerations. 
1  (1917) 33 T.L.R., p. 244. 
2  (1917) Br. and Col. Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 532. 
3 (1919) Journal Officiel, March 2, 1919, p. 2348 ; (1916) Gazetta Ufficiale, April 26, 
1916, No. 98. 
4 (I9i7) 34 T.L.R., p. 149 ; Cf. Sir S. Evans in the Hypatia (1916), Br. and Col. 
Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 377. 
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In the Eir, the French Prize Court decided that the production 
of the whole series of the bills of lading was sufficient to prove that 
claimants had conserved the right of disposal, and were the owners 
of the goods.1 
The Italian Prize Court likewise held in the Kyzicos and the 
Ambra,% that proof of ownership can be made only by the bills of 
lading, as it is by their possession that the hypothesis of any transfers 
during the voyage can be excluded, and it is not the simple copies, 
but the originals of the bills of lading, which must be exhibited 
before the Court. 
The same test was applied by the German Prize Court in dis­
allowing a claim of neutral ownership, when only two out of the three 
bills of lading3 had been produced. 
At one time it was considered to be the established rule in 
France that the evidence of property must come exclusively from 
the documents found on board. This was the principle embodied 
in the Reglement of July 26, 1778. During the last war, however, 
the Appellate Tribunal (the Conseil d'Etat), has decreed, by a liberal 
interpretation of the old practice, that claimants will be receivable 
in invoking, besides the ship's papers, any other documents capable 
of substantiating their eventual rights of ownership (the Czar 
Nicolai II; the Joannina ; the Boeroe).* The inference to be 
attached to documentary evidence is so strong in France that the 
Conseil d'Etat has, in the cases of the Gorontalo and the Iberia, 
reversed the decision of the Court below upon production by 
claimants of further documents, which they had not presented 
before, and which, added to the evidence filed in the first instance, 
were judged sufficient to establish their ownership on the goods.6 
The British system distinguishes between transactions originating 
in time of peace and post bellum contracts. In the first case, the 
main determining factor is whether, according to the intention of 
the parties, the general property in the goods has passed to the 
purchaser or has remained in the vendor. The Sale of Goods Act, 
1893,6 lays down special rules as to how this intention should be 
1 (I9i5) Journal Officiel, June I, 1915, p. 3517. 
2 (1916) Gazetta Ufficiale, May 24 and June 13, 1916, Nos. 122 and 138. Cf. 
the Chrysopolis (1916), ibid., Jan. 4, 1917, No. 3. 
3 Hamburg Prize Court in the Blommersdijk (1917), Grotius, Annuaire Inter­
national, 1917, p. 245. 
* (1916) ; (1917) Journal Officiel, May 24 and Dec. 22, 1916, pp. 4622 and 1000 ; 
Dec. 24, 1917, p. 10555. 
6 (1917) ; (1921) ibid., May io, 1917, p. 3714 ; Jun® 14, 1921, p. 6802. 
* 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71 and 20. 
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discovered. The incidence of risk or loss is not a determining 
consideration. 
The Privy Council has held in the Parchim that " it is well settled 
that the enemy character of goods seized as prize is to be deter­
mined by property, and not by risk " ; and in the Prinz Adalbert 
that " the question whether the property has passed depends upon 
intention, and is a question of fact." 1 
Very different principles apply, however, to transactions entered 
into after the outbreak of hostilities or in contemplation of war. 
In such cases, the rules of municipal law, as to the passing of the 
property, or the intention of the parties, do not affect the belligerent 
captor's right of confiscating goods in transitu, on their way to the 
enemy, even though the strict legal ownership may be vested in the 
neutral consignor. As Sir Samuel Evans has held in the Louisiana,2 
" if the capture of cargoes shipped during war were made to depend 
upon such questions as relate to the passing of property under the 
Sale of Goods Act, it would dwindle to vanishing point, because 
nothing would be easier than for neutral vendors so to frame the 
contract that the legal property in goods contracted to be sold to, 
and intended to become ultimately the property of, the enemy, 
should remain in the vendors until actual delivery." 
Side by side with this rule, there exists another in the converse 
case of transfers of ownership on merchandise afloat from an enemy 
to a neutral. It is the accepted practice that such transfers will 
not be recognised by a Court of Prize, as property which has a 
hostile character at the commencement of the voyage cannot 
change that character by assignment to a neutral. According to 
the Privy Council's decision in the Vesta, it is necessary, in order that 
property may pass, that the neutral consignee should have taken 
material possession of the goods, " a mere symbolical delivery by 
the handing over of mercantile documents " being insufficient.3 
Material Date for determining Property.—The French invari­
able rule is that the legal status of a cargo must be appreciated at 
time of seizure, and that all posterior incidents are unable to influence, 
in any way, either the rights of the belligerent captor or of the seized 
goods (the Fortuna ; the Kirkoswald) .* 
The same practice has been adopted by the German Prize Court 
1 (I9I7) 34 T.L.R., p. 53 ; (1917) 33 T.L.R., p. 490. 
2 (1916) 32 T.L.R., p. 619. 
3 (1921) 37 T.L.R., p. 505. 
4 (I9I7) ; (1918) Journal Officiel, April 27, 1917, p. 3362, and Aug. 21, 1918, 
P- 7389. 
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in the Blommersdijk, where it was held that ownership must be 
determined at date of capture.1 
The decision of Sir Samuel Evans in the case of the Rijn was, 
likewise, that the material time for appreciating whether a cargo is 
contraband or not is the date of the seizure.2 
What order should, however, be made by a Prize Court when 
goods which were the property of a neutral when seized had become 
the property of the enemy at the date of the neutral's claim ? The 
case arose for the first time in the Palm Branch, and Sir Samuel 
Evans condemned the cargo on the ground that if it were released 
to the neutral claimants, the latter would have held the goods, or 
their proceeds, as the trustees to, and for the benefit of, the German 
owners.3 This decision was approved of by the Privy Council 
(except as to a small percentage of the cargo which did not belong 
to enemy underwriters).4 It is open, nevertheless, to criticism as 
it imposes an unnecessary hardship on neutrals who cannot avail 
themselves of any reciprocity in instances where goods of enemy 
character at time of seizure become neutral at time of claim, as was 
the case in the Gothland,5 This neutral character did not save 
them from condemnation, Sir Samuel Evans's argument being that 
they were enemy at date of capture, and, as decided subsequently 
by the same President in the Frogner,6 " a captor is entitled to 
have his case tried according to the facts as they existed at 
the time of seizure, and he cannot be called upon to inquire— 
and the Court itself will not inquire—as to what happened 
afterwards." 
The logical principle appears to be, in all cases where a change 
from neutral to enemy property takes place between the dates of 
seizure and claim, that the Court should order a fresh seizure to be 
effected (as was done by the French Prize Court in the Ariadne, 
and by Sir Samuel Evans in the Schlesien),1 when the goods, being 
enemy at the time of the second seizure, can be validly condemned. 
If a fresh seizure should be deemed inappropriate, and as the goods 
cannot be released for the benefit of the enemy owner, the proper 
1 Hamburg Prize Court (1917), Grotius, Annuaire International, 1917, p. 245. 
2 (T9i7) Br. and Col. Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 507, and the Privy Council in the 
Odessa (1915), 32 T.L.R., p. 103. 
3 (1916) 32 T.L.R., p. 725. 
4 (1918) 35 T.L.R., p. 163. 
6 (1916) Br. and Col. Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 293. 
8 July 24, 1917. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
7 (r9i6) Journal Official, Aug. 7, 1916, p. 7152 ; (1916) Br. and Col. Prize Cases, 
ii, p. 268. Cf. Privy Council in the Orteric (1920), 123 Law Times Reports, p. 448. 
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order should be an order of detention into Court until the termina­
tion of the war. 
Presumptions of Enemy Character. (1) Goods on Enemy Ships.— 
The immemorial rule of the sea was to confiscate all cargoes found 
on enemy vessels. The modern practice has been rightly defined by 
Art. 59 of the Declaration of London, 1909, which provides that, in 
the absence of proof of the neutral character of goods on board an 
enemy ship, they are to be presumed enemy. This doctrine was 
applied by the French Prize Court in the cases of the Ottoman 
vessels the Sahda, the Farjella 1 and the German ship the Billow.2 
In the latter it was decided that such cargo is confiscable, even if 
it does not consist of contraband goods. 
The Italian Prize Court has also held, in the case of the Austrian 
steamer the Moravia, that goods shipped on an enemy vessel 
must be presumed to belong to an enemy, and not to a neutral 
subject, when the neutral claimant is unable to furnish proof of his 
ownership.3 
And Sir Samuel Evans's considered judgment in the Arzilla was 
that the doctrine which presumes goods found upon an enemy ship 
to be enemy, unless a distinctly neutral character by documentary 
proof accompanies them, must be applied to the case of a ship­
ment before war, as well as to goods shipped after the outbreak of 
hostilities.4 
The fact that a transfer of cargo from an enemy to a neutral 
vessel has been effected, and that the goods have been seized on the 
neutral ship, does not exempt such cargo from confiscation. The 
goods are, in fact, considered as being still in transit, and as retain­
ing the enemy character, until the final destination is reached. In 
the case of a cargo originally shipped on the German steamer the 
Neuenfels, and subsequently transferred on the Jeanne and three 
other Scandinavian steamers, Sir Samuel Evans held that the 
neutral vessels were really in the position of vehicles employed by 
the enemy agent, and incorporated into the enemy service, just as 
much as if the German ship had got nearer to port, and had used the 
neutral vessels as lighters in waters which were possibly not deep 
enough for the German steamer to go through.6 
1 (1916) Journal Officiel, Sept. 10 and Oct. 29, 1916, pp. 8072 and 9450. 
2 (1920) ibid., Aug. 1, 1920, p. 11022. 
3 (1916) Gazetta Ufficiale, April 26, 1916, No. 98. 
* May 15, 1916. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
5 (19x6) Br. and Col. Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 227. Cf. the Rijn (1917), ibid., 
vol. ii, p. 507, and the Bawean (1917), ibid., vol. iii, p. 116. 
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There is equally no interruption in the continuity of transport 
when the cargo is seized on land after having been discharged from 
the enemy ship. This subject was discussed by the French Prize 
Court in the matter of various cargoes landed from the German 
steamers the Anatolia, the Bogados, the Seriphos and the Tinos, 
and seized in several warehouses of the port of Piraeus. The Court 
ruled that goods sent by sea acquire and preserve the character of 
maritime cargo, and remain subject to the exercise of the belligerent's 
right of capture, even when seizure is effected on land, as dis­
tinguished from on board a ship.1 
(2) Consignments " to Order" or to Unreal Consignees.—The 
reason of enemy presumption, in cases of shipments " to order," is 
that the consignor can change their destination according to his 
convenience or interest, and that a bill of lading "to order" 
can be endorsed and transferred from hand to hand, thus leaving 
open the question whether the original consignee will be the 
same person who will receive the goods at the conclusion of the 
voyage. 
In the case of the cargo on the N. Canellopoulos, the French 
Prize Court decided that in all instances where goods are consigned 
" to order " they are presumed, unless proof to the contrary is given, 
to have an enemy destination.8 
To shipments " to order " must be assimilated all consignments 
made out to the shipper's order. Sir Samuel Evans held in the 
Kim* that the fact that the goods were consigned to the shipper's 
order was a circumstance of suspicion in considering the question 
whether the goods had a hostile ultimate destination. The same 
interpretation was adopted by the Italian Prize Court in the Ismine,K 
and the German Prize Court in the Lupus. There was, however,5 
an unwarrantable extension of this doctrine by the German Prize 
Court in the Blommersdijk, where all consignments to the Nether­
lands Oversea Trust were assimilated to shipments " to order," 
on the unjustifiable ground that this Association was strongly under 
the influence of the British Government, and that the cargoes might 
1 (I9i8) Journal Officiel, Dec. 17, 1918, p. 10848 ; confirmed on appeal (1921), 
ibid., June 14, 1921, p. 6803. Cf. Italian Prize Court in the Ambra (1917), Gazetta 
Ufficiale, May 3, 1917, No. 104 ; and Evans in the Eden Hall (1916), Br. and Col. 
Prizt Cases, vol. ii, p. 84. 
a (J9i7) Journal Officiel, March 24, 1917, p. 2358. 
8  ( I 9 I 5)  32 T.L.R., p. 10. 
4 (I9I7) Gazetta Ufficiale, May, 12, 1917, No. 112. 
4 Berlin Supreme Court (1917), Grotius, Annuaire International, 1917, p. 260. 
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be diverted to the United Kingdom in spite of any protest made by 
Holland.1 
On the other hand, a consignment to a named person does not 
exclude the presumption of enemy character when the consignee is 
only an apparent or dummy consignee acting as intermediary or 
conduit pipe for the real enemy buyers. Thus, the French Prize 
Court in the Mar Mediterraneo and the Cadorna 2 condemned goods 
nominally sent to named purchasers in Switzerland, but who, as 
evidence showed, were acting for the account of hidden German 
consignees. As Sir Samuel Evans laid down in the Sydland, " the 
named consignee must be a real and genuine consignee in the 
business and commercial sense. The fact that a person who happens 
to be in existence is named, if he be merely a nominee without 
any interest, is not enough." 3 Their Lordships' opinion was also 
that the " named consignee must mean some person, other than the 
consignor, to whom the consignor parted with the real control of the 
goods " (the Louisiana ; the Urna).* 
(3) Absence or Concealment of Documentary Evidence.—One of 
the elementary principles of prize law is that claimants must make 
a frank and straightforward statement of their exact position in 
relation to the goods claimed. Sir Samuel Evans, in the Kankakee, 
disallowed a claim for the release of the cargo, and commented 
adversely on the behaviour of the claimants, who " had wilfully 
withheld material information from the Court, wilfully refused to 
produce material documents in their possession or control, with 
the view of attempting to impose upon the Court." 5 And the 
Privy Council held in the Carolina6 that the non-production of 
evidence, which might, without difficulty, be submitted by the 
appellant, is a serious consideration and necessarily throws doubt 
on his case. 
The Italian Prize Court condemned the goods on the Evangelistria 
or Donates,1 as they were travelling without a bill of lading, and the 
ship's papers did not indicate the consignee. 
A similar confiscation was decreed by the French Prize Court in 
1 Hamburg Prize Court (1917), ibid., p. 245. 
2 (1QX7) (1920) Journal Officiel, Aug. 23, 1917, p. 6740 ; Aug. 28, 1920, p. 
12625. 
3 (1916) Br. and Col. Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 510. 
4 (1918) 34 T.L.R., p. 222 ; (1920) 36 T.L.R., p. 652. 
5 Feb. 4, 1918. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
6 July 23, 1920, ibid. Cf. Sir Henry Duke in the Hollandia, ibid., May ii, 1920. 
7 (1917) Gazetta Ufficiale, April 19, 1917, No. 92. 
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the Ellispontos.1 The Court, however, will not condemn a cargo 
when the claimants are in the impossibility, owing to circumstances 
of force majeure, beyond their control, to produce the necessary 
evidence. The case presented itself in the Anatoli, where it was 
proved that all the documents relating to the goods had been 
destroyed by a fire which had broken out at the French Legation 
in Athens.2 
(4) Hostile Association of Consignors or Consignees.—There is a 
reasonable inference of enemy destination when the shippers or 
consignees are closely associated with enemy agents, or with the 
enemy Government, and when their trade operations are intimately 
connected with, or dependent upon, commercial organisations 
established on hostile territory. In the Peloponnesos the French 
Prize Court condemned a consignment of moneys sent to a company 
at Cavalla, it being notorious that its president was an agent of the 
enemy State 3 ; and in the Thessalia and the Epaminondas,* the 
goods, although bound for a neutral country, were confiscated, as it 
was shown that both the shippers and the consignees were in constant 
relations with the enemy Powers, and were supplying them regularly 
with contraband articles. In the Kirkoswald,5 the cargo was con­
signed, under the auspices of the Societe Suisse de Surveillance, to 
a company established in Switzerland, but in close proximity to the 
German frontier, and having its chief office at Hanover. The Court 
condemned the goods and rejected the plea of the Societe Suisse de 
Surveillance, that merchandise addressed to it ought to be exempted 
from capture. The Court held that the right of seizure is an attri­
bute of sovereignty and, in the absence of an express declaration, 
can never be presumed to have been waived by the belligerent 
captor. Nothing in the instruments creating this Association 
implied that the French Government had renounced, in its favour, 
the rights of seizing and confiscating goods destined for the enemy 
territory. 
Sir Samuel Evans, equally, decided in the Tysla that a cargo 
must be condemned when it is sent nominally to people who are 
agents for the German Government.6 
1 (1916) Journal Officiel, Dec. 18, 1916, p. 10883. 
2 (1917) ibid., Aug. 23, 1917, p. 6741. 
8 (1918) ibid., Nov. 27, 1916, p. 10316. 
4 (1918) ibid., Oct. 14 and Dec. 21, 1918, pp. 8944 and 10984. 
6 (1918) ibid., Aug. 21, 1918, p. 7389. Affirmed on appeal, ibid., Sept. 24, 1920, 
p. 14101. 
6 Aug. 23, 1916. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
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There is also a strong inference of enemy character when the 
consignors or consignees are on the Black List (French Prize 
Court in the Almazora,1 and Sir Samuel Evans in the Stanton)} 
(5) Statistical Cases.—The ease with which, in the circumstances 
of the modern development of all sorts of transport, goods imported 
into a neutral country can find their way to the enemy territory, 
induced the Allies to adopt a rationing policy by which such imports 
were limited by the average pre-war quantities. In cases where 
shipments to neutral countries adjacent to enemy States were 
found to exceed considerably the statistical limits, the onus was 
thrown upon the claimants to discharge the inference of hostile 
destination. 
Lord Sterndale, in the Urna,3 condemned a cargo of dried fruits 
sent to Denmark on the ground that the imports into this country 
in the year of seizure were nearly three times higher the annual 
average before the war, and that the claimants had not rebutted the 
presumption that the goods were going to the enemy. And the 
Privy Council, in the Baron Stjernblad, held that it was impossible, 
in the presence of a tenfold increase of the imports of cocoa-beans to 
Sweden, to avoid suspicion or to predicate, with regard to any 
particular shipment, that a considerable portion thereof was not 
destined to find its way to Germany.4 
The same presumption was acted upon by the French Prize 
Court in confiscating a cargo of wine on the Tiber consigned to 
Denmark when, according to the statistical evidence, the importa­
tions of wine into this neutral country, in the year under review, 
were eight times higher than the normal pre-war quantity.5 But, 
in the case of the Iberia, the Court decreed release of the goods to 
claimants, who proved that the cargo, although exceeding the 
statistical limits, was really intended for bona fide consumption in 
Sweden.6 
Restrictions on Maritime Capture. (1) Goods on Neutral Ships. 
—The immunity of enemy goods on neutral vessels was first advo­
cated by the Dutch, in the middle of the seventeenth century, on 
the principle that a ship must be considered as a floating part of 
1 (I9I9) Journal Officiel, April 20, 1919, p. 4177. 
2 June 13, 1917. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
3 April 14, 1919. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. Affirmed on 
appeal (1920), 36 T.L.R., p. 652. 
4 (1917) 34 T.L.R., p. 106. Cf. the Nome (1921) 37 T.L.R., p. 541. 
* (1918) Journal Officiel, May 19, 1918, p. 4356. 
# (i9r9) ibid., Aug. i i ,  1919, p. 8492. 
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the country to which she belongs, and that a neutral territory cannot 
be invaded by a belligerent. This doctrine was revived, a century 
later, by Frederick of Prussia in the Silesian controversy, but it had 
never been acknowledged as a generally recognised rule of inter­
national law until the Declaration of Paris, 1856, when it was 
embodied in Art. 2, which stipulates that the neutral flag covers 
enemy goods, with the exception of contraband. 
The French Prize Court held in the Thessalia 1 that it is incum­
bent on captors to establish that the contraband goods seized on the 
neutral vessel had an enemy destination. That, as this proof had 
not been given, the goods must be released, even when the docu­
ments produced by the claimants are not sufficient to justify the 
innocent character of the cargo. This decision is in accordance with 
Lord Sterndale's judgment in the Dirigo 2 that it is not enough for 
condemning goods that they should be on the list of contraband 
articles. If the condition of enemy destination is not fulfilled, the 
goods on the neutral ship cannot be declared good prize. The same 
opinion was expressed by the Italian Prize Court in the Kyzicos.3 
In the cases of the Batavier II and Batavier VI, Sir Samuel 
Evans, following on a decision of the Ceylon Prize Court,4 held that 
the protection of the neutral flag does not extend to cover goods 
landed from on board a neutral vessel and seized on land in various 
warehouses within the port of London.5 This conclusion is, how­
ever, quite unfounded both on principles of justice and of logic. 
It is only by a legal fiction that goods captured on land are deemed 
to be a maritime prize as forming still part of the cargo of the vessel 
from which they were discharged, and it is, therefore, reasonable 
that they should continue to enjoy the protection afforded by the 
neutral ship on which they are assumed to be. 
(2) Enemy Goods shipped before the Outbreak of Hostilities or 
in Ignorance of War.—The Sixth Hague Convention, 1907, exempts 
from condemnation enemy cargoes found on board enemy vessels 
which left their last port of departure before the commencement of 
the war, and are encountered on the high seas, while still ignorant 
of the outbreak of hostilities, or which, having entered, in such 
1 (1918) ibid., Oct. 14, 1918, p. 8944. 
2 (1919) 35 T.L.R., p. 533. Cf. Privy Council in the Hakan (1917), 34 T.L.R., 
p. 11. 
3 (1916) Gazetta Ufficiale, Feb. 9, 1916, No. 32. 
4 The Dandolo, the Caboto (1916), Br. and Col. Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 339. 
6 (1917) ibid., vol. ii, p. 432. And Sir Henry Duke in the Roma, Dec. 11, 1919. 
Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
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ignorance, a port of the adversary Power, are unable to leave, owing 
to circumstances beyond their control. This rule was applied by 
the French Prize Court in the Jiul and the Oranje Nassau 1 to cargoes 
shipped before the war, and by Sir Samuel Evans, in the Southfield 2 
to transactions which took place without any contemplation of the 
imminence of war. But, as the French Prize Court held in the cases 
of the Austrian steamer the Marienbad and the German steamer 
the Billow,3 the provisions of the Hague Convention are absolutely 
foreign to cargoes seized on enemy vessels, which took refuge in the 
roadsteads of third States with the express object of avoiding capture 
by the enemy belligerent cruisers. 
The decision of the Belgian Prize Court in the Minna was, like­
wise, that the German ship had not been prevented, by any cause 
of force majeure, from leaving the port of Ostend, but had, intention­
ally, elected to remain there through fear of the British men-of-
war stationed in the North Sea.4 
The same interpretation was adopted by the Chinese Prize Court 
in the case of the German steamers the Kaethe, the Triumph, the 
Helene and the Sexta, which had been using the port of Swatow as a 
refuge for more than two years. The Court ruled that the Con­
vention was applicable only to merchantships bona fide engaged in 
business, and that vessels which had ceased trading, and had availed 
themselves of a neutral port for the purpose of escaping capture, 
could not claim any protection under the said Convention.5 Sir 
Samuel Evans's judgment in the Belgia proceeded on identical 
considerations.8 
(3) Enemy Goods sent by Post.—The inviolability afforded by 
Art. 1 of the Eleventh Hague Convention, 1907, to postal corre­
spondence was taken advantage of by the Germans for covering 
consignments, on a large scale, of contraband goods smuggled fur­
tively, as mails, into Germany. The Hague Convention was never 
meant, as Herrn Kriege, the German Delegate at the Peace Con­
ference, had himself admitted, to protect such goods, and both 
Great Britain and France carefully examined all mails and post 
1 (I9I5) Journal Officiel, June 8 and Aug. 19, 1915, pp. 3721 and 5819. 
2 (I9I5) 31 T.L.R., p. 577. Cf. Privy Council in the Daksa (1919), 33 T.L.R., 
p. 281. 
3 (1919); (1920) Journal Officiel, Aug. 12, 1919, p. 8526, and Aug. i, 1920, 
p. 11022. 
8 (I9I9) Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, 1920, p. 138. 
8 Judgments of the High Prize Court of the Republic of China (1918), translated 
by F. T. Cheng, 1919, pp. 1, 6, 11 and 31. 
8 (I9I5) 31 T.L.R., p. 490. Affirmed on appeal (1916), 32 T.L.R., p. 435. 
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parcels, and confiscated any contraband articles found in them 
(Sir Samuel Evans in the Tubantia, the Gelria, the Hollandia,1 and 
the French Prize Court in the Venezuela).2 
(4) Enemy Goods seized after Conclusion of the Armistice.—An 
armistice implies the suspension of all military and naval operations, 
and, consequently, of all maritime seizures. During the last war, 
however, the belligerent parties have stipulated, by express agree­
ment, that all enemy ships and cargoes -met at sea should continue 
to be liable to capture, and that the blockade of the enemy coasts 
should remain unchanged (Art. 26 of the Armistice Convention with 
Germany of November 11, 1918). In the case of a cargo of food­
stuffs on the Rannveig, Sir Henry Duke rejected the claimant's con­
tention that the despatch of goods to a German base of supply 
raised, owing to the suspension of hostilities, no presumption 
of warlike use, and held that the terms agreed upon in Art. 26 
precluded the assumption that the Allied Powers had conceded 
to Germany the privilege of free importation of goods into her 
territory.3 
The same meaning has been applied to the provisions of Art. 26 
by the French Prize Court in the Pena Castillo." 
Liens on Seized Cargoes.—Courts of Prize have always declined 
to recognise any mortgage, charges, liens or other rights set up to 
defeat the belligerent captors' claims on hostile property. It is, 
in fact, a well-accepted principle that capture as a prize of war, 
jure belli, overrides all previous liens, and that the seized goods are 
acquired free from equities. 
The French Prize Court, in the Athena,5 refused to admit the 
alleged right of ownership of a pledgee creditor, and held that its 
only mission was to judge the validity or otherwise of maritime 
prizes, being incompetent to adjudicate on the " special " property 
or interest which a privileged creditor might have in the seized goods. 
In the Marienbad it disallowed, equally, the claim of neutral under­
writers who contended that, as a result of the abandonment by the 
assured of the insured cargo, they had become, according to an 
express clause in the Insurance policy, the sole owners of the goods. 
1 (1916) 32 T.L.R., p. 529. 
2 (I9i9) Journal Officiel, March 14, 1919, p. 2719. 
; March 16, 1920. Transcript from the official shorthand notes. 
4 (1920) Journal Officiel, April 29, 1920, p. 6499. 
s (1918) ibid., Dec. 17, 1918, p. 10848. Cf. the Eir (1916), ibid., Aug. 17, 1916, 
p. 7506. 
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The Court rejected this claim on the ground that no such rights 
could ever be recognised by a prize jurisdiction.1 
It was also laid down by their Lordships' Board in the Odessa,'-
that a Court of Prize will ignore any special rights created by private 
contracts or dealings between individuals. Legal property was the 
sole criterion. 
The decision of the German Prize Court in the Fenix was, like­
wise, that prizes constitute an original method of acquiring posses­
sion, and are equivalent to an occupatio jure belli which vests in the 
captor, in conformity with the admitted rules of international law, 
the ownership, free from every encumbrance, of the goods seized. 
The captor can, consequently, recognise no mortgage or lien which 
third parties allege to have on the captured cargoes.3 
The finding of the Chinese Prize Court in the Albenga was, 
equally, that a lawful seizure by a belligerent is an acquisition 
original in character, and free from any right to the same thing that 
might exist in third parties. The question whether a captured cargo 
is burdened with a debt is a civil matter outside the jurisdiction of 
the Prize Court.4 
In distinct opposition to the above principles, the Italian Prize 
Court held, in the Moravia and the Ambra,s that the normal functions 
which the banks accomplish in modern maritime commerce by 
financing sellers on the security of the bills of lading, confer on these 
banks the exclusive legal possession and the right of disposal of the 
goods represented by the bills of lading. This right of lien dominates 
and absorbs the concurrent rights of seller and buyer alike. The 
rather remarkable conclusion of the Italian Prize Court was that it 
is the nationality of the pledgee bank that must determine the 
enemy or neutral character of the goods seized, and that, therefore, 
enemy goods must be released when the bank which holds the bills 
of lading is of non-enemy nationality. 
Captor's Right to Freight on Released Goods.—There is a diversity 
of practice between the English and French rules as regards 
the right to freight of the belligerent captor, when part only of the 
intended voyage has been covered. The old British principle is 
that a captor is not entitled to freight, unless the goods have been 
1 (1919) ibid., Aug. 12, 1919, p. 8526. 
2 (I9i5) 32 T.L.R., p. 103. Cf. the Kronprinsessan Margareta (1917), Br. and Col. 
Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 409. 
s Berlin Supreme Court (19x4), Zeitschriftfiir Volkerrecht, vol. ix (1916), p. 103. 
4 (1918). Translated by F. T. Cheng, 1919, p. 16. 
6 (1916) Gazetta Ufficiale, April 26 and June 13, 1916, Nos. 98 and 138. 
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brought to the actual port of destination in accordance with the 
intention of the contracting parties, even although the ship may 
have performed a very large part of her voyage. Sir Samuel Evans 
strictly adhered to this rule in the Roland/ and refused to allow any 
freight on the ground that the goods had not been carried to the 
place where the parties intended them to be delivered and disposed of. 
The question arose in the French Prize Court in the case of the 
Barmbek,2 on the claim of a British company asking that the freight 
paid to the French Minister of Marine at a pro rata itineris be restored, 
as the charter-party which governed the contract of affreightment 
referred to the English law, under which no freight is due, except 
if the goods are brought to the port of destination. The Court ruled 
that a captor is not bound by any contracts which might have taken 
place between the shipper and the charterer or shipowner. The 
practice and procedure of a Prize Court cannot be modified by the 
municipal legislation of other States, but must rigorously follow the 
jurisdiction and practice admitted in its own country. That, in the 
words of Sir Samuel Evans 3 " any other solution would necessitate 
a close investigation of all the terms, conditions and circumstances 
involved in the contractual obligations of the parties, and of their 
rights and liabilities under foreign municipal law, which this Court 
has always refused to undertake." The principle of the captor's 
right to a proportionate freight had never been departed from in 
French prize jurisdiction,4 and the claim must, consequently, be 
disallowed. 
1 (1915) 31 T.L.R., p. 357. 
2 (1916) Journal Officiel, July 24, 19x6, p. 6611. 
3 The Roland (1915), 31 T.L.R., p. 357. 
4 Cf. the Julius, Nov. 25, 1870 ; the Vorsetzen, Nov. 2, 1871 ; the Alma, Dec. 13, 
871. 
EXTERRITORIALITY IN CHINA. 
[Contributed by LAUNCELOT PACKER, ESQ.] 
ALL well-wishers of China are confronted with a widespread belief which 
prevails among foreigners there, of two fundamental facts concerning 
its people : 
First—That the basis of action in China is economic rather than 
moral, free scope being left to pursuit of immediate economic advantage, 
unhampered by moral consideration—in other words, that the Chinese 
people have not the code of morals which influences action in the West. 
Second—That in China the family, is the unit, and not the individual. 
If it were true that the motive power of the Chinese people is the 
desire of material acquisition, they alone could not be entrusted with the 
administration of justice to foreigners. 
No effective system of administering justice can be built solely on the 
basis of " honesty being the best policy," since the material results of 
adopting such a policy are too remote for the man bent on present personal 
gain : a remote undefined benefit from rendering justice cannot offset an 
immediate benefit offered for withholding it ; the administration of in­
justice is fruitful of opportunity for acquisition. 
Historically the Chinese Court has not been a Hall of Justice. Many 
hundreds years ago a memorial was refused, which prayed that the 
corruption of the Courts be checked, and an edict was issued by the 
Emperor of the day which recited that the Chinese were naturally a liti­
gious people, and that this fact was a great evil: it concluded that, if 
a man go to Court, it is well that he should be mulcted in all that he has. 
If in China the unit be the family, rather than the individual, any 
system of administration must be encumbered by the " family inefficients," 
of the man who has the power of appointment. One of the chief officials 
of the Senate—a Western-educated man—was asked by the writer how 
he dealt with the question of appointments, which were demanded by 
his family. He replied that though he personally was opposed to family 
appointments, his mother believed in them, and " concessions had to be 
made to her view." 
If one turns from administration of justice by the Chinese to adminis­
tration in other departments, one finds that the Westerner believes that 
the same fundamental defects will destroy real efficiency. It was freely 
predicted in 1914 in China, that any railway taken over by the Chinese 
would ultimately be reduced to such a condition of inefficiency that 
camels would beat it in competition, that commodities would be delayed 
on the railways unless effective bribes were paid, and that money charged 
to " up-keep " in the accounts would find its way into the pockets of the 
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individuals administering the railway, while the railway property was 
allowed steadily to depreciate. 
Such widespread beliefs—even if they be not accepted as facts of 
general application—must constitute a barrier to rapid change in so 
fundamental a matter as the administration of justice, and great caution 
will be exercised in removing the existing safeguard of Exterritoriality, 
though it imposes limitations on Chinese freedom of action. 
China was of old likened to a soft rubber ball, readily yielding to 
pressure, but resuming its original shape immediately upon the removal 
of the pressure, but competent observers testify to the impress of Western 
ideas, during the last ten years, which may prove to be permanent in 
character. He would indeed, however, be a bold man who would yet 
advocate the relinquishing of exterritorial rights, without providing 
for some foreign administration in Courts which are to deal with the 
lives and property of foreigners, and also some well-defined body of law 
to be applied in them, as Westerners resident in China would be unwilling 
to submit themselves and their property to the administration of justice 
solely by the Chinese Courts. 
The Western investigator of Chinese affairs is always struck, both by 
the difficulty of ascertaining facts in China, and also of presenting the 
Chinese conception in terms of the Westerner. What may be to a 
Westerner a binding agreement may be to a Chinaman a pious belief or 
hope; what may be to the Chinese President a vagary of some young 
inexperienced men needing punishment, may be a solemn act of a Parlia­
mentary Committee to the Westerner. 
All endeavours suddenly to superimpose on a Chinese foundation a 
theoretically perfect Western law system, without regard to the existing 
facts in China will fail as ignominiously as did the attempt to engraft an 
English constitution upon China in 1913-14. It simply failed to fit any 
condition in China, and was utterly useless, though theoretically in itself 
a perfect constitution. 
In spite of difficulties, facts in China must as far as possible be collected 
and set out for Westerners, and all those interested in China will be grateful 
therefore to Professor Willoughby, who, in his recent book Foreign Rights 
and Interests in China, has successfully collected and grouped such as can 
be ascertained. This book presents many salient features which any 
attempt at modification of exterritoriality must regard. It is a definite 
and successful endeavour to collect and present facts, leaving for future 
examination—possibly his own—questions as to the extent of China's 
dependence on foreign aid to put her house in order. He deals with such 
matters as existing foreign commerce, spheres of interest, concessions, 
Chinese debts and financial commitments, railway loans and foreign 
control, etc. 
In his chapter on Exterritoriality Professor Willoughby examines 
its origin in China, and agrees with the view that it is based on treaty— 
the Treaty of Nankin in 1842 being the legalised beginning of exterri­
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toriality—rather than on established International Law. In other words, 
agreement has evolved exterritoriality in China; cannot agreement cure 
its defects ? 
The Chinese Government is to a great extent dependent upon foreign 
loans for which the Customs Service and the Salt Gabelle have offered 
a sound basis ; both of these services are only acceptable security owing 
to the fact that they are under foreign domination and administration, 
and Western bankers would be chary of floating such loans if that control 
were absent. In these splendid services the Chinese themselves partici­
pate, though they have been established and maintained in face of 
difficulties by the indomitable character and probity of Westerners. 
It is perhaps to these services that the future must look for guidance 
in framing any departure from the present system of administration of 
law for foreigners. The American or English lawyer would naturally 
look also to the American Federal Judicial Code, which provides for 
removal of causes to the Federal Courts where through diverse citizenship, 
etc., prejudice or local influence is feared—and generally to the British 
Code for China and United States State Codes in framing a code of sub­
stantive law to be administered—as well as to Chinese law. 
It is conceivable that a single International Court, with appropriate 
subordinate District Courts, might be established in China, with power 
of removal to itself of causes in which foreigners are involved, enforcing 
its own code of law, somewhat on the model of the Federal Court in 
America, with criminal as well as civil jurisdiction, and that the Chinese 
could participate in such a Court. It is also conceivable that under the 
auspices of such a Court a body of law might grow up and gradually 
be adopted into the Chinese law, as the jus gentium was adopted into the 
Civil Law of Rome. 
If in this age of agreement among nations, such a single Court can be 
established by the Treaty Powers, and a body of law be evolved which 
fits the real conditions in China, exterritoriality in its evolution, far from 
being a curse, may influence the Chinese Courts, and prove ultimately 
to be the means of spreading throughout the land the best conceptions of 
justice in East and West. 
NOTES ON IMPERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
[Contributed by PROFESSOR BERRIEDALE KEITH, D.C.L.] 
Fishery Rights in Quebec.—The judgment of the Judicial Committee in 
Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Quebec 1 marks a 
further step in the slow process of defining the precise nature of the 
Dominion and the Provincial rights over Canadian fisheries. In Attorney-
General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario,2 and Attorney-General 
for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada 3 the vital distinction 
was affirmed between the proprietary rights of the Provinces and the 
power of regulation vested in the Dominion, and in the latter case it was 
held that, as the common law is applicable to British Columbia, and as 
under that law the right of fishing in tidal waters and the sea was a public 
right, the regulation of that right belonged solely to the Dominion Par­
liament. The Provincial Legislature, on the other hand, could deal as 
a matter of property with rights of fishing in non-tidal waters, subject 
to the Dominion power of regulation of these fisheries, which, however, 
did not extend to conferring proprietary rights. The Legislature could 
also authorise the fixing of engines to the solum above the low-water 
mark, subject to non-interference with the rights of the public to fish 
in tidal waters. The question of the proprietary right in the solum 
below low-water mark, and the three-mile limit was expressly left 
unanswered on the ground that questions of international law were 
involved, with which in the proceedings in question it would be incon­
venient to deal. The answers thus given would, it is clear, have disposed 
of the issue, but for the fact that the common law is not applicable in 
the main to Quebec, and the Court of King's Bench in Quebec, to which 
the question was referred for an opinion by the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council, held that the earlier case did not decide the issue, and that, 
under the law of Quebec, the Provincial Government was entitled to 
grant exclusive rights of fishery in the tidal waters of Quebec, and in the 
sea up to the three-mile limit. This judgment has now been declared 
wrong by the Judicial Committee on a very simple and clear ground 
Without deciding whether, on the conquest of Quebec, the royal preroga­
tive ceased to be governed by French law and became regulated by 
English law, the Committee relied on the Act passed by the Parliament 
1 [1921] A.C. 413. 
2 [1898] A.C. 700. Compare Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for 
Canada, [1921] A.C. 401. 
3 [1914] A-c- I53-
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of Canada in 1865, under which, as under earlier legislation, the public 
right of fishery in tidal waters is asserted. Since the British North 
America Act, 1867, the sole power of modifying such a right rests with 
the Dominion Parliament and the Legislature of Quebec, like that of the 
other Provinces, has only such powers to deal with fisheries as rest on 
proprietary rights ; it can deal with non-tidal fisheries, and with the use 
of the solum above low-water mark, in connection with tidal fisheries, 
but not so as to interfere in the latter case with the publicright of 
fishery. Moreover, even as regards non-tidal fisheries the Dominion 
possesses paramount powers of regulation which may almost indefinitely 
infringe on provincial rights. 
The Status of Dominion Companies.—The judgment of the Judicial 
Committee in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King 1 is a brilliant example 
of the skill of the Committee in analysis of the British North America 
Act, and of the extraordinary complication of the Canadian Constitution. 
The six appeals consolidated in the judgment were all based on the 
issue of the true interpretation of the principles laid down by the Com­
mittee in John Deere Plow Company v. Wharton,3 and the judgment 
reverses decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, and of the Appellate 
Courts of Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. In all the cases the 
vital question raised was the extent to which the Dominion could confer 
powers on companies so as to prevail over provincial legislation. The 
Provinces have only the power to create companies with provincial 
objects, and therefore it rests with the Dominion alone to create companies 
with power to carry on their business throughout the Dominion. The 
Provinces, in the exercise of their powers must, it is now decided, respect 
the status conferred by the Dominion, and this restriction clearly raises 
questions of the utmost delicacy. How far may a Province insist on a 
Dominion company registering itself in the Province, or taking out a 
licence to carry on business ? The Judicial Committee's decision shows 
that there is no simple answer. The Province may impose the duty of 
taking out a licence as a means of raising a direct tax for provincial 
purposes, or of securing the observance of some restriction as to contracts 
binding on the public generally, or of causing the doing by the public 
generally of some act of a purely local character only under licence. 
But it cannot use a system of licences as a means of indirect taxation,3 
or of impairing the capacity of a company under Dominion law, nor can 
it penalise a failure to take out a licence by forbidding a company to 
sue in the province. Similarly, a Province may require a Dominion 
company to register, and to pay fees not exceeding those levied on 
provincial companies, as a legitimate means of obtaining information 
and levying taxation, but it cannot enforce registration by forbidding 
1 37 T.L.R. 436. 
2 [1915] G.C. 330. 
3 Brewers and Maltsters Association v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1897] A.C. 
23per Lord Herschell at p. 237. 
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an unregistered company to enter into contracts or sue in provincial 
Courts, for it would thus be denying the company a status granted by 
the Dominion. On the other hand, any Province may enact a general 
mortmain law, under which corporations may be restricted as to the 
holding of land, and, when such an Act exists, as in the case of Ontario, 
the provisions of the provincial legislation are not overridden by the 
general power given by the Companies Act of Canada to Dominion 
companies, to hold and acquire real estate in connection with their 
business operations. These principles are clearly valid, but their appli­
cation offers endless possibility of conflict, and their existence is a further 
reminder of the complications inseparable from a federal constitution 
incapable of easy amendment. 
Ecclesiastical Law in Quebec.—The decision in Despatie v. Tremblay1 
illustrates admirably the value of the Judicial Committee as the final 
Court of Appeal in the case of issues affecting the status of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Quebec. The facts of the case, which had raised 
much interest in Canada, are simple. The parties were members of the 
Roman Catholic Church, who in 1904 were duly married according to 
the rites of that Church, by their own cure. In 1910, at the instance of 
the husband, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the diocese declared the 
marriage null and void, on the ground that it had been ascertained that 
the parties were cousins in the fourth degree, a fact of which they were, 
not unnaturally, ignorant at the time of the marriage ; and that under a 
decree of the Lateran Council of 1215 a marriage of cousins so related 
was invalid, unless a dispensation had fiist been obtained. On the 
strength of this ecclesiastical pronouncement, and of the relationship, 
the husband claimed in the Superior Court of Quebec a declaration of 
the nullity of his marriage, and the declaration was granted by that Court 
and affirmed by a majority in the Court of Review. By a widespread 
and unfortunate misunderstanding, the decision was treated in other 
Provinces of Canada as if it were an assertion of the supremacy of the 
ecclesiastical law over the civil law ; in point of fact, the decision was 
based on the interpretation put on Article 127 of the Civil Code of 
Ouebec, which, in effect, provided that impediments to marriage recog­
nised by the different religious persuasions, so far as they were not 
expressly dealt with in the Code, remained subject to the rules hitherto 
followed in the Churches. The Court held that the effect of this provision 
was to embody in the civil law the ecclesiastical rule that a marriage of 
fourth cousins where no dispensation had been obtained was invalid. 
This result was obviously strange, and it is not surprising that the 
ludicial Committee should have reversed the decision, and have found 
that, save as expressly enacted in the Code, no marriage can be declared 
null and void on the score of ecclesiastical law. From the constitutional 
point of view the importance of the case lies in the clear exposition of 
the position of ecclesiastical law in Quebec. When Canada was ceded 
1 37 T.L.R. 395. 
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to the British Crown, the regime then in force, under which Protestants 
were not even tolerated, came at once to an end, and the disabilities 
imposed by Imperial Acts on Roman Catholics would have extended 
to the people of Quebec, but for the stipulations made in their interest 
in the terms of cession, and given legislative effect by Imperial Act.1 
From this and subsequent legislation alone are the rights and privileges 
of Roman Catholics in Quebec derived. It is necessary, therefore, to 
discover in some legislative enactment a provision providing for the 
nullity of marriages of the type in question, and no such enactment has 
ever been passed. Up to the enactment of the Civil Code the only 
restriction on inter-marriage was, accordingly, that enacted in the 
Statute 32 Henry VIII, c. 38, which forbids marriages within the 
Levitical degrees, as is also done by the Civil Code. A marriage between 
persons within other degrees, if disapproved by the Roman Catholic 
Church, need not be celebrated by a cure, but, if celebrated, it is valid 
in law. 
There is nothing in the decision that is absolutely new, but unques­
tionably it makes explicit a fact which in the Courts below was hardly 
appreciated at its true value: the cession of Canada involved the 
substitution for a State with the Roman Catholic as the established 
Church of a State with the Church of England as the established Church ; 
a complete intolerance of Protestants was succeeded by a generous, but 
still definitely limited, tolerance of the Roman Catholic Church. The 
powers of that Church in Quebec are not to be gathered from its authority 
in France before the cession ; in the domain of civil law as opposed 
to conscience they must rest on the precise term of enactments by one 
or other of the Legislatures which from time to time have had power 
to legislate for Quebec. 
The Nature of Canadian Federalism.—Few judicial dicta have evoked 
more controversy than Lord Haldane's famous effort2 to prove that the 
constitution of Canada is not a true federal constitution in the sensd 
in which that character may be ascribed to the Commonwealth Con­
stitution. Lord Haldane's position must be admitted to have proved 
indefensible,3 except on an arbitrary restriction of the meaning of the 
term " federal," and his pronouncement as made obiter in an Australian 
case cannot weigh seriously against decisions of the Judicial Committee 
in Canadian cases in which the true federal character of the Canadian 
constitution is assumed.4 A constitution is not to be denied to be federal 
because the federal Legislature is granted the residuary power in lieu 
of it being reserved to the Provinces, and, though it is legitimate to 
point out the difference in this regard between the Constitutions of 
1 14 Geo. Ill, c. 84, s. 5. 
2 Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining 
Co., Ltd. (1914) A.C. 237, 252-4. 
3 See W. P. M. Kennedy, Canadian Historical Review, ii. 106-25. 
4 E.g. The Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. The Receiver-General 
of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437, 441, 442. 
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Canada and of the Commonwealth, it is a common error to forget that 
the practical difference between the extent of the powers of the Canadian 
Provinces and the Australian States is very limited. 
There is, however, as Professor Kennedy, the most recent and 
effective of Lord Haldane's critics, reminds us, one point of importance 
on which debate is yet proceeding. If Lord Haldane's view is accepted, 
and the Canadian Constitution is a fresh grant, we are no doubt entitled 
to disregard any arguments not based entirely on the British North 
America Act. When, therefore, the power of disallowance of provincial 
legislation is accorded by the Act to the Governor-General, i.e. to the 
Dominion Government, we may deduce that the power was intended 
to be exercised, and that the Dominion Government is charged with the 
duty, as it has the power, to disallow any provincial legislation which 
offends against the moral principles approved by the Dominion Govern­
ment of the day. The Canadian Minister of Justice under the present 
regime has not shrunk from acting on this theory in practice, thus 
negativing the view to the contrary always maintained by Sir A. Ayles-
worth under the Laurier regime. While it is easy to sympathise with 
Mr. Doherty's dislike of the semi-confiscatory legislation now unfortun­
ately sometimes approved by provincial legislatures, it is difficult to 
doubt the wisdom of the older precedent ; disallowance is a clumsy and 
ineffective weapon, and it has the supreme demerit that it weakens the 
moral responsibility of legislators by permitting them to trust to another 
source, the duty of satisfying themselves of the justice of what they 
enact, and seeks to perform a function of control which justly appertains 
to the electorate. Mr. Doherty's action, indeed, has clearly failed to 
find general approval in Canada, and it may be assumed that, in future, 
the Dominion Government will follow the lead set by Lord Milner in 
1920, when he declined to disallow the confiscatory legislation of Queens­
land. The only legitimate use of the power of disallowance seems to 
lie in the convenience which may exist in thus disposing of an enact­
ment clearly ultra vires the Province, when injury might result from 
leaving the measure to be declared null and void by the Courts. 
Inter-Imperial Enforcement of Judgments.—The provisions of the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1920,1 for the reciprocal enforcement 
of judgments in the United Kingdom and other parts of the British 
Dominions, fulfil somewhat tardily the recommendation on this score 
made by the Imperial Conference of 1911. It is an interesting proof of 
the diversity of legal conditions in the Empire that it has been impossible 
to devise any system for the automatic enforcement of judgments. The 
registration of a judgment obtained in a superior Court overseas in the 
High Court is subject in every case to the discretion of the Court, and 
there is therefore an important divergence from the procedure in regard 
to the enforcement in England of Scottish and Irish judgments.1 Impor­
1 10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 81, ss. 9-14-
« Judgments Extension Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 34). 
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tance attaches from the point of view of the conflict of laws to the list 
of cases in which registration of judgments is not permitted, for it throws 
a clear light on the English doctrine of the conditions under which 
foreign judgments generally should be recognised.1 
In the main these conditions are reproduced in the Act without 
alteration. Thus, no judgment may be registered if it was obtained by 
fraud or was in respect of a cause of action which, for reasons of public 
policy, or for some other similar reason, could not have been entertained 
by the English Court, a provision which will exclude judgments in 
revenue cases, or in respect of gambling losses. Moreover, no judgment 
may be registered if an appeal is pending or is intended to be brought 
against it, although an ordinary foreign judgment may be sued upon 
in these circumstances, subject to the power of the Court to stay pro­
ceedings pending the result of such an appeal. More important, however, 
and not free from obscurity, are the piovisions as to the jurisdiction 
which will justify the registration of a judgment. It seems clear that 
jurisdiction is recognised in every case in which the judgment debtor 
was duly served with process within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
original Court, and further that in any case in which the debtor was 
not carrying on business, nor ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction, 
and did not appear voluntarily or otherwise submit, or agree to submit, 
to the jurisdiction of that Court, the judgment cannot be registered. 
Further, even if the debtor was ordinarily resident or carrying on business 
within the jurisdiction, or had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction, a 
judgment cannot be registered if he was not duly served with the process 
and did not appear. It seems to follow that jurisdiction is recognised 
as existing in the case of any person ordinarily resident or carrying on 
business, or who has agreed to submit, provided always that process 
has been duly served, and we must assume that due service in these 
cases includes service without the jurisdiction so long as it is sufficient 
to bring the case effectively to the notice of the defendant, for no doubt 
would exist as to the jurisdiction if service could be effected locally. 
Thus, for purposes of enforcement of judgments rendered in some part 
of the British dominions, English law has recognised, what it refuses 
to accept in the case of ordinary foreign judgments, ordinary residence 
or carrying on business as a ground for jurisdiction. 
The concession is interesting, and may have been intended to supply 
in the case of the British Dominions the place of jurisdiction on the 
score of nationality, which in theory is recognised by English Courts. 
There is still no distinction of British nationalities on which jurisdiction 
could be founded,2 and ordinary residence or carrying on business even 
in the case of foreign countries might well be regarded as a far more 
reasonable basis of jurisdiction than mere nationality. At any rate, 
1 See A. V. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2nd edition), chap. xvii. 
2 See In re Johnson, (1903) 1 ch. 821, 832-5 per Farwell, J. ; Gibson v. Gibson, 
[1913] 3 K.B. 379. Canada, of course, has recently decided to define Canadian 
nationality, but English law has not yet recognised the distinction. 
312 NOTES ON IMPERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
the way is now open for the development of such a doctrine, and it will 
be interesting to see how far the Courts will give effect to it. 
The Act evades, naturally enough, the vexed topic of divorce legis­
lation, by confining the registration of judgments to such judgments as 
order payment of money, including arbitration awards when under the 
local law they are enforceable as if they were judgments. 
Divorce Jurisdiction in India and the Dominions.—The decision in 
Keyes v. Keyes1 asserts somewhat belatedly what has been recognised 
for many years,2 the invalidity of divorces granted by Indian Courts to 
persons not domiciled in British India. Curiously enough, the ratio 
decidendi adopted was the rather strained view that the Indian Divorce 
Act of 1869 could not be interpreted as sanctioning the divorce of 
persons not domiciled in India, because so to interpret it would be 
to make it ultra vires the legislative authority conferred on the Indian 
Legislature by the Indian Councils Act, 1862. The decision should 
rather have rested on the obvious fact that, as the jurisdiction was to 
be exercised on the principles followed in England, as soon as Le Mesurier 
v. Le Mesurier3 made it clear that divorce jurisdiction depended on 
domicile, the Indian Courts should have followed the principle laid down 
in that case by the Judicial Committee. The validation by Imperial 
Act of the divorces hitherto granted under the Act of 1869 removes the 
immediate difficulty as regards India, but it leaves unsolved the question 
of divorces granted in Courts in the Dominions, for instance, in the case 
of deserted wives whose husbands have changed their domicile.4 It is, 
of course, possible that divorces in these special instances might be 
regarded as valid by English Courts, for there are dicta 5 recognising the 
right of English Courts to grant divorce in such cases ; but, failing this, 
the case may be met by legislation, though there are serious difficulties 
in the way of framing any legislation on a satisfactory basis.6 
Act of State in British Dominions.—The decision of the House of 
Lords in Johnstone v. Pedlar,7 on appeal from the Court of Appeal in 
Ireland is of great interest as determining in effect for the whole of the 
Dominions of the Crown the extent to which the doctrine of Act of State 
can be pleaded as a bar to proceedings by an alien in a British Court 
against officers of the Crown acting under the instructions of a responsible 
minister of the Crown. The respondent in the appeal was born in 
Ireland, but had been naturalised as a citizen of the United States. He 
1 37 T.L.R. 499. 
2 Responsible Government in the Dominions, iii. 1240—5. 
3 [1895] A.C. 517. 
* E.g. in New Ireland, Poingdestre v. Poingdestre, 28 N.Z.L.R. 604. 
5 See Niboyet v. Niboyet, [1878] 4 P.D. 1, 14 per Brett, L.J. ; Armytage v. 
Armytage, [1898] T. 178, 185, per Gorell Barnes, P. ; Ogden v. Ogden, [1908] P. 46. 
6 Compare the Matrimonial Causes Bill of 1921, clause 10, which aims also at 
meeting the difficulty raised in Stathatos v. Stathatos, [1913] P. 46 and De Mon-
taign v. De Montaign, (1913) P. 154. 
''The Times, June 25, 1921. 
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returned to Ireland, and, after taking part in the disturbances of 1916, 
was at last arrested on May 1, 1918, while engaged in illegal drilling, 
for which offence he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and 
recommended for deportation. When arrested, the respondent had in 
his possession £124 in cash, and a cheque for £4 15s. 6d., which the 
police seized and detained, the detention being formally ratified by the 
Chief Secretary for Ireland acting in his capacity as a minister of the 
Crown. The respondent then took proceedings to secure the return of 
these items of property, and succeeded in obtaining a majority decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Ireland in his favour, and it was from this 
decision that the appellant, the Chief Commissioner of Dublin Metropolitan 
Police, came to the House of Lords. 
The decision turned on the question whether it was a sufficient defence 
to such an action to allege that the property was detained as an Act 
of State, and that the claimant was an alien. The House of Lords had 
no difficulty in affirming the doctrine that the plea was bad, and that 
an Act of State can only be alleged against an alien in respect of an 
action done outside the British Dominions, in accordance with the 
doctrine laid down in Bur on v. Denman.1 Their Lordships cited with 
approval the famous decision in Walker v. Baird,2 which established 
that the plea of Act of State is not available against a British subject, 
and insisted on the fact that the alien while on British territory owes 
a local allegiance which carries with it obligations as well as privileges, 
including the protection of the Courts against tortfeasors, and they held, 
therefore, that, the plea adduced in the case before them was bad as 
an answer to the claim. 
The decision, however, leaves unsettled the very difficult question, 
which was not actually brought before the House of Lords, of the rights 
of the Executive Government apart from statute against an alien who, 
temporarily resident in the country, engages in treasonable acts against 
the State. An alien cannot in any way relieve himself of his local 
allegiance so as to be able to evade punishment for any act of treason 
committed by him while on British territory, But has he the same 
rights, if he engages in a treasonable act, as has a British subject, 
natural born or naturalised ? Can he claim against the servants of the 
Crown the status of a subject of the Government which he is endeavouring 
to subvert ? The judgment of Lord Finlay emphasises the apparent 
unfairness of any such claim, but there is something to be said on the 
other side. If it be held that an alien is bound by the ties of local 
allegiance, is it just to deprive him of the advantages of such allegiance ? 
Should a man be liable to be treated at the pleasure of the Government 
as if he were a British subject, or as an alien pure and simple ? It 
would seem that it is wiser to hold fast to the doctrine of local allegiance 
rather than introduce an element of injustice and caprice, and to provide 
by statute any further restrictions on aliens rather than invoke against 
1 2 Ex. 167. a [1892J A.C. 491. 
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them the mysteries of an Act of State. The doctrine of local allegiance, 
it must be remembered, is far from unfavourable to the Crown ; it has 
been held that an alien is guilty of high treason if he assists his own 
countrymen when in occupation of British territory in which he was 
residing at the outbreak of war,1 and an alien enemy, despite the protection 
afforded him by law, is liable to be interned at the pleasure of the Execu­
tive as a prisoner of war.2 
[<Contributed by PROFESSOR HARRISON MOORE.] 
Crown Colony Government.—An article on Crown Colony Government 
in the Caribbean in The Nineteenth Century and After for April 1921, 
calls attention to the little that has been done in the way of systematic 
exposition of the working of Crown Colony Government as compared 
with that of Parliamentary Government in the colonies. For this, no 
doubt, there are many reasons. The fact that Parliamentary Govern­
ment is essentially government by discussion provides abundant pub­
lished material for the constitutional student, while in the case of 
the Crown Colonies the material will, to a far greater extent, be restricted 
to official files, not generally accessible. Another reason is that the 
study of government has not made a great appeal to British students, 
except those aspects of it which may be summed up in the terms "civil, 
political and religious liberty." In these circumstances, attention may 
be called to an essay by Mr. Edwaid Sweetman, M.A., of the University 
of Melbourne, on " Constitutional Development of Victoria, 1851-6 " 
(Whitcomb & Tombs, Wellington, N.Z. and London). Victoiia was not, 
of course, a " Crown Colony " in the technical sense. Its Government 
was prescribed by Imperial Acts, and its Legislature was as to two-
thirds of its members elected. But from 1851 to 1856 it had this in 
common with Crown Colonies—that its principal officials were appointed 
by the Biitish and not the Colonial Government, that, though in some 
cases they might be members of the Legislature, it was as nominees of 
the Crown, to whom alone, and not to the Legislature, they were respon­
sible. That in such a Government, executive officials, if not nominated, 
may not seek election as members, is best illustrated by a case earlier 
than the period covered by Mr. Sweetman. In 1844 Sir Thomas Mitchell, 
Surveyor-General of New South Wales, not having been nominated, 
sought and obtained election as a member of the Legislative Council of 
the colony. In a few months he resigned, in circumstances sufficiently 
explained in a despatch from the Secretary of State, which contains the 
following statement of principle: 
If Her Majesty's officers think fit to assume relations and responsibilities 
disqualifying them for the support of Her Majesty's Representative, they 
are, of course, perfectly free to do so, but, having done so, cannot be per-
1 De Jager v. Attorney-General of Natal, [1907] A.C. 326. 
2 Ex parte Weber, [1916] 1 A.C. 421. 
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mitted to retain their employment ; otherwise, there would not only be a 
end to all concert and subordination in Her Majesty's service, but the 
sincerity and good faith of those by whom it is administered would be brought 
into serious discredit. (Quoted, Jenks's Government of Victoria, pp. 122-3.) 
The objects Mr. Sweetman had in view in examining this pre-
responsible government period was to ascertain how far the ground 
was being prepared for the impending change by the practice of Govern­
ment and the relations of the Executive of the Legislature. The " test 
questions " are set out in the Introduction, and it may be worth while 
to recapitulate them in the belief that they may be useful to students 
engaged upon similar tasks in relation to other places. 
What were the relations between the Governor and his principal Executive 
officers ? How far did they collectively form a body of advisers determining 
policy ? To what extent was the Executive Council a Council of officials ? 
How far was it the practice to include officials or Executive Councillors 
among the nominee members of the Legislative Council ? Did the Execu­
tive Councillors or the officials in the Legislative Council act collectively as 
does a Ministry, or separately as do individual members ? Had those 
nominee members of the Council who were neither officials nor Executive 
Councillors freedom of action, or were they a " Government party" expected 
to support the Executive ? Did the Executive " lead the House" ? Did 
the Legislative Council, in addition to making laws and imposing taxes, claim 
to criticise the general administration ? Were " votes of censure " known ? 
Was a general Budget laid before the Legislative Council, so as to enable 
it to review the whole expenditure of Government, including that part of 
the expenditure which it did not directly control ? Were there any cases 
in which appointments to the Executive Council were made with a view 
to securing the support of the Legislative Council, or any in which a man 
ceased to hold office, or to be a member of the Executive Council, or was 
removed from the Legislative Council, in deference to the opinion of that 
Council ? In making appointments to the Executive Council, did the 
Governor ever make a choice from the elective members of the Legislative 
Council. 
It is to answering this class of question that Mr. Sweetman has 
directed his researches, and his book is an interesting account of the 
way in which people who are familiar with Parliamentary Government 
tend to turn political institutions of a different kind towards that type. 
The rule governing the conduct of Crown Colony officials who have 
been nominated as members of the Legislative Council was laid down by 
the Secretary of State in 1882, in view of ceitain actions by officials in 
Jamaica. The Legislative Council consisted wholly of nominee members, 
of whom half were executive officials and half non-official. Under a 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Jamaica, the Governor, Sir Anthony 
Musgrave, has been cast in heavy damages at the suit of one Pulido, 
whose ship had been detained (wrongfully as the Court held) on suspicion 
of a breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act. (The case, as an appeal to 
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the Privy Council is familiar to constitutional students—Musgrave v. 
Pulido, L.R. 5 A.C. in.) The case was plainly one in which the Governor 
ought to be indemnified by Government ; but while the British Govern­
ment held that the liability properly belonged to the Colonial Govern­
ment, there was an almost universal opinion in the colony that the 
liability having been incurred for Imperial purposes, i.e. in view of the 
obligations laid upon the Empire to observe neutrality, and by the acts 
of officers appointed to be responsible to the British Government, the 
charge was one which ought not to be thrown on the colonial funds. 
The Governor was directed to prepare a vote to the Council authorising 
the payment, and the Secretary of State intimated that " official members 
would of course be directed to support the vote." A copy of this 
instruction was sent by the Governor to each of the official members. 
Thereupon, two of these members—the Auditor-General and the Crown 
Solicitor—resigned their seats on the Council as disagreeing with the 
proposal for which they were asked to vote. This being reported to the 
Secretary of State, he writes on January i, 1882 : 
The action taken by the two officers cannot be allowed to constitute a 
precedent, because it is necessary that the Government should be able to 
rely with confidence on the unreserved support and co-operation in the 
Legislative Council of all who hold official seats therein, and it will be 
desirable that henceforth in accordance with the principles in which the 
Legislatures of other Crown Colonies are constituted the official seats should 
be assigned to certain offices, and to the individuals who may for the time 
being be the holders of such offices, so that it may be clearly understood 
that an officer who is not prepared to support the Government will vacate 
his office as well as his seat in the Legislative Council. (Cd. 3453, Sess. 
Papers, 1882, vol. xlvi, p. 58.) 
NOTES. 
Adoption.—The Committee appointed by the Home Secretary under the 
chairmanship of Sir Alfred Hopkinson, to consider (i) whether it is 
desirable to make legal provision for the adoption of children in this 
country, and (2) if so, what form such provision should take, has issued 
a valuable report (Cmd. 1254, Stationery Office, 2d.). The Committee 
obtained evidence as to the laws of other countries, but they considered 
that little advantage would be gained by attempting to use the laws 
existing in different European countries as precedents with the possible 
exceptions of some provisions introduced by recent legislation in Scan­
dinavia. The one fact which emerged was that adoption of children 
does receive legal recognition in almost all civilised States. On the 
other hand, the Committee attached great importance to, and believed 
that valuable assistance could be gained from, the consideration of 
recent legislation in English-speaking countries, particularly in certain 
British Dominions, and in the United States of America. Special refer­
ence is made to the law in Western Australia, and also to the account 
of the New Zealand legislation published elsewhere in this number. In 
Canada the legislature of British Columbia passed an Act last year to 
regulate the adoption of children. The Committee, however, in their 
own recommendations, have not followed the legislation of any one 
country, but have arrived at their conclusions on the evidence after 
considering and comparing the laws of other countries on the subject. 
The report, with its careful reasoning, should be read at length, but it 
may be useful to add the summary of the recommendations : 
" (1) That an Act should be passed to give legal recognition to the 
adoption of children carried out in the method prescribed and to secure 
that the adopter and the adopted child should have rights and duties 
inter se similar to those between natural parents and their children. 
" The Act should make provisions as to ( a )  judicial sanction to be 
required for such adoptions, the County Courts being the tribunal for 
this purpose and the High Court having concurrent jurisdiction ; (b) 
the consents to be obtained and the conditions to be fulfilled before 
adoption is sanctioned ; (c) the effects of adoption as regards the rights 
of the parties both as to property and otherwise. 
" (2) An amendment of the Children Act, 1908, so as to secure notifi­




" (3) The legitimation of children born out of wedlock by the subse­
quent marriage of their parents, as recommended in our interim report. 
" We consider that the above three questions are urgent. As soon as 
they have been dealt with by separate Acts we recommend further : 
" (4) That the whole legislation relating to children should be taken 
into consideration, amended as may then be necessary, and consolidated." 
The Medical Service 0! the Supreme Bench of Baltimore.—The 
Medical Service in connection with the Courts of Baltimore City began 
some five years ago, when, at the suggestion of several judges of the 
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the position of Medical Officer was 
created, which was filled by Dr. John R. Oliver, a member of the staff 
of the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic of the Johns Hopkins Hospital. Until 
recently, the Medical Service had no appropriation from any public 
fund, and Dr. Oliver was compelled to work alone. Prior to 1920 the 
organisation was purely the creation of the Supreme Bench, but in that 
year the Medical Service was established by Act of the State Legis­
lature, and an appropriation secured. The latter enabled Dr. Oliver to 
make a complete reorganisation of the office, to have the services of an 
assistant, and to double the possibilities for service. 
The Medical Service was to act as " the watcher at the gate of the 
Criminal Court " to prevent any person, mentally irresponsible or 
seriously ill, from passing into penal institutions, thus freeing the prisons 
from mentally disturbed persons, the feeble-minded and from those 
badly balanced personalities to whom prison discipline does no good, 
and who should be cared for as sick people rather than criminals, and 
who should be placed in proper institutions. The Service was founded 
upon lines somewhat broader than those of the two older services in 
Chicago and Boston, which are more intimately connected with the 
purely mental side of the question. Not only does this Service take 
cognisance of mentally deficient delinquents, but it takes in all medico­
legal matters of every description. In all cases of possible homicide, 
the autopsy is either made by Dr. Oliver or in his presence, careful notes 
are made, and a report is submitted directly to the chief prosecuting 
officer and parties concerned in the case requiring such. Assistance is 
rendered the police in many ways, such as the investigation of blood­
stains, footprints, etc. The Medical Officer is also frequently called into 
the Civil, as well as the Criminal Courts, as the Court's expert on various 
questions, such as the credibility of a witness, the possible limits of preg­
nancy in bastardy cases, the wage-earning abilities of men involved 
in non-support cases, and in any cases in which the science of medicine 
can be applied to the solution of legal problems. 
In addition to " the watch at the gate " referred to above, the 
physicians at the various penal institutions refer cases to this office 
which come to their attention while making daily inspections. These 
institutions are again combed by trained social workers of the Prisoners' 
Aid Association of the Baltimore Alliance of Charitable Agencies. Thus, 
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a double check is maintained which rarely fails to note the few cases 
which " ease " through " the gate." 
A physical and mental examination is made of each case, after which 
a report of the findings is submitted to the Court in which the case is 
assigned, and copies are also submitted to the Prosecuting Attorney for 
the State, the Prisoners' Aid Association, and to the prisoner's attorney. 
This is the usual routine, though, quite frequently, the Medical Officer 
is called to testify as to his findings. 
A Medical Service has also been established in connection with the 
Prisoner's Aid Association, of which Dr. Oliver is also Chief Medical 
Officer. This Service deals with the physical and mental condition 
of all persons before the Courts for trial and of all persons who, after 
serving their sentences, are released in its care. It also forms a con­
necting link between the Court Medical Service and the physicians who 
are in charge of the penal institutions. In this way the mental and 
physical conditions of accused persons are covered from their arrest, 
through their trial and prison sentence, down to and including the time 
of their release and of their readaptation to the social life of the community. 
Maintenance.—The Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) 
Act, 1920, provides for the enforcement in England and Ireland of main­
tenance orders made by a Court in any part of His Majesty's Dominions 
outside the United Kingdom to which the Act extends. The Legis­
latures of the undermentioned Colonies having made reciprocal provision 
for the enforcement in those Colonies of maintenance orders made by 
Courts in England and Ireland, an Order in Council was issued on May 27, 
1921, extending the Act to Grenada, Leeward Islands and Mauritius. A 
further Order in Council was issued on June 27, 1921, extending the Act 
to Malta and the Straits Settlements. 
Proposed Amendment of Tenancy Law in Oudh.—Mr. Sabonadiere 
writes: " One of the most interesting proposals now pending before 
any of the Legislatures in India is the bill to amend the Oudh Rent 
Act, which has been introduced in the Legislative Council of the United 
Provinces. The bill is almost certain to give rise to much controversy 
when its details come to be considered. In most of the land of Oudh 
the ordinary tenant is secured a tenure for at least seven years by the 
present Act, and a landlord desiring to eject a tenant at the end of such 
a term has to pay a heavy and irrecoverable court fee. The Act also 
limits enhancements of rent either to the sitting tenant or to a new-comer 
when such a term runs out. In the rest, and much smaller part, of the 
land of Oudh the tenant, unless of the limited class of occupancy 
tenants, has no protection at all. The enhancement limitation is 
habitually evaded by a system of premiums exacted by the landlords. 
The bill proposes to substitute ten instead of seven years for the term 
of unbroken holding, and to give the tenant the right to hold on there­
after for life, subject to revision of the rent by the Court at the end of 
each ten-year term, and it also provides for periodical inquiries for the 
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fixation of fair rent rates for each class of soil in each district or other 
local area. All this is excellent. But the bill proposes considerably to 
enlarge, or to allow the landlords to enlarge, the area in which tenants 
have no protection, to create a controversial class of " undesirable 
tenants " whom the landlord can move the Court to eject at any time, 
the Court to have discretion in this matter, and to allow the landlord 
to eject at any time on the real or pretended ground that he wants the 
land for certain personal or outside purposes. If he makes a show for 
just over two years of carrying out those purposes the tenant will be 
permanently got rid of. It remains to be seen how these provisions 
will fare in Committee of the Legislative Council. 
The Taxation of Excess Profits in Great Britain.—" With all its 
imperfections, we may perhaps say of it what was said of the Laws of 
Solon, that though not the best in itself, it is the best which the interests, 
prejudice and temper of the times would admit." Such was the com­
ment of Adam Smith on the system of Corn Laws, and so may the 
financial student of to-day regard the taxation of Excess Profits, especi­
ally as a means of providing the sinews of war. 
In view of the controversy which has centred round this particular 
form of taxation, it is particularly interesting to have the unbiased 
views of a broad-minded, disinterested commentator such as Professor 
Haig, whose report was published as a Supplement to the December 1920 
issue of The American Economic Review.1 
In 1919 the War Finance Committee of the American Economic 
Association decided to send a Special Commission to Great Britain 
to study the system of taxation on Excess Profits in vogue. The 
Commission was unable for various reasons to come to England, but one 
of its members, Professor R. M. Haig, of Columbia University, under­
took the work single-handed, and although in England for less than six 
weeks during 1920, he has produced a report which will take high rank 
in the list of scholarly productions by fiscal students. 
The Report begins with an examination of the causes which led 
to the favourable reception granted to the first Excess Profits Duty 
Enactment in 1915. The idea of a levy on Excess Profits provided a 
strong appeal to Labour generally, while the general public hoped that 
the measure would have a restrictive influence on profiteering. 
Professor Haig then proceeds, in the second section of the Report, 
to an exceptionally well-informed description of the interpretation of 
the law by the Inland Revenue Department, and compares the methods 
adopted by the English Revenue officials in dealing with problems similar 
to those which had caused difficulty in America. He incidentally points 
1 The Taxation of Excess Profits in Great Britain—A Study of the British 
Excess Profits Duty in relation to the problem of Excess Profits taxation in the 
United States. A Report prepared for a Committee on War Finance of the 
American Economic Association, by Robert Murray Haig, Ph.D., Associate Professor, 
School of Business, Columbia University, assisted by Geo. E. Holmes of the New 
York Bar. 
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out how the British law has eliminated hardship as far as possible by an 
ample supply of " cushioning," and contrasts unfavourably the inelas­
ticity and inflexibility of the American system which failed to make 
sufficient provision for abnormal cases. 
The third section of the Report is devoted to an examination of the 
administrative machinery, and, in view of the popular prejudice against 
bureaucracy, it is interesting to note the high praise tendered by this 
impartial investigator to the Inland Revenue officials generally. He is 
amazed at the wide discretionary powers conferred on the administrative 
officials, and, after contact with officials of the Inland Revenue, with 
accountants whose practice brought them into close touch with the 
administration, and with taxpayers, is filled with admiration for the 
efficient manner in which the machinery is operated, and the general 
satisfaction it has given. He, moreover, points out that the British 
system was more thoroughly planned in its inception—the system in 
vogue there now being fundamentally the same as that introduced in 
1915, while the American system has undergone very considerable 
revisions in the course of its career. 
The next section of the Report deals briefly with the effect of the 
Excess Profits Duty. Professor Haig is very guarded in his statements 
here, and has not dealt with the relative superiority of the American 
system regarded from the " ability " standpoint. After quoting from 
speeches of prominent statesmen and financiers, he remarks : 
" It is freely asserted that the duty has been an important influence 
making for high prices, but the best informed opinion appears to hold 
that the tax has been, in most cases, the excuse for, and not the true 
cause of, the increases in prices." 
He also calls attention to beneficial effects which have been incidental 
to this duty, namely, welfare work, the improvement of industrial 
housing, and the scrapping of out-of-date plant, all of which measures 
were the result, probably, of a desire to escape a portion of the duty. 
The volume can be heartily recommended to any student of finance 
who desires to obtain a brief but thorough review of the British system 
of Excess Profits Duty taxation. 
Financial Support of Hospitals in the Dominions.—Although it has 
been determined to maintain the voluntary system of financing the hos­
pitals of the United Kingdom, it may not be without interest to record 
the arrangements in other parts of the Empire. Broadly speaking, there 
are two main systems—one in which the State or the local authority 
is the predominant partner and enlists the co-operation of voluntary 
subscribers upon the management, and the other in which the State has 
given legislative authority to the work of voluntary bodies and supple­
mented their funds. In the former system the financial basis is a State 
grant at a rate per diem upon the basis of the number of days' actual 
treatment and stay of each patient. In the latter system the State's 
contribution is on a scale according to the amount of the voluntary 
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contributions from different sources. It seems to be clear, therefore, 
from the Dominions' experience, that the grant on the basis of occupied 
beds involves the larger amount of external control leading by a short 
step to the supersession of voluntary control by an arrangement in 
which bureaucracy exercises the predominant part. 
It is worth while to note that in England the moneys at present re­
ceived from the State and local authorities are devoted to special objects, 
e.g. venereal diseases and professional education, and are not given by 
way of contribution to the cost per bed of maintaining the hospital. 
The two systems are represented respectively in Canada and Australia. 
In Canada the local authority predominates, and in Australia the under­
lying principle of the legislation appears to be an endeavour to strengthen 
and supplement the work of the voluntary hospitals. In Victoria, for 
example, the control is vested by statute in a committee elected by the 
subscribers of whom not more than one-fourth may be honorary medical 
men on the staff of the institution. The corresponding New South 
Wales Act specifies that in order to be entitled to vote, the subscriber 
must have contributed at least £i in the preceding year or £10 in one 
sum. The State contributes an amount equal to the private annual 
contributions on condition that the Government, through Police Magis­
trates or other approved officers, have the right to recommend the 
admission of patients. In South Australia the Government is repre­
sented on the governing body in the same ratio as the State contribution 
to the total income, i.e. one-half or two-thirds. Western Australia has 
a similar but more elaborate arrangement, while in Queensland a converse 
arrangement is in operation whereby the subscribers have representation 
in accordance with the total amount of their contribution. 
While the system in New Zealand is primarily one of State control, 
the financial arrangements are directed to encourage voluntary generosity. 
The particulars are set out in the Hospitals and Charitable Institutions 
Act, which provides that the subsidy shall not exceed: 
" (a) Ten shillings for every pound value of all devises or bequests. 
" (b) Twenty-four shillings for every pound of the value of all con­
tributions or gifts of money, land or other property, other than devises 
or bequests ; 
" (c) For every pound levied by the Board from contributory local 
authorities, under the provisions : 
" (i) One pound in respect of capital expenditure ; 
" (ii) An amount determined in accordance with an elaborate 
schedule in respect of expenditure other than capital 
expenditure." 
The subsidy is not to exceed £500 in respect of the estate of a single 
testator. It has been found that this system of subsidy, which was 
devised to assist the poorer Hospitals Boards, has not been successful 
in that respect. The voluntary contributions in the last year for which 
figures are available only amounted to £17,963 out of a total income 
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of £668,584. In the Australian States the proportion of voluntary 
contributions to total income is substantially higher. In New Zealand 
also it is thought that more effort should be made to obtain pay­
ments from patients, and that a uniform fee is desirable throughout the 
Dominion. So far as can be traced in the numerous reports and statutes 
which have been obtained from the Dominions, there is no official 
corresponding to the Lady Almoner. It is clear that the primary object 
of her work to prevent people from pauperising themselves is as much, 
if not' more, necessary under a State system than it is under a voluntary 
system. 
Under both systems there is generally an inspector, who is primarily 
connected with the medical side of work, but New Zealand has a lay 
inspector whose duty it is " to inspect and report upon methods of 
purchase and use of supplies ; to report upon the stores system in vogue, 
test the same, and, where necessary, make a stores audit." He reports 
upon any waste or extravagance and suggests methods whereby economy 
can be ensured, obtaining the necessary information, to enable com­
parative costing statistics to be prepared. He also investigates and 
reports on the office organisation and accounts, and sees that up-to-date 
methods are followed. He also examines the efficiency of the staffing 
on the domestic side of the institution. Generally, the objects of his 
appointment are to promote efficient and economical administration of 
hospitals, especially in securing that those treated in them, who are 
able to do so, should contribute adequately to their support. 
The New Zealand plan of financial subsidy is in operation in Cape 
Colony, where 30s. is given for every £1 of the value of all voluntary 
contributions or gifts of money other than devises or bequests, £1 for 
every £1 of the value of all devises or bequests, and £1 for every pound 
received as fees from patients, with a provision that the subsidy is not 
to exceed £500 in respect of the estate of a single testator. 
In Canada the provision of hospitals follows broadly the same lines 
in the different provinces with the exception of Quebec, where note may 
be made of an Act devoting the entertainment tax in Montreal to their 
support. In Ontario the Province does not contribute to any hospital 
more than the amount of the municipal grant for its maintenance, and 
no sum is paid in respect of paying patient. Alberta contributes 50 cents 
per day for each patient, and half that sum for paying patients. Nova 
Scotia pays 30 cents for each day's actual treatment and stay of a 
patient in such hospital up to 1,500 dollars, and thereafter at the rate 
of 20 cents. During the past few years the attention of the Legislatures 
have been directed to the provision of hospitals and medical attention 
in country districts. The organisation is generally entrusted to Hospital 
Boards elected or appointed for the purpose. 
The circumstances in this country differ widely from those prevailing 
in the Dominions, but human nature is much the same all the world 
over, and when once the stream of aid from taxation or the rates begins 
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to flow, then it is difficult to maintain the supply of the milk of human 
kindness represented by the contributions and work voluntarily given 
to the maintenance of the hospitals. 
International Aspects of Public Health Questions.—The present 
century has witnessed a marked tendency to recognise that many questions 
connected with the public health require international co-operation for 
their effective handling, and the institution of the League of Nations 
has served to show a tendency which had been acquiring force during 
the generation which preceded the Peace of Versailles. 
Attention has been directed to the importance of distinguishing 
between those public health questions which appear to demand con­
sideration from the international standpoint for effective administration 
and those which, like many scientific, legal, and social problems, are 
advantageously studied and discussed with that many-sided approach 
that the views of different nationalities are sure to supply. 
A paper 1 read by Sir William Collins to the Kensington Branch of 
the League of Nations on December 3, 1920, sought to survey Inter­
national Health Questions from the point of view of the League, and 
an address by Dr. G. S. Buchanan on February 18, 1921,2 to the Society 
of Medical Officers of Health, envisaged International Organisation in 
the light of Public Health. 
In both these papers the objects, the machinery and the limits of 
international activities in regard to health questions are investigated, 
and the work already achieved by the League of Nations recorded. The 
continuance and extension of the work of the Sanitary Conventions of 
1892 to 1912, the international notification of infectious diseases, the 
campaign against typhus, hours of labour and employment of women 
and children, naval hygiene, vital statistics, the control of traffic in 
dangerous drugs, were duly passed in review as well as the co-operation 
of the League of Nations with voluntary agencies such as the Red Cross 
Societies whose encouragement and promotion are by Article 25 of the 
Covenant especially confided to that organisation. 
The Monthly Summaries of the League of Nations, non-officially 
issued from Geneva by the Information Section thereof, enable us to 
judge of the progress so far attained by the new machinery at work in 
relation to the public health. 
A perusal of these summaries serves to remind us that progress in 
organisation, when some forty different Governments are concerned, 
and some important countries are not included, is necessarily slow, and 
that post helium machinery has to be adapted to ante bellum activities 
which were already in partial occupation of the field. 
Thus, the setting up of a permanent health organisation by the 
League was delayed by diplomatic efforts to secure official consent of 
all the Powers which were party to the Rome Sanitary Convention of 
1 Published in The Hospital, April 30 and May 7, 1921. 
2 Published in The Lancet, vol. i, 1921, p. 4 1 5 .  
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1907 to merging the work of the Office d'Hygiene in Paris with the new 
and extended activities of the International Health Organisation of the 
League at Geneva. The abstention of the United States from the 
League and any of its Commissions and Committees, has retarded 
the inauguration of even the Provisional Health Committee which the 
Council of the League, at its meeting in Paris in February and March 
last, decided to set up. 
As regards the other " humanitarian question," the official " Monthly 
Summary" of the League records the work of an advisory com­
mittee on the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, which met 
at Geneva in May. It is amiably remarked that " it seemed to the 
committee that the Hague Convention (Opium) had not been put into 
practice everywhere." Although the Opium Convention of 1912 came 
into force, nominally, in January 10 of this year, it would be more 
correct to say that it has not as yet been put into practice anywhere. 
It is of the essence of the Convention that all nationalities producing or 
using the dangerous drugs in question shall mutually co-operate in re­
stricting them to medical and legitimate purposes only. This objective 
is far from attainment even in those countries which have done most 
towards putting the Convention into operation, and indeed the efforts 
of each are largely dependent for success on the co-operation of all. 
A lengthy questionnaire is being issued either through the League 
or the Netherlands Government to all the Powers, whether within or 
without the League, the replies to which will not be available for six 
months. It is hoped that by February next the Council of the League 
may be moved to take action " to render more efficacious and even to 
reinforce the stipulations of the Hague Convention." 
Thus, it will be seen how slowly it is possible to proceed, even with 
urgent reforms dealing with vital questions of health, when the Govern­
ments of some forty or fifty Powers have to be brought into line. 
The Criminal Code of St. Lucia.—"The Criminal Code of St. Lucia, 
1920, represents the codification of all laws up to 1920 on the subjects 
of geneial crime and criminal procedure. In fact, it is a combined 
Penal and Criminal Procedure Code. The Ordinance of 1918 made 
several additions to, or alterations in, the then existing law, and it then 
directed that both these, and all intermediate amendments made by 
various Ordinances since the last codifications of the Penal and Criminal 
Procedure Laws, should be incorporated in a single Criminal Code, 
together with what was left of those former codifications. Mr. J. E. M. 
Salmon, Registrar of the Royal Court, was entrusted with this task, 
and was given power to make all necessary consequential amendments, 
and to propose other minor amendments, which were to be specially 
reported to the Legislative Council, and not to be incorporated in the 
Code until approved by it. The final text as approved by the Legis­
lative Council and the Governor was to come into force as the new 
Code, and the amendments made in 1918 were not to take effect until 
22 
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then. The task was completed in 1920. It appears that the Canadian 
Code, and those of Bermuda, St. Vincent, and the Transvaal have been 
drawn upon fairly freely in compiling the new Code. The result" 
writes Mr. Sabinadiere " is a work of considerable magnitude. Mr. 
Salmon has performed the huge task allotted to him with great care 
and efficiency. But of necessity there is much repetition in a Code 
which attempts to incorporate without much alteration in detail a 
large part of the common law of England relating to crime. When 
Macaulay and his colleagues drafted the India Penal Code they had 
the courage to see that for the purposes of a Code the principles 
of English law were unsurpassable, but that its details were so 
complex that a Code embodying them would be far too lengthy for 
every-day use. Besides which, it would be no more easily compre­
hensible than the uncodified law which it was intended to simplify. So 
this new Code for St. Lucia shows in practice how great are the difficulties 
of codifying the criminal law of England as it stands. This does not 
require us to reason that it would not be a good thing to codify that 
law. Much of it is so scattered between the common law and divers 
statutes, that it is a matter of difficulty to know what the law on any 
given point is, and how the liability comes in, and where a breach of 
duty is made punishable. Partial codification would be no remedy. 
If there is to be a Code it must punish everything punishable which is 
not left for treatment in special or local laws. Bearing these considera­
tions in mind, one can understand why the St. Lucia Code is open to 
criticism as unduly prolix, too full of detail, and not provided with 
enough broad statements of principle. The difficulty is a double one. 
For two procedures, or indeed three, commitment, summary trial, and 
trial at Assizes, have to be dealt with, and the example of English law 
is followed in dealing with each fully and separately. Whereas there is 
much common to all three which need have been stated only once in 
titles applying to all trials. Then at various points of the Code there 
are provisions which more properly belong to a Law of Evidence. For 
instance, the provision that a witness can be called on to answer an 
incriminating question which is directed to show that he is untrustworthy 
or partial, with a guarantee that his answer is not to be used in any 
prosecution against him except one for answering such question falsely, 
is as fairly applicable to a civil trial as to a criminal proceeding. But 
presumably, the Law of Evidence has not been codified in St. Lucia. 
But the general impression given by the Code is that it is a good Code, 
well expressed, and much more understandable of people with merely 
a fair lay education than is the criminal law of England." 
Social Hygiene.—Professor Levi's earnest plea, in an interesting 
monograph,1 is for a larger and more effective control by States of 
social hygiene. The vital importance of national health has suddenly 
1 La Medicina Sociale in difesa della vita e del lavoro. By Professor Ettore 
Levi, 1921. (Roma, Soc. Anon. Editrice La Voce). 
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been revealed to the States at the close of the last war when thousands 
of cripples were left, destitute and helpless, to the care of public assist­
ance. This has been followed by a general revival of social legislation, 
having, for its basic principle, the modern conception that collective 
needs must prevail over personal and particular interests, and that 
Society has the supreme right to defend and promote the welfare of the 
national stock. 
The infectious character of the greatest and most insidious enemies 
of humanity—tuberculosis, alcoholism and venereal diseases—renders 
it imperative that the campaign for their prevention and cure should be 
undertaken, under a joint scheme, by all the nations of the world. 
After summarising, in an open letter to the late Sir David Henderson,1 
the results of his research, Professor Levi urges the creation of an Inter­
national Institute for the diffusion, by propagandist pamphlets, of the 
elementary rules of social hygiene. Special attention should be given 
by the Institute to the study of comparative legislation, and of the 
various systems of State assistance in order that the efforts of the 
different nations may be co-ordinated and their work carried out in 
strict harmony and co-operation. 
Mandates.—In the Journal for October, 1919 (vol. i, p. 175) the late 
Professor Goudy contributed a note on the legal aspects of " mandate." 
The ordinary textbooks on International Law, including Calvo's Dic-
tionnaire de Droit International, appear to know nothing of the name as 
a technical description of any international status or government, though 
analogies mayperhaps be found in the position of some parts of theTurkish 
dominions as defined by various treaties, as, e.g. the government of the 
Lebanon under the Protocol of 1861, or Cyprus under the Treaty of 
1878. In such cases, however, the territory does not cease to be a part 
of the Turkish dominions, and probably for any legal purpose no serious 
difficulty in determining the matter of sovereignty would arise. Only 
two cases are known to the writer in which, prior to the Peace Treaty, 
" mandate " has been definitely invoked eo nomine in international 
relations for the government of territory. One of these, curiously enough, 
is in regard to one of the territories now " mandated " by the Treaty 
of Versailles. At the Washington Conference of 1887 between Great 
Britain, the United States, and Germany on the affairs of Samoa, the 
Germans propounded a scheme whereby the administration would be 
carried on by a native government, with an adviser to act as " the 
mandatory of the three Powers." The adviser was to be nominated by 
Germany, as the Power with preponderating interests, subject to the 
approval of the other two Powers (see British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. lxxix, p. 904). The scheme came to nothing. 
A much more striking case is that of Crete in 1898. In three cases 
the term " mandate " is used so frequently and in so formal a manner as 
1 Director-General of the League of Red Cross Societies. 
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to suggest that it was already a technical term with precise and definite 
implications. The case may be examined in volume xcii of the British 
and Foreign State Papers, pp. 1224 et seq. In the course of the negotia­
tions proceeding at the Courts of the several Powers the suggestion was 
made that Prince George of Greece should be appointed High Com­
missioner " under a joint mandate " from the Powers (see Despatches of 
the British Ambassadors at St. Petersburg (pp. 1224-5) and Rome (p. 1226). 
The suggestion seems to have originated in the Italian Foreign Office, 
which proposed a temporary mandate for two or three years for the 
regulation and pacification of the island. The sugggestion bore fruit, 
for shortly afterwards we find Lord Salisbury setting out the conditions 
of appointment agreed to by the Powers, of which the first was that " the 
High Commissioner will have a temporary mandate of three years for the 
pacification of the island and the establishment of a regular administra­
tion." A Memorandum was then prepared for submission to the King 
of Greece, by which the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and 
Russia inform His Majesty of the proposal to offer to Prince George the 
mandate as High Commissioner for the pacification of the island and 
the establishment of a regular administration, and ask his permission for 
the acceptance of the mandate by the Prince (p. 1232). This Memoran­
dum was presented by the diplomatic representatives at Athens at an 
audience, and His Majesty replied : "I authorise my son to accept 
the mandate which the Powers desire to commit to him in nominating 
him as High Commissioner." A formal offer was then made to the 
Prince, begging him to accept the mandate under the terms set out, and 
the Prince replied accepting the mandate. Finally, the Proclamation 
by which Prince George assumed the government refers in terms to the 
mandate of his appointment. 
The case, it will be noted, differs from those under the Peace Treaty, 
since the mandate is conferred upon an individual and not upon a State 
or Government. Notwithstanding this, it has an analogy to the Class 
C mandates of the Peace Treaty, for in substance, it is the recognition 
of the preponderating interest of a neighbouring State. In both cases the 
mandatores are several, and to them the mandatory owes responsibility. 
A significant alteration made in the draft form of appointment of the 
High Commission for Crete makes this clear. The first draft provided 
that " the High Commission will govern under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan " ; this was changed to " the High Commissioner will recognise 
the suzerainty of the Sultan " (pp. 1228-9). 
The recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
on Native Reserves in Southern Rhodesia, has an interesting reference 
to mandates in a matter which presents a sufficient analogy to inter­
national relations to have drawn from their Lordships the statement 
that the matters referred to them must be dealt with from a broader point 
of view than any suggested by the terms of art peculiar to municipal law. 
The conquered territories of Matabeleland and Mashonaland were 
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administered by the British South Africa Company under an Order in 
Council. The Company did, in fact, grant titles to land and receive pay­
ment therefor. But their Lordships held that the Crown had never parted 
with its title to the Company, and the Company therefore was liable to the 
Crown for the price and rents so received. But on the principles of 
mandate the Company was entitled to reimbursement for expenses properly 
incurred in administration, and might therefore be credited with the 
proceeds of land alienation applied to this purpose. 
The Housing Problem in Egypt.—One of the most striking results of 
the war (writes Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith, in the economic field, is the 
great upheaval it has occasioned in the building trade, and in the problem 
of housing the population in general. In almost every country in Europe 
the difficulty of finding accommodation became more and more acute as 
the war proceeded. The causes of the phenomenon were, of course, 
patent and easily to be foreseen. Building operations which, under normal 
conditions, are never (interrupted, from one year's end to another, became 
impossible, throughout a long period of years, both because of the ever-
increasing difficulty of imports and transport of materials, and because 
labour for civilian building operations was unprocurable. In Paris, for 
instance, where, in normal times, some 7,000 flats (" appartements ") 
are built, every year, occupying some 1,500 timber-yards in that 
city, the latter were reduced in September 1920 to 50. Nor were such 
conditions confined to Europe. Even in so rich a city as New York, 
where the general effects of the war have been comparatively little felt, 
it was recently stated that some 500,000 persons were awaiting the 
provision of houses, the construction of which the present fantastic 
price of steel prevented. 
In Egypt the building and housing crisis has been less acute—in 
proportion to the population—than in other countries. Indeed, to the 
general causes above indicated must be added a considerable increase 
in the population of the country which rose in the last decade for which 
statistics are available (1907-1917) from 11,287,359 to 12,750,918. 
There has been, moreover, a marked tendency for the rural population 
to flock^into the towns, the population of Cairo, for instance, rising in 
the above-mentioned period from 654,476 to 790,939. 
The result was a sudden and enormous rise in rents, which, if allowed 
to continue unchecked, would have made it practically impossible for 
the poorer classes to find lodgings of any kind. 
Legislative intervention in such a question of economic delicacy is 
notoriously dangerous, but most countries have had to undertake it, and 
France, England, and Italy have all dealt with the problem of legislation. 
It was found necessary to follow these precedents in Egypt, and two recent 
numbers of that able and interesting periodical L'£gypte Contemporaine 
(December 1920 and February 1921) contain a full account of the genesis 
and development of the legislative measures taken in that country 
to cope with this thorny problem. 
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The law first promulgated was No. n of 1920, applicable to " dwelling-
houses " (habitations) in all the towns and localities subject to house-tax. 
Its main provision was that, from the date of its promulgation, the 
maximum rent allowed was that provided in the lease or agreement at the 
date of August 1st, 1914, plus 50 per cent. Certain exceptions were 
allowed, however, where such rent was exceptionally low, either by reason 
of the personal relations between the landlord and the tenant, or because, 
since August 1914, the landlord had effected substantial improvements. 
The law also provided that the landlord could no longer eject the tenant 
save by permission of the judge, and on the ground either that the rent 
had remained unpaid for fifteen days after an official demand for it had 
been made, or that the premises had been improperly or illegally misused 
or were being otherwise damaged. 
This law gave rise to many and bitter complaints and criticisms on 
the part of both landlords and tenants. The landlords complained that 
the permissible increase of 50 per cent, was inadequate, and that the 
rise in rents should correspond to the rise in the cost of living, which far 
exceeded 50 per cent. The tenants maintained that rents are merely 
the return on capital invested in land or buildings and must not excee d 
the normal rate of interest allowed, which, in Egypt, is limited by law. 
The landlords further complained that, under this legislation, a house-
owner was no longer able to give notice to quit to his tenant even when 
he wished to occupy his property himself, or to instal in it a member of 
his family. They also pointed out that the law raised a serious obstacle 
to the improvement of residential quarters, where, in many cases, far 
more accommodation could be forwarded by the demolition of small, 
insanitary dwellings and the construction of new and greatly enlarged 
premises. 
On the other hand, the main grievance of the tenant class was 
that the law of 1920 dealt only with the rent of dwelling-houses, and 
provided no remedy against the exorbitant rents which were being 
demanded for shops and other business premises. 
Ultimately the Egyptian Government decided to appoint a Legal 
Commission to study all these questions and make recommendation for 
the revision of the law. This body, which was composed of three Euro­
peans and three Egyptians, reported on December 29, 1920, and its very 
interesting report is given in full in the Review above quoted. The 
result was the new law—No. 4 of 1921—which has endeavoured to 
solve satisfactorily the above and many other difficulties. It has 
made no change in the fundamental principle of the 50 per cent, maximum 
over the pre-war rent. It is, however, of a temporary character, and is 
to remain in force for a year only, till June 30, 1922. 
The Institute of Advanced International Studies.—Under the auspices 
of the International Juridical Union, the French Academy of Moral and 
Political Sciences and the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, a 
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school for the study and teaching of International Law has recently 
been established in Paris.1 
Two special features characterise the new Institute. It is intended, 
in the first place, to provide a highly specialised educational centre for 
the study of International Law and related subjects. In the second 
place, this teaching will be imparted by the most competent professors 
and statesmen of all nations. The school will thus represent the different 
doctrines and systems of the world. 
Besides affording an international centre of research and scientific 
progress, the Institute has also among its direct aims : 
(1) To participate in the reconstruction of international law which 
should now be moulded in strict harmony with the actual exigencies 
of States and the strenuous conditions of modern life ; 
(2) To emphasise the moral influence of the ideas of right and justice 
in the formation of international law ; 
(3) To develop feelings of good understanding and solidarity among 
the members of the League of Nations ; 
(4) To educate public opinion on matters of foreign policy by the 
extended diffusion of the principles of international law. 
The creation of the Institute appears to be particularly appropriate 
at the present time when the old European nations are undergoing a 
process of evolution and transformation, new States are being established, 
and numerous Treaties offer themselves for interpretation. The services 
which the Institute is destined to render can hardly be over-estimated, 
as it is on the existence of an enlightened and world-wide knowledge of 
international law that the future peace and prosperity of mankind will 
largely depend. 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals.—Arrangements have been made for the 
publication of a series of reports of the decisions of Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals. These Tribunals have been established under the Treaties 
of Peace to adjust private property rights and interests between nationals 
of the Allied Powers, and nationals of the Central Powers, and they mark 
an important development in the administration of private international 
law. The first monthly Part of this series, enti ed Recueil des Decisions 
des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes, and published in Paris (Librairie de la 
Societe du Recueil Sirey) reached England during the summer. The 
reports are vouched for by six presidents of Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, 
including Professor Borel, President of the Anglo-German Tribunal, and 
by L'Office Francais des Biens et Interets Prives, and have a strong 
editorial committee. The principal contents of this first instalment are 
a list of the Tribunals already set up, and rules of procedure issued by 
three of them. But some early decisions of the Franco-German Tribunals 
are also to be found there. The questions in dispute between French and 
1 The Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales was formally opened by M. 
Millerand, President of the French Republic, on April 19, 1921. 
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German nationals are so many that it has been found necessary to estab­
lish more than one Tribunal to deal with them. The judgments of these 
Franco-German Courts, relatively more numerous than those of other 
Tribunals, will doubtless be widely cited before the Arbitral Tribunals 
in this and other countries. But the editors of these reports by no 
means intend to limit themselves to French decisions, and later parts 
will contain British, Italian, and other judgments. It will then appear 
whether these judgments are to be printed in French or in the language 
in which they were delivered. The editors have tried the experiment 
of printing head-notes to the cases in three languages—French, English, 
and Italian. Legal French, legal English, and legal Italian are each 
full of technicalities, and few enjoy facility of expression in more than 
one of these languages. This is apparent in the English of the head-notes. 
But English readers who are familiar with other languages extend to the 
series the warm welcome which it deserves. 
The Mesopotamian Mandate.—Dr. C. J. Colombos supplies the 
following note : 
In a remarkably well-written monograph1 Mr. Campbell Lee discusses 
the Mandatory System created by Art. XXII of the Treaty of Peace 
with Germany, 1919 (Part I, the Covenant of the League of Nations). 
This article introduces several novel ideas into international politics 
and international law. The tutelage of the people inhabiting the former 
German overseas possessions and certain parts of the Ottoman Empire 
is entrusted, under it, to advanced nations who " by reason of their 
resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best 
undertake this responsibility." 
Great Britain having been selected as Mandatory for Mesopotamia, 
Mr. Balfour submitted, on December 7, 1920, to the Council of the 
League of Nations, for its approval, the British Draft Mandate. 
Mr. Campbell Lee, after a scholarly review of the terms of the Mandate, 
shows that this new status cannot be understood except by the aid of 
that most characteristic of legal institutions, the English principle of 
Trust. Both Roman and continental law are unable to provide a solu­
tion for the application of the rules of private Mandate to the inter­
national Mandate adopted by the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
It is onlyin the English law of Trust that the exalted idea of unremunerated 
service can be found, and that the duties of a trustee can be made to fit 
so closely into the scheme of mandatory government established by the 
Versailles Treaty. 
The same spirit of trusteeship has guided British colonial policy 
for the last one hundred years, and explains adequately how the leaders 
of this people—a people not free from self-interest—have been able to 
bring together and keep together during these years the most wonderful 
1 The Mandate for Mesopotamia and the Principle of Trusteeship in English Law, 
by D. Campbell Lee, M.A., LL.B. Being the Rhodes Lecture delivered at University 
College, London, on May 23, 1921. 
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aggregation of self-governing, non-tributary nations the world has 
ever seen. 
The author ventures, however, upon debatable ground when he 
asserts that the sovereignty of the mandated area is in suspense pending 
the creation of the new Arab State. It is difficult to admit the existence, 
in international law, of any suspended sovereign rights. A scrutiny of 
the powers assigned by Art. XXII to the League of Nations leads to 
to the conclusion that sovereignty is collectively vested in the several 
States composing the League of Nations, and that it is exercised on their 
behalf by the Mandatory until such time as the mandated territories 
reach full maturity and independence. 
The mandatory system has been recently criticised by some pub­
licists as being merely a disguise, in pleasant and palatable words, for 
imperialistic designs of conquest and annexation. Mr. Campbell Lee 
emphatically denies this accusation, and proves that the disinterested 
and progressive administration now being carried out by Great Britain 
in Mesopotamia is a complete refutation of all the charges advanced 
against her. There is no doubt that the intention of the British Govern­
ment in accepting the Mesopotamian Mandate has been to undertake, in 
all good faith and sincerity, " a sacred trust of civilisation for the 
well-being and development " of the Arab people. 
NOTICES OF BOOKS. 
THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT. 
THE late F. W. Maitland's seminal mind is always producing new fruit, 
and it has recently produced rich fruit in Professor A. F. Pollard's 
Evolution of Parliament. Professor Pollard first achieved eminence as 
an historian by his studies of the Tudor period in England, and of the 
Reformation period of European, and especially of German, history. 
After having held the chair of constitutional history at University College, 
London, he was, in 1908, elected to a fellowship at All Souls' College, 
Oxford, on condition of pursuing researches suggested by Maitland. 
The result was a series of lectures delivered partly in England, partly in 
the United States, and now worked up into his latest book. He modestly 
describes his book as less a history of Parliament than a suggestion of 
the lines upon which it should be written, and rather an indication of 
the research that is still required than of that which has yet been accom­
plished. It is for the specialist to criticise and to place its proper value 
on the research and learning embodied in this volume. To one who is 
not a specialist it appears to be the most comprehensive, most suggestive 
and ripest study which has yet appeared of the subject with which it 
deals. Professor Pollard is an ardent admirer of Maitland, a disciple, 
but not a servile follower, of his master. He has struck out his own 
lines of inquiry and research, and has tested and illustrated his master's 
teaching by the more recent writings of such men as Mcllwain, McKechnie 
and Baldwin. And he has inherited much of his master's charm of 
j style. His pages sparkle with epigrammatic and felicitous phrases, and 
there is not a dull page among them from cover to cover. 
To the critics of parliamentary institutions who do not content 
themselves with repeating the old formula that parliamentary govern­
ment is on its trial, but declare, more confidently, that it is doomed to 
die and deserves to die, the author replies by reminding them that the 
political institutions which stand the test of time are organisms sub­
sisting upon their adaptability to their environment, and ever-changing 
with the conditions of their existence. The venerable Mother of Parlia­
ments, whose progeny, under different names and with different shapes, 
have extended over the whole world, has undergone many changes in 
her past, and is doubtless destined to undergo many changes in her 
future. But that is no reason for chanting premature dirges over her 
funeral. 
Professor Pollard is cheerful and hopeful about the future. His 
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attitude as a critical historian towards the beliefs and theories of the 
past is boldly, though perhaps not unduly, challenging and aggressive. 
He summons up for trial and sentence some of the most cherished and 
venerable traditions of English constitutional law and constitutional 
history. Listen to what he says at the opening of his second chapter : 
Four ideas, at least, with respect to the foundations and functions of 
English Parliaments have become firmly rooted in the popular mind. One 
is that their principal object has ever been the making of laws ; another 
is that hereditary peerage and popular representation were indispensable 
elements in their original constitution ; a third, that they have always 
consisted of two houses ; and a fourth, that they were based on three estates. 
Like all conceptions that have been firmly grasped by the multitude, these 
impressions about the history of Parliament are hardly less false than true; 
and it is the purport of these pages to show cause for thinking that Parlia­
ments in their infancy were much that Parliament to-day is not, and little 
that it is ; that legislation was not the original purpose of their being ; that 
they existed before they contained any representative elements; that 
there was a time when, if Parliaments comprehended a peerage at all, that 
peerage was not in Parliament by hereditary or any other right than royal 
grace ; that Parliament was at first a single chamber ; that there was no 
" house " of Lords until after the close of the Middle Ages ; that the " house " 
of Commons was not an original part of Parliaments, but yet is older than 
the "house" of Lords; and that the notion of three estates—so far from 
being the fundamental principle upon which Parliaments were built—was 
borrowed from abroad, and hesitatingly applied in the third century of 
English parliamentary history to an institution to which it was foreign in 
spirit and in practice. 
Then follow chapters with such significant titles as " The Myth of 
the Three Estates," and " The Fiction of the Peerage." 
What is the meaning, or rather, what are the various meanings and 
changing imports of such terms as " estates," " status," " state " ? How 
far do they correspond with anything which existed in the time of 
Edward I ? Why three estates, and what are they ? When did this 
" trinity " first come into vogue ? How was it that in the eighteenth 
century Charles James Fox, and, apparently, English statesmen 
generally, gave a definition of the three estates which, nowadays, would 
be condemned as an elementary blunder? These are some of the 
" posers " with which Professor Pollard confronts us. 
It is on the peerage law that he pours his chief scorn. " The Law 
of Peerage," he says, " is a modern monument of legal fiction." Of 
course, what history knows to be fiction may be quite sound law. In 
the realm of law magna est fictio et prevalebit. But the authority of 
fiction in law, as of dogma in theology, is always liable to be sapped 
by the application of the historical method. Study of the birth and 
growth of beliefs, customs and institutions throws much light on the 
possibilities and probabilities of their decay and death—or develop­
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ment. The application of the historical method to such a problem as 
the reform of the House of Lords might have an explosive effect. 
The chief points on which Professor Pollard lays most stress through­
out his book are, perhaps, two. 
1. The mediaeval Parliament was a conference—a big talk. Things 
were done in Parliament, not by Parliament. Parliament was, in the 
Middle Ages, a set of conditions under which men acted rather than the 
agent itself. Even to-day it is in theory the King in Parliament that 
enacts laws. 
2. The functions that were performed in the mediaeval Parliament 
were partly judicial, partly administrative, partly fiscal, a blend of the 
three, with a progressive tendency towards differentiation. But the 
judicial functions were earliest in date. Parliament was a Court, a term 
which has many meanings. And it began by being a Court of Justice, 
the highest in the land. 
A series of chapters traces the gradual evolution of the different 
functions performed in and through Parliament. One of them discusses 
Montesquieu's famous doctrine of the separation of powers. This 
doctrine, it is argued, in agreement with a recent American writer,1 is 
historically unsound and, though enshrined in the constitution of the 
United States, constitutionally mischievous. The aim of the British 
constitution in its gradual development, was, not the separation of 
powers, but ithe differentiation and specialisation of functions—a very 
different thing. And the Government should be treated, not as an 
enemy, but as a friend and servant of the people ; not an enemy to be 
weakened by division, but a friend to be strengthened and employed 
for the benefit of the people. It is the people's best safeguard, not 
merely against anarchy, but against the undue predominance of private 
and special interests. If the American Government were stronger it 
would be more useful. So argues Mr. Bondy, and Professor Pollard 
apparently concurs. Their conclusions represent one facet of the truth. 
In his last chapter, originally written in 1915, on " The British 
Realms in Parliament," the author advances beyond the comparatively 
safe field of history into the dangerous field of contemporary politics. 
He dislikes the terms " empire " and " imperial " as applied to a common­
wealth, community or congeries of States, and thinks that " empire " 
implies an " unconstitutional authority, military domination and rigid 
uniformity," whereas " the essence of the British realms is government 
by consent, liberty and heterogeneity." He deprecates the phrase 
" imperial cabinet " as suggesting false analogies. He recalls the " big 
talks " of the thirteenth century out of which the modern Parliament 
was developed in England. He develops his view that the English 
Parliament was primarily a Court of Law, finds in community of law 
and legal tradition a better foundation of a commonwealth than race or 
religion, and points out that " a judicious admixture of Roman law and 
1 W. Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers. Columbia University, 1896. 
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other systems is not inadmissible, as we know from Scotland and South 
Africa." All these considerations point to a gradual, cautious, experi­
mental advance towards that unity in diversity which is the common 
ideal. 
Professor Pollard's book is one which no student of constitutional 
history can afford to overlook. 
C. P. I. 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. 
FOREIGN policy means the principles by which the political relations of 
a State with other States are, and have been, guided. In such books as 
Mr. Arthur Hassall's The History of British Foreign Policy from the 
Earliest Times to 1912, published in 1912, and Professor H. E. Egerton's 
British Foreign Policy in Europe to the End of the Nineteenth Century: 
a Rough Outline, 1917, we find traced the course of events, the surrounding 
circumstances, the grounds on which any particular policy was adopted 
and maintained: whether it was, for instance, to meet the aims of 
Philip II, or Louis XIV, or Napoleon, at world-supremacy ; whether 
England should intervene on the Continent, or abstain; what the 
Balance of Power should be ; how far dynastic, or trade, or national 
considerations were at stake. British foreign policy has observed no 
code, but can be discerned in its historical applications or gathered 
from the speeches of Ministers, such as Chatham, Pitt, Castlereagh, 
Canning and Palmerston. Thus, there has always been a foreign policy 
of some kind, long before Hague Conferences or international tribunals 
for arbitration were designed. Whether such institutions are estab­
lished or not, the circumstances of the world-wide British Empire will 
require England, in spite of her insular position, to have a policy towards 
other nations on the continents of the world. Foreign " questions "— 
disputes arising from British foreign policy—may hereafter be sub­
mitted to international tribunals, but that cannot mean that the latter 
will effect a termination of " foreign policy." 
A volume1 published by the Carnegie Endowment gives a very 
different account of American foreign policy, and of its final objective. 
That policy is embodied in the expression " the Monroe Doctrine " of 
1823, and seeks its Nirvana, its absorption, in permanent International 
Courts for justiciable disputes, administering codified international law. 
Little is said of the history, either of American foreign policy, or of 
the earlier occasions on which the famous doctrine was asserted. George 
Washington, in September 1796, laid down the principle: "The great 
rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our 
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as 
1 American Foreign Policy. Based upon statements of Presidents and Secre­
taries of State of the United States and of Publicists of the American Republics. 
With an Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Washington, D.C., 1920. 
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possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be 
fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." In the interests 
of America he advised aloofness. Jefferson (1801) was opposed to 
entangling alliances. Monroe, in December 1823, asserted th'at " the 
American-continents, by the free and independent condition which they 
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as 
subjects for future colonisation by any European Powers." He added: 
" With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power 
we have not interfered, and shall not interfere," and " Our policy in 
regard to Europe ... is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any 
of its Powers," and (elsewhere) not to take part in the wars of the 
European Powers. Other Presidents confirmed the principle of respecting 
the existing-rights of every European Power, while asserting the equally 
important principle that hereafter no territory on the American continent 
shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European Power. On these 
grounds President Cleveland, in 1895, protested, in the Venezuela case, 
" against the enlargement of the area of British Guiana in derogation of 
the rights, and against the will, of Venezuela," and proposed arbitration. 
Theodore Roosevelt (1905) admitted that " an aggrieved nation can, 
without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it sees 
fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided 
that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of 
government, or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise." 
The fullest exposition of " The Real Monroe Doctrine " was made by 
Mr. Elihu Root, then ex-Secretary of State, in an address in April 1914, 
which is particularly interesting as showing succinctly the political 
circumstances in which the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was originally 
declared (after the revolt of the Spanish provinces in South America, 
which Spain unaided was plainly unable to reduce to their former con­
dition of dependence). Some remarks of Mr. Root's may be quoted: 
" No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of inter­
national law, or that the doctrine which he declared has become inter­
national law. It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts 
would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States, and 
that the United States would regard them as unfriendly"; and again: 
" The doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of 
self-protection, and that right is recognised by international law." The 
sayings or writings of Secretaries or Presidents cannot, it is admitted, 
constitute a national policy. "It is the substance of the thing to 
which the nation holds, and that is and always has been that the safety 
of the United States demands that American territory shall remain 
American." It is not clear how Mr. Root could write: "The scope of 
the doctrine is strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupa­
tion of territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a 
pre-existing American Government. It has not otherwise any relation 
to the affairs of either American or European States." Monroe had 
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written in 1823 that the American policy in regard to Europe was " not 
to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers," or to take 
part in their wars. This work would have been more complete if it had 
been brought up to date and had shown the grounds on which America 
entered in 1917 into the Great War, how far America, through President 
Wilson, concurred in or deviated from the traditional and accepted 
policy of the Monroe Doctrine as a whole. The rest of the book consists 
of the part taken by America in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 
1907. Her aim has been the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes by the establishment of a permanent Court and the adoption 
of various Conventions regarding the rights of neutrals, etc. Their 
desirability may be admitted, but they can hardly be said to fall within 
the generally-accepted meaning of " Foreign Policy." 
C. E. BUCKLAND. 
UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION.1 
THE movement towards uniformity of legislation throughout the civilised 
world on matters of common interest, which was brought to a standstill 
by the war, is once more making its influence felt. At the last Con­
ference of the International Law Association at the Hague, an attempt 
has been made, with powerful support from the great business interests 
concerned, to arrive at an international solution of the vexed problem 
of the liability of shipowners for loss or damage to cargo. An obstacle, 
which has hitherto stood in the way of success in dealing with this and 
similar problems, has been the difficulty of reconciling the divergences 
in the fundamental conceptions on which the different systems of juris­
prudence are based, so as to arrive at a solution which will be acceptable 
universally. It is now generally recognised that these systems fall into 
three great groups, the Anglo-American, Latin, and German-Scandi-
navian groups, to which the Mohammedan group may possibly be added. 
Although these systems have much in common, there has been little 
or no indication of any readiness to make sacrifices for the purpose 
of ensuring world-wide uniformity of legislation. For the present 
the best prospect of success would seem to lie in promoting uniformity 
within each group, and in the case of the English-speaking communities 
there would seem to be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at this 
result. Each of the component members of this group must, however, 
first of all put its own house in order, and it is satisfactory to note the 
considerable advance in this direction which is taking place in the 
United States and the British Overseas Dominions. 
Mr. Terry's Compendium of the Uniform State Laws reveals the 
progress which is being made in the United States. It has been published 
under the auspices of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
1 Uniform State Laws in the United States, by Charles Thaddeus Terry. (New 
York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1920.) Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting 
of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 1920. 
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Uniform State Laws, and contains the text of all the different Acts with 
very full notes. It is a book with a purpose. The scheme for homo­
geneous legislation on matters of common interest throughout the various 
States seems to depend for its continued success on compliance with 
two fundamental conditions. In the first place, it is essential that the 
Uniform State Laws should not be tampered with by indiscriminate 
statutory amendment by the various States, and further that the inter­
pretation or construction by the State Courts of the Uniform Laws should 
proceed along identical lines so far as is possible. If these conditions 
are not satisfied the whole scheme might well prove to be abortive. In 
this respect Mr. Terry has rendered an invaluable service. The various 
Uniform Laws are collected together and carefully indexed, and the 
notes contain every reported decision of the Courts of any State which 
has adopted these Acts. There is also a table of cross-references showing 
the corresponding section numbers in the Statute Book of each of the 
States. It thus becomes possible for a judge or practitioner in any of 
the States of the Union to ascertain rapidly and without any difficulty 
how any question of interpretation or construction has been dealt with 
by the Courts of other jurisdictions, and the tendency to diverge from 
the common track will thus be kept in check. This volume will also 
form a welcome addition to the library of the student of comparative 
law, more particularly as regards comparative commercial law—a most 
important but somewhat neglected subject. 
The demand for uniformity of legislation is also insistent in Canada. 
Business men having dealings throughout the Dominion are embarrassed 
by the existence of numerous provincial statutes, which are often contra­
dictory and are always a source of irritation. This demand is capable 
of being met in either of two ways. The Dominion Parliament has the 
power under section 91 of the British North America Act to legislate 
with this end in view, but this course is inconsistent with the preservation 
of the true balance of a federal system. The Provinces are therefore 
seeking for a solution in the voluntary adoption of uniform laws. Many 
imperial statutes have already been adopted throughout Canada, with 
the exception of Quebec, e.g. the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the Partner­
ship Act, 1890, and the Factors Act, 1889. The Commissioners on Uni­
formity of Legislation in Canada are faced with the problem of dealing 
with the chaotic state of company law in the Dominion at present. The 
methods of incorporation vary, and there are also manifold differences 
both in company law and practice throughout the Provinces. The 
Commissioners appear to have grave doubts as to the feasibility of 
securing uniformity in this respect, but express the hope that it may 
be found possible to come to some agreement on the more urgent and 
important branches of this part of the law. It is interesting to an 
English lawyer to note that it is suggested that the doctrine of ultra 
vires should be abolished, and that there is a difference of opinion as to 
the advisability of adopting the Imperial Companies Act, 1908. The 
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question of limited partnerships has also been under discussion. The 
report of the Commissioners cites with approval the article on this 
subject by Mr. J. E. Hogg in the Journal of this Society ("Partnership 
Law in the British Empire," vol. xviii, New Series, pp. 233-41). The 
conclusion arrived at by the Commissioners is that there is no pressing 
need for legislation on this subject, although the present position is 
unsatisfactory in many respects. It may also be added that in some 
cases the proposed uniform legislation in Canada approximates more 
closely to the American than to the British model, as, for instance, the 
draft law regarding the conditional sales of goods. So far as Commercial 
Law is concerned, the time appears to be at hand when in all important 
respects there will be substantial uniformity in the laws of all the English-
speaking communities, such an achievement is certain to be of the 
greatest value in facilitating the conduct of business by diminishing the 
uncertainty and irritation which is caused by the endeavour to comply 
with varying rules of law in the course of the transit of goods through 
different jurisdictions. 
H. C. GUTTERIDGE. 
A HANDBOOK TO ENGLISH LAW.1 
L'OBJET de cet ouvrage est precise en ces termes sur la couverture du 
livre: " This work aims at giving, in simple and untechnical language, 
a knowledge of those rules and elementary principles of the Law of 
England which should be known to every scholar—whether a boy or 
a girl—of fourteen years of age and upwards." Et l'auteur ajoute, a 
la fin de sa preface (page vi): " The object of this commentary is not 
to make boys or girls into lawyers, but only to stimulate in them an 
interest in the laws of their own country." 
Les directeurs du Journal of Comparative Legislation ont pense, 
avec raison, que le livre de M. le Juge Ruegg pouvait presenter encore une 
autre utilite: il sont estime qu'il etait de nature a rendre service aux 
juristes etrangers, qui sont souvent tres embarrasses d'aborder et d'etudier 
le droit anglais, et ils m'ont fait l'honner de me demander d'exposer ici 
aux lecteurs de Journal mon sentiment sur ce point. 
Je dirai, en peu de mots, qui mon sentiment concorde absolument avec 
le leur. 
A beaucoup d'egards, ce livre se recommande comme le premier 
au quel un juriste Stranger, possedant la langue anglaise, mais totale-
ment ignorant du droit anglais, devrait s'adresser pour en acquerir 
1 An Elementary Commentary on English Law, by His Honour Judge Ruegg, 
K.C., County Court Judge of North Staffordshire and Joint Judge of Birmingham. 
(George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London : pp. viii + 194.) 
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une connaissance generate et en penetrer l'esprit. Et meme pour ceux 
qui se sont deja inities aux mysteres de Common Law et de l'Equity, ou 
qui se sont risques dans le labyrinthe du Statute Law de Angleterre, 
il constitue un resume utile permettant de classer les idees dans un cadre 
clair, classique, accessible a tous. 
J'ai particulierement goute les quatre premiers chapitres sur le droit 
anglais en general, ses principales divisions, l'organisation de Cours de 
Justice en Angleterre, et le personnel de la profession juridique. II y a 
la des notions inconnus du droit continental, telles que les definitions du 
"Common Law," et de 1' " Equity," si difficile a expliquer a des Frangais. 
Je me propose, a la rentree de l'annee scolaire 1921-1922, de faire traduire 
oralement a mes etudiants, en guise d'exercice scolaire, dans la " class­
room " de droit anglais a notre Faculte de droit de l'Universite de Paris, 
ces quatre premiers chapitres de livre de M. le Juge Ruegg. 
Le Chapitre V (concerning personal rights) contient des passages egale-
ment tres interessants pour un etranger (right to personal liberty, 
habeas corpus, self-defence, and its limits). 
Quant ceux chapitres qui suivent, il y a lieu, pour un etranger, d'en 
faire deux parts.1 Les chapitres relatifs a la real property, que l'auteur 
lui meme annongait comme les plus redoutables pour le lecteur (preface, 
p. vi), presentent tres clairement des formes de propriete d'essence feodale 
aujourd'hui disparues dans la plupart des Etats continentaux ; l'interet 
qui s'attache a ces chapitres, pour un etranger (et notamment pour un 
Frangais) est done d'ordre historique et scientifique.2 Les chapitres 
concernant la personal property, les contrats, les titres negociables, le 
statut domestique, les torts offrent, par contre, un puissant interet 
pratique, quoique l'originalite du droit anglais soit moins accentuee sur 
les divers points qu'en matiere de propriete fonciere. 
Les deux chapitres qui terminent le livre, l'un visant le droit penal 
(1concerning crime), l'autre la procedure civile (the ordinary course of a 
trial), sont bien a leur place, et seront lus avec profit par tous. 
Pourresumer mon impression, je dirai que 1'" elementary commentary." 
de M. Ruegg repond parfaitment a ce type d'ouvrages que nous appelons, 
en France, les livres de "droit usuel " (e'est a rie dont il est fait usage 
journellement) et j'ajouterai meme que nous n'en possedons pas de modele 
aussi reussi. De plus, il a l'avantage de mettre le droit anglais a la 
portee des etrangers, dans une langue savoureux, ornee de citations 
heureuses et aussi parfois d'anecdotes pleines d'humour (voir notam­
ment, page 51, note 1). 
S'il etait permis, pour finir, de formuler quelque desiderata, je dirai 
(1) qu'un appendix tres sommaire contenant l'indication des principaux 
livres de droit en usage en Angleterre serait de nature a rendre grands 
services ; (2) que tes regies de droit concernant la famille, la propriete, 
les contrats ne sont pas, pour mon gout, suffisamment accompagnees 
d'une explication rationelle ou sociologique. En exprimant cette reserve, 
je sois bien que je parle en m'inspirant d'idees francaises ; le Frangais 
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n'aimepas, en general, qu'onlui expose des regies de conduite aux quelles 
il dont obeir " sans savoir pourquoi." Le peuple anglais est moins rais-
6oner, sans cesser pour cela d'etre raisonnable. II y a la une difference 
de nos deux grands pays.1 
HENRI L. LEVY ULLMAN, 
% 
Professeur de legislation comparee 
a la Faculte de droit de I'Uni­
versity de Paris. 
LIABILITY OF MENTAL DEFECTIVES IN CIVIL ACTIONS. 
IT has often been remarked as a curious fact that civil cases in which 
lunacy has been set up as a defence have been extremely rare, as opposed 
to the frequency with which it is an issue in criminal trials. Dr. Cook's 
exhaustive survey2 has collected only some 200 cases. The reason is 
probably that persons already certified as lunatics are not in a position 
to do actions rendering them liable to civil proceedings, and those 
not certified are unlikely to risk bringing unwelcome consequences on 
themselves by raising this defence. There is indeed reason to suspect 
that lunatics not infrequently get into Civil Courts. If judges had the 
power to remand the parties in civil proceeding for a report by experts on 
the state of their minds, much valuable time and money would be saved, 
and the case law on the subject would be substantially enriched. 
Dr. Cook's important study in psychological jurisprudence covers 
ground which has never been adequately treated in any modern work. 
His researches show that the law relating to the civil responsibility of 
lunatics is confused and obscure, and it rests largely on contradictory 
decisions based on dubious grounds. This is particularly apparent in 
the chapters on Tort and Contract. There is an irreconcilable difference 
of opinion between the school that holds that a lunatic is civilly liable for 
his deeds on the ground that " where one of two innocent persons must 
bear a loss he must bear it whose act caused it," and those who retort 
with Sir Frederick Pollock, " this decision is erroneous in principle . . . 
there was no real voluntary act at all." This "conflict of equity" is 
1 Entres autres remarques de details, je me permet de signaler (page 9) la 
definition du Digest et des Institutes de Justinien. Le Digest, que M. Ruegg, repre-
sente comme, " a collection of Roman Laws," n'etait pas autre chose qu'une com­
pilation des livres classiques decoup6s pas extraits (un peu comme si, pour le droit 
anglais, on alignait des coupures des textbooks of authority, de Stephens, Pollock, 
Anson, etc., et on leur dormait force de loi). Quant aux Institutes, representees 
comme " really an elementary code . . . largely taken from a Code of Law by a 
former writer named Ga'ius," ce n'etaient pas un Code, mais (de meme que 
l'ouvrage de Ga'ius) un " elementary Commentary " & l'usage des etudiants en 
droit de l'epoque. 
2 Insanity and Mental Deficiency in Relation to Legal Responsibility : A Study 
in Psychological Jurisprudence, by William G. H. Cook, LL.D. (Routledge, 
10s. 6d. net.) 
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of old standing, and it is not quite clear which view would be sustained 
by the Courts to-day. 
In the chapter on Contracts the author argues that the judgment in 
the Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone to the effect that lunatics are estopped 
from pleading non compos mentis unless the other party knew of the 
insanity is inconsistent with the common law of England, and with the 
principles of equity. He holds strongly that lunatics should be as exempt 
from civil responsibility as they are from criminal. It may be urged, 
however, that this discrepancy between civil and criminal liability exists 
even in the case of sane persons. Any citizen who has accidentally 
injured another may well find that he has a good defence to criminal 
proceedings, but cannot escape the payment of damages. If Dr. Cook's 
contention is correct, and the lunatic is absolutely exempt from all 
responsibility, he is in a privileged position as compared with the 
sane. 
The chapter on Testamentary Capacity raises many interesting 
problems of a medical rather than a legal nature, for the law is here 
clear enough. The difficulties arise from the generous rule of English 
law which allows testamentary capacity to the partially insane, pro­
vided that their mental disorder is not such as manifestly incapacitates 
the testator from making a rational will. In practice, the validity of a 
will made in such circumstances has usually turned on the highly technical 
question of the influence of a delusion or delusions on the testator's conduct. 
It is to be regretted that Dr. Cook has not brought his discussion on 
these points into line with modern psychological teaching. He rejects 
the old doctrine of " the unity and indivisibility of the mind," but his 
" faculty " psychology is itself obsolete, and the mind is no longer 
regarded as being divided into water-tight compartments. Some reference 
might with advantage have been made to modern research on the genesis 
of delusions, for it will make alienists, and one hopes judges, increasingly 
unwilling to declare in the dogmatic fashion of the past that any specific 
delusion could have no possible effect on testamentary capacity. It is 
now recognised that even a single delusion is not an excrescence on the 
surface of the mind without organic connection with other thoughts or 
emotions, but is a symptom of deep and possibly widespread mental 
disorder. Further, delusions cannot always be taken at their face 
value—they may be distorted or symbolic expressions of the real " false 
belief " which the patient is secretly cherishing. 
Careful study of judgments in certain cases shows a startling lack 
of appreciation of the dangers of " blind intervals " and convalescent 
stages of insanity. The greatest caution ought to be shown in upholding 
wills made while the patient is still under certificate where there have 
at any time been delusions against any members of the family. For 
example, delusions of infidelity against a wife are very frequently accom­
panied by doubts—sometimes never expressed in direct form—about 
the paternity of one or more of the children. Long after definite delusions 
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against the wife have vanished (temporarily or permanently) the testator 
may retain an unreasoning dislike of the child which may easily express 
itself in unjust exclusion from the will. Again, there is a well-known 
stage in convalescence from insanity when the patient is free from 
definite symptoms but has an imperfect or distorted memory for the 
incidents of his attack. Consequently he regards his confinement as 
a wanton outrage, and conceives an intense hatred for the relative who 
was instrumental in having him certified—often a devoted son or 
daughter. If he is allowed to make a will at this time grave injustice 
may be done, yet the testator may fulfil all the tests of a " sound and 
disposing mind " which usually satisfy the Courts. 
The book has a good Index and a valuable Appendix on the powers 
and duties of Lunacy Authorities. A helpful addition to a new issue 
would be a chapter on the civil responsibility of the feeble-minded, a 
quite untouched and very important subject which bristles with special 
difficulties of its own. There are now several thousands of persons, 
certified defectives under the Mental Deficiency Act, mixing with the 
general population under a loose " supervision " or " guardianship " 
who enjoy a freedom from responsibility equivalent to that of a lunatic 
if charged with the commission of a crime. Will it be held that " feeble­
mindedness " confers the same immunity in civil proceedings ? At 
present a man may escape liability for very grave crimes because of his 
mental defect, and yet a marriage contracted by him would be valid and 
not even voidable. It is by no means certain how far the rule would 
apply to other contracts. Again, defectives have been described as 
" permanent children," and, like ordinary children, are capable of much 
purposeful malice, especially when they know they are immune from 
punishment. It would appear inequitable that possible victims could 
obtain no civil redress. 
In the discussion of these and many similar anomalies, both lawyers 
and medical men will look to the guidance of " liaison officers " such as 
Dr. Cook for the elucidation of the obscure territory on the border-line 
between the two professions. 
LETITIA FAIRFIELD. 
WAR AND NEUTRALITY. 
BONFILS'S Handbook of International Law1 has, since its first publication 
in 1894, taken a prominent rank among French legal classics, and has 
habitually been referred to as representing the view of continental jurists. 
The present, eighth, edition, however, differs substantially from the 
last edition published in 1914 by M. Fauchille. The important inter­
national events which have occurred in the meantime, and the burning 
1 Traite de Droit International Public—Guerre et Neutrality, par Paul Fauchille. 
Huitidme Edition du Manuel de Droit International Public de M. Henry Bonfils, 
1921. (Paris, Rousseau & Cie). 
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questions revived by the Great War, have so much enlarged the text 
that it has been found necessary to divide it into two volumes and to 
change its title from Handbook into Treatise. Bonfils's original work 
has thus been almost entirely rewritten and we may, therefore, accept 
as practically correct M. Fauchille's claim that he ought to be regarded 
as the author—and no longer as the editor—of the book. 
As might be expected from the standing of the distinguished writer, 
the book shows in every page the most thorough scholarship and the 
widest research. The general principles of international law are com­
prehensively stated and supported by appropriate quotations in which 
conflicting doctrines are discussed, and the reader is guided to the right 
solution. The modern character of the book and the inclusion of all 
the recent Treaties and Conventions, with extended notes, add much 
to its usefulness. Although the text is at times elemental, and contains 
too many repetitions, the matter is well arranged and the style is clear 
and forcible. Special attention has been paid to the Bibliography, 
which is unusually complete, and among which may be noted the author's 
frequent references to British contributors, and to the work of the 
Grotius Society on the problems of war. 
The book concludes with a very full Index. A novel feature is the 
additional Index of Cases, very rarely to be found in French treatises. 
The harsh and brutal treatment which prisoners underwent at the 
hands of Germany during the late war makes M. Fauchille suggest that 
an official representative of a Neutral Red Cross Society be authorised, 
in the future, to reside permanently in each of the belligerent countries, 
in order to inspect the various detention and concentration camps, 
and enforce the due observance of the dictates of humanity (p. 185). 
On the question of war crimes, the author advocates the creation of 
a Supreme International Tribunal for the judgment of all persons— 
however high their station—charged with the violation of the laws and 
customs of war (p. 319). Any breach of these rules ought to be con­
sidered as an offence against civilisation, and should entail the personal 
responsibility of the offender. M. Fauchille proposes that the necessary 
sanction be provided by the declaration of a strict financial and com­
mercial boycott by all the Powers composing the League of Nations 
against any State affording protection or assistance to war criminals. 
The citation of cases appears to be remarkably full; on some few 
topics, however, the omission of leading cases may be noticed. In 
dealing with the confiscation of vessels for carriage of cargo of which 
half or more is contraband, the author refers, among British and Colonial 
decisions, only to the judgment of the Prize Court of St. Lucia in the 
Lorenzo 1 in order to prove that ignorance of the shipowner is immaterial 
when the contraband carried exceeds the quantitative test (p. 930). 
But this mechanical rule, now followed on the Continent, is fundamentally 
opposed to the British practice. As it was laid down by the Privy 
1 (1914) 1 Br. and Col. Prize Cases, p. 226. 
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Council in the Hakan, there can be no forfeiture of the ship without 
knowledge " on the part of the owner, or possibly of the charteier or 
master, of the nature of the cargo." 1 
Perhaps the most striking and interesting chapters in the whole 
book are those devoted to air law, a subject which M. Fauchille has 
made particularly his own ever since his first Report to the Institute 
of International Law in 1900, and in which he has attained considerable 
competence. 
It is only to be regretted that M. Fauchille, purporting to write a 
book of his own, should not have suppressed the violent attacks against 
British sea policy (pp. 371, 582, 809) which appeared in former editions, 
but which are wholly unwarranted and unjustifiable and cannot be 
explained except perhaps by Bonfils's well-known partiality and strong 
anti-English bias. 
C. J. COLOMBOS. 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF INDUSTRY. 
THESE two studies2 dealing with somewhat different aspects of practically 
the same problems, may with advantage be read together, as they are 
complementary in a manner not the less complete for being apparently 
entirely accidental. 
Mr. Baker's study is the shorter of the two. It deals with the general 
principles underlying Government control of industry during the war, 
and the general results arising therefrom. Incidental to this discussion 
are brief accounts of the organisation through which control was estab­
lished and administered. 
These brief summaries serve as a key to Professor Watkins's larger 
work, in which the careful descriptions of Government commissions, 
committees and departments involve a continuous cross-referencing and 
apparent repetitions that leave the reader somewhat confused and under 
a vague impression that simplification and co-ordination were achieved 
by a very complicated system and an organisation of committees so 
multifarious that it would be incomprehensible without the aid of the 
two tables which reduce the system to diagrammatic form. 
Naturally both books contain many references to parallel movements 
and developments in Great Britain, and, even where these are not 
explicitly made, the reader with a vivid recollection of our own industrial 
history during the war naturally tends to supply them. 
1 (1917) 34 T.L.R., p. 11. Cf. the Zamora (1921) 37 T.L.R., p. 515. 
2 Government Control and Operation of Industry in Great Britain and the United 
States during the World War. By Charles Whitney Baker, C.E. (Consulting Engineer). 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ; Preliminary Economic Studies of 
the War, No. 18.) 
Labour Problems and Labour Administration in the United States during the World 
War. Professor Gordon S. Watkins. (University of Illinois Social Studies, vol. 
viii, No. 4.) 
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Both of the great English-speaking nations had many problems in 
common. There were also some very important differences. 
In the first place, the United States had ample time for preparation. 
The spectacle of a world at war was before her for three years, and her 
agents and emissaries had access to all the belligerent countries. It 
was to be expected, therefore, that the Government would be cognisant 
beforehand of the internal difficulties that were likely to arise in the 
event of war, and would take steps beforehand to meet them—steps 
that were impossible in the case of this country, faced, as it was in 1914, 
with a catastrophe as sudden as it was all-embracing. 
To a certain extent this preparation was made by the United States 
in the establishment of the Council of National Defence, only fully 
organised a month before the country entered the war, although legis­
lative provision for its establishment had been made by Congress in 
August 1916. 
" The function of this body was the co-ordination of the industries and 
resources of the country for the national security and welfare, and the 
creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the 
immediate concentration and utilisation of the resources of the nation." 
It can hardly be claimed that this Council achieved its objects. It did, 
however, provide a preliminary basis for the developments rendered 
necessary by war conditions. Such a basis was lacking in England, 
although this country had the advantage in the possession of almost 
forgotten powers. Thus, for example, the British Government took 
immediate control of the railways in accordance with an Act dating 
from 1871, a step delayed for many months in the United States, and 
only provided for when multiplicity of control had proved the existence 
of difficulties that might have wrecked this country's chances of success 
at the outset of hostilities. 
In the same way the provisions of the Factory Acts could be modified 
by a series of special orders that enabled the country to tide over the 
period of war-reorganisation of industry rendered necessary by the 
increasing demand for munitions. 
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that in the United States atten­
tion could be concentrated from the first on the maintenance of efficiency, 
through a high standard of industrial conditions. In England, on the 
other hand, the imminence of the danger at first necessitated a lowering 
of the accustomed standard. It is, however, too often forgotten that 
suspensions of sections of the law were temporary, partial and accom­
panied by restrictive conditions to safeguard, as far as was humanly 
possible under the circumstances, the health and efficiency of the 
workers, and especially of the women and young persons on whom the 
safety of the country depended to an extent totally unexpected. It 
was, therefore, only after twelve months of war that we were able to 
safeguard efficiency by progressive welfare measures that have probably 
left their mark on industry for all time. 
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The United States had time for preparation ; the peril was as remote 
as the likelihood of invasion. The welfare of the workers engaged from 
the first the attention of the authorities, and, although housing conditions 
incident on large scale migrations of labour seem to have been equally 
great and equally unforeseen in both countries, the workers on the 
further side of the Atlantic seem to have escaped the overwork and 
exhaustion that were almost inevitable here in face of the incessantly 
increasing demands of the allied armies, and the hard and constantly 
changing conditions under which war was being waged. 
Neither country, however, escaped menacing and disturbing industrial 
unrest, and in this respect the United States suffered both from its 
immunity from attack and from the want of homogeneity in its popu­
lation—drawbacks which our countrymen have probably never appraised 
at their full value. 
The experiences of Great Britain seem to have been very little help, 
and the old battles were refought in the States from the spring of 1917 
onwards with an even greater bitterness because large sections of the 
population had neither understanding nor sympathy for the war, and 
" recognition of the union " and complaints of victimisation were still 
in the forefront of causes of industrial strife. It is true that disputes 
in this country were more dangerous, but they were easier to meet 
where the area was smaller, and public opinion more easily co-ordinated, 
and where external stimuli such as raids by sea and air, visits to France 
and from men on leave, enforced the persuasions of the Government. 
In both countries machinery for the settlement of labour disputes 
was in existence, and this, on the whole, appears to have been more 
freely used in England. In both countries great difficulties arose from 
the multiplicity of authorities. For example, an instance is cited of 
an industrial dispute in the United States into which four Government 
departments immediately entered with attempts at settlement, inde­
pendently of each other, and with no common policy. As Professor 
Watkins writes: "It was evident that the first year of the war had 
uncovered many diverse policies emanating from a single Government, 
and the inevitable result was that' the nation, operating through different 
agencies, was saying and doing irreconcilable things.' " The establish­
ment of the War Policies Board seems to have gone far to remedy this 
state of affairs. 
In both countries, then, there was pronounced labour unrest. 
In both countries organisations were hastily adopted to meet the 
varying fortunes of war, and their establishment was accompanied by a 
steady increase in the area of Government control of industry. In both 
countries the necessity soon became apparent of a carefully planned 
system of administration that should co-ordinate responsibilities and 
policies, while decentralising the actual functions of administration, of 
control, of mediation in disputes, etc. 
Both countries alike relied on the voluntary principle as applied to 
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coercion. British war legislation is small in volume compared with the 
reorganisation effected. In the United States it was smaller still. In 
both countries alike coercive measures signally failed to secure industrial 
quietude, while awards by arbitration were, in the great majority of 
cases, honoured and loyally observed, though the President had means 
of forcing recalcitrants unknown in England. Our attempts to " pro­
claim " strikes were founded on a general measure capable of particular 
application which very generally failed. In the three cases cited by 
Mr. Baker the President obtained special legislative powers for dealing 
with each as it arose, which amounted to definite and irresistible coercion. 
" Congress," however, certainly " acted wisely in passing promptly, 
and with little opposition, a few statutes placing full authority in the 
hands of the President or those to whom he should delegate it, and 
not attempting to insert a multitude of details in the Acts. A curious 
result of the procedure in the two countries is the greater tendency in 
the United States for the one big man to emerge, wielding almost 
autocratic powers. In the case of the President this came as a great 
surprise to the democracies of the Old World, but the powers and 
influence wielded by such men as Mr. MacAdoo, the railway chief, or 
Samuel Gompers, the veteran labour leader, were hardly less startling. 
Judging from the parallel experiences in the two countries, one of 
the chief guides to future action lies in the fact that comparatively 
little reliance was placed upon legislation, except as a basis for organ­
isation. It was necessary to inaugurate certain new departments, to 
give them status and spending power, and to define their functions. 
Outside this sphere legislation succeeded when it was an embodiment 
of public opinion, and was less important than the negotiations and 
agreements to which it became, as it were, the seal. 
Mr. Baker is probably right in insisting that the experiences of the 
war years have not solved the question of the nationalisation of industries. 
Efficiency, as he rightly explains, must be defined according to the 
end desired, and, in time of war, efficiency has a meaning strictly deter­
mined by the circumstances of the time. Thus understood, Government 
Control proved its efficiency, but, judging solely from these recent 
experiences, it stands neither approved nor condemned as a permanent 
proposition. 
The war has undoubtedly taught us much. Perhaps one of its chief 
lessons for the future for the English-speaking races is its confirmation 
of their tendency to keep definite legislation in the background, and 
to regulate social evolution by voluntarism, confirmed from time to 
time, but not anticipated, by legislation. 
In an age when the world looks with growing hope to arbitration 
in place of the crude methods of the past, this experience, gained largely 
in the course of our very chequered industrial history, is not without 
its significance and its encouragement as regards the larger problems 
with which mankind is faced. M. C^CILE MATHESON. 
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MINING LAWS. 
THE first-fruits of the work of the Imperial Mining Resources Bureau, 
which was incorporated in 1919 for the collection and dissemination of 
information as to the mineral resources of the Empire, appear in two 
volumes.1 The prospector and the miner, as well as the financier, 
require to know how to proceed safely along the path prescribed by 
ordinances and regulations, in which stiles have to be crossed, and pitfalls 
avoided. 
The task of collecting and publishing this information has been 
entrusted to a legal committee, consisting of Sir R. Redmayne, Lord 
Morris and Dr. J. W. Evans ; and a very competent editor is found in 
Mr. Gilbert Stone. The Governors of the Bureau are aware of the 
difficulties before them, among these being the frequent amendments 
of existing law, and the references in a mining law to other laws of the 
territory, and such as those relating to land and labour. The Regula­
tions made under the Minerals Ordinance, 1916, of Nigeria, have been 
amended no less than six times between 1916 and 1919. It may, 
however, be predicted that the Nigeria law is now fairly settled, and 
will hold its ground for many years to come. Before 1914, when 
Northern and Southern Nigeria were united, the rights of the Crown 
with respect to mining were well established, and previous legislation 
was without difficulty superseded by the Mineral Oils Ordinance, 1914, 
and the Minerals Ordinance, 1916. Apart from a provision in the latter 
in favour of natives under customary law, these laws assert the entire 
control of the Crown, and prescribe the rights and duties of prospector 
and miner under licence and lease. Procedure is on lines already 
familiar in the mining industry. The Oils Ordinance authorised the 
making of regulations, but none have been made, the local government 
being of opinion that those scheduled to a repealed Ordinance are still 
alive and operative as having been " issued or made in virtue of " that 
Ordinance. Mr. Stone accordingly inserts these regulations in the 
book, though he does not disguise his opinion, in which most lawyers 
will concur, that the entire repeal of an ordinance carries the repeal 
of a schedule. Another question that may create some difficulty arises 
upon a comparison of the two Ordinances. The term " mineral " for 
the purposes of the Minerals Ordinance includes asphalt, bitumen, coal, 
etc., and " all substances of a similar nature to any of them " ; while 
in the Oils Ordinance the term " mineral oils " includes " bitumen, 
asphalt and all other bituminous substances, with the exception of 
coal." Many allied substances would therefore seem to be both minerals 
and mineral oils. 
In the Gold Coast and its associated provinces, Ashanti and the 
1 The Mining Laws of the British Empire and of Foreign Countries. Vol. i, 
Nigeria; vol. ii, West Africa. 
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Northern Territories, the legislation is more complicated, each having 
its separate laws. The Gold Coast and Ashanti Ordinances start from 
the same basis, mining concessions granted by native landowners. 
These must be certified by the Supreme Court as valid before they can 
be acted upon. In the Northern Territories, on the other hand, the 
prospector applies for his licence direct to the Governor. The Gold 
Coast Concessions Ordinance of 1900 has been amended no less than 
eleven times, and thus Mr. Stone's edition of the law with the amend­
ments carried into the text will be welcomed by all concerned. After 
all the amendments, however, there are still some pitfalls. Thus 
" mineral " includes " mineral oil," and that term includes bitumen, 
etc., but neither is otherwise defined. Special provisions apply to 
" precious stones," but here again the meaning is left to common sense, 
or the costly arbitrament of law. One of the purposes of the present 
publication being to provide precedents for consideration in the drafting 
of mining laws in other parts of the Empire, Mr. Stone does well in 
pointing out such flaws as appear in the various enactments. 
A. G. 
A NEW METHOD FOR JURISPRUDENCE? 
" LAW, both customary and enacted, is intended to be a direction of 
conduct, but its actual applications is a compromise between intentions-
and circumstances." Facts lead to theories, but theories can only be 
based on facts. Thus Sir Paul Vinogradoff1 sets himself the task of 
co-ordinating the work of the jurist with that of the historian, a task 
which he declares at the outset to be of great difficulty. The volume 
now published is the first of a series, and, without an outline of the 
ground which it is hoped to cover in subsequent volumes, it is not 
perhaps fair—or altogether possible—to estimate the work already 
accomplished, but it is difficult to see the plan on which space is 
allotted to the multifarious points noted, or by which the number of 
examples quoted are regulated. 
The book opens with an Introduction of 160 pages dealing in two 
parts with: (a) Law and the Sciences, (b) Methods and Schools of 
Jurisprudence. In any conflict as to the right to the use of the term 
Jurisprudence which may occur between theorists and historians, it is 
clear which camp may look to Sir Paul Vinogradoff for support; it is 
not so easy to gather his views as to the nature of law (perhaps because 
he would seem to use it in several senses, although himself warning the 
student against confusing "laws" with "law"). For, although he 
treats in the first half of the Introduction with the relation of Law to 
Logic, Psychology, Social Science and Political Theory respectively, 
these chapters are a series of apodeictic propositions profusely illustrated 
rather than a systematic treatment of the subject. 
1 Historical Jurisprudence. Sir Paul Vinogradoff. Vol. i. Oxford University 
Press, 1920. 
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The second half of the Introduction is that part of the volume which 
shows most method, and at once both sums up recent history and points 
the way to probable progress in the future. Sir Paul Vinogradoff sees 
in the present position the result of a three-staged development: the 
first arising under the influence of the natural sciences he terms the 
period of the " Rationalists " ; this is followed by a period of " Roman­
ticism," finding expression in the school of " Nationalists," only in their 
turn to be replaced by the " Evolutionists." In " Modern Tendencies of 
Jurisprudence " Sir Paul Vinogradoff sees matter not only for criticism, 
but also for aspirations of a constructive nature on a socialistic basis. 
He doubts the possibility of " general jurisprudence " in any sense 
other than that of "an encyclopaedic survey of the juridical principles 
of individualistic society," and this we take to be the aim of his work. 
•"His contrast of legal history with historical jurisprudence, the former 
being based on a chronological, the latter on an ideological sequence, is 
one full of suggestive thought, and we must be grateful to Sir Paul 
Vinogradoff for this new aspect. But he refers to the danger of the 
ideological method, and we venture to think he underrates that danger, 
although he specifies two particular causes for caution : (a) that chrono­
logical processes of history cannot fail to affect the ideological deductions 
from a social type ; (b) that to present logical coherence the subject 
must be dealt with statically, whilst it must not be forgotten that there 
is also a dynamic point of view. 
In what does this ideological method consist, and of what value is 
it in estimating and appreciating the present and preparing for the 
future ? " Law is conditioned by circumstances, . . . but the aim may 
also be to trace the life of juridical ideas in their action and reaction on 
conditions, and for that purpose the student of historical jurisprudence 
has to group his material in accordance with the divisions and relations 
of ideas rather than dates." " The significance of human evolution 
consists in the fact that such ideal lives can be traced in its progress." 
" The problem set to scientific method is how to utilise that charac­
teristic " ; what we are to seek in Jurisprudence is what is being sought 
in other sciences—an ideological study of types. We could wish that 
Sir Paul Vinogradoff had discussed this subject more fully, but in default 
of that we turn to the structure of the book itself for further explanation. 
Sir Paul Vinogradoff lays it down that if individualistic civilisa­
tion were to give place to a socialistic conception all the positions of 
jurisprudence would have to be reconsidered ; he thinks it similarly 
undoubted that our present " individualistic jurisprudence " has estab­
lished its predominance after a prolonged struggle with feudal and 
theocratic conceptions, themselves the successors in retrograde order of 
city life, tribal law and totemism. That being so, we are surprised to 
find the body of this volume dealing with Tribal Law—and not the 
basic idea of totemism—why ? All the more since a second volume on 
" The Greek City " is promised soon. 
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But to go further. Tribal Law is divided into three sections: 
Elements of the Family, Aryan Culture, and the Clan and the Tribe. 
The first section seems essentially a suitable starting-point, since 
" law deals with conduct." Although we must not digress to deal with the 
theories of marriage discussed by Sir Paul Vinogradoff, yet since this is 
the part which, so far as subject matter is concerned, is likely to evoke 
the greatest interest, two points of especial importance must be men­
tioned : (i) the new interpretation put upon the significance of matriarchy 
in sociological theory ; (2) the new suggestions as to the relation of endo­
gamy and exogamy and the causes of the two systems. 
From " the Selection of Mates " we pass naturally to a consideration 
of the relative positions of the mother and the father, from thence to 
other relationships arising from family unions—and eventually (after a 
digression on Aryan culture) to the relations of Clan and Tribe. 
So far the ideological connection is clear and helpful. But does it 
carry us farther ? This alone hardly deserves so dignified a name, and 
when we come to the details without which no further progress is possible, 
we come upon what we fear is an insurmountable difficulty in the 
suggested method. To construct any ideological sequence examination 
must be made of a vast variety of facts—taken from varying circum­
stances of time and place. What is the test as to which of the observed 
facts to select and which to reject ? Sir Paul Vinogradoff himself says: 
" Facts of Roman Law will have to be considered under various points of 
view; they help us to understand not only the civic state of the 
Republican period, but also the archaic rules of Tribal Law on the one 
hand, and the individual jurisprudence of the Empire on the other." 
Or, take again further examples from the book: the chapter on the 
selection of mates is illustrated by, or rather built on, examples from 
Australian societies of the present day, from Todas and Tibetans, with 
a closing reference to the customs of the Hebrews of the Old Testament 
and of the Egyptians. The chapter on the relative positions of the 
mother and father is built on examples from the Seri of California, the 
Nayars of the Malabar coast (a tribe " which has reached an advanced 
state of society, and stood the test of centuries and of modern conditions 
of life "), Indian society,—and North American Indians—amongst 
others. 
What lies at the root of this selection of examples ? Why are these 
and not others chosen—and why in this order ? Is it unjust to fancy 
that the ideological sequence is first formed in the mind of the writer, 
and then proved from examples ? In this case, of what value are the 
examples ? 
It is easy to destruct; difficult to construct. The fascination of the 
subject matter and the vast vistas that have been opened up by the 
learned researches of recent years tempt and allure, and it may be 
suggested that Sir Paul Vinogradoff has fallen captive. Would it be 
reactionary, and nothing but reactionary, to plead for a limitation of 
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the term Jurisprudence to its older and less ambitious use, one which is 
now somewhat unfairly under-estimated ? It may be urged that, once 
its limitations are frankly admitted, it has a useful part still to play, 
and, whilst we would equally pay tribute to the studies of philology, 
anthropology, sociology, ethnology or archaeology, to all of which Sir 
Paul Vinogradoff in turn refers us, we would contend that it is not 
without reason that these sciences have separate names. The time 
has not come—and indeed may never come—in which Jurisprudence 
can claim to unite them all in its generic title, but each may give 
invaluable service to the others. 
Since the above notice was written Professor de Montmorency has 
published his Inaugural Lecture as Quain Professor of Comparative Law 
in the University of London. In this connection it is chiefly of interest 
in that he also makes the wider claims for Jurisprudence, but it differs 
from Professor Vinogradoff's book in the greater efforts made to establish 
these claims on a reasoned basis. Taking for his starting-point Savigny's 
view that law is itself obedient to a cosmic process, one of organic 
growth, Professor De Montmorency postulates a conscious orderliness, 
which is not only no less dependable than, but even of a similar character 
to, the assumed orderliness of material phenomena. This is to be found 
in the adaptation of life to environment, which, developing through 
many stages, becomes conscious as well as sub-conscious, and, culminating 
in self-consciousness, establishes the reign of law. (But this, it is to be 
noted, Professor De Montmorency considers should be sharply contrasted 
with the " tyranny " involved in the Austinian conception of Law.) 
Professor De Montmorency agrees that there is apparently no system 
of human law which lacks the sense of obligation, but he bases this on 
the relationship of mutual effort and support, though how this operates 
is not quite clear. " Obedience to law ultimately was due to fear of 
incapacity to grapple with an environment, but the fear itself was 
begotten by mutual effort and support, by, in other words, what we call 
Love : that is to say, the recognition of the necessity to provide against 
the dangers of environment sprang originally from the Love of Kind, 
the will to preserve the species." 
But a further step backward in analysis is necessary, and that Pro­
fessor De Montmorency takes in resting " mutual effort and support " 
on the assumption of the religious relationship of a Creator to man 
partaking of his Creator's nature, at any rate, in the characteristic of 
freedom. This creature, the subject of a growing complexity of develop­
ment, experiences " spiritual and mental hunger " ; the former finds 
expression in a representation, however inadequate, of " some Force 
imagined or intuitively conceived of as residing in the Realms of Help 
or the Regions of Punishment and ... is the basis of Sanction in 
Religion." The mental hunger adopts this sanction as a means in the 
task of adaptation to environment. 
" Hence the ultimate basis of sanction would seem to be, not the word 
356 A NEW METHOD FOR JURISPRUDENCE? 
of a lawgiver, but something that we may call intuitive and inseparably 
interwoven with the consciousness of the law-obeyer." 
Whilst admitting some of Professor De Montmorency's contentions, 
it is not necessary either to agree to his condemnation of the 
Austinian position, which we have never understood to be a meta­
physical creed, or to follow Professor De Montmorency in his outline of 
the development of self-consciousness and its unbroken connection with 
the assumed orderliness of life. Is there not an assumption on his 
part—essential to his thesis—of a similarity of kind between the con­
sciousness of the animal and the consciousness of the human creature 
endowed with freedom of choice ? Is this assumption justifiable ? 
MONICA M. GEIKIE COBB. 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, U.S.A., OF 1807. 
IN a former issue of this JOURNAL attention was called to Dr. Scott's 
little book on James Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Con­
vention of 1787 (which formed the Constitution of the United States 
of America), in which work Dr. Scott based an analogy between the 
Federal Convention and the development of the League of Nations, and 
urged that the " Society of Nations," in forming an International Organ­
isation, should master the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and 
consider the experience of the United States. Madison (1751-1836), 
it will be remembered, was a member of that Convention, Member and 
Delegate of many important bodies, and President of the United States 
1809-17. As a reporter of proceedings, he appears to have been facile 
princeps. 
In both the little book and the present larger book1 the important 
documents, viz. (1) the Declaration of Independence, 1776, (2) the 
Articles of Confederation (agreed to in 1777, ratified in 1781), and (3) 
the Constitution of the United States, 1787, are reproduced in extenso ; 
and in both books there are reproductions of the same three facsimiles 
of Madison's manuscript. The new matter, in the larger book, consists 
of an Introductory Note by Mr. G. Hunt on Madison's Record, and a 
paper by Dr. Scott on the Convention of 1787, repeating that " peoples 
of all the States forming the Society of Nations " should find Madison's 
Notes of the proceedings of 1787 to be of interest. The bulk of this 
larger work reproduces at length the antecedents of the Convention, 
and among them appear character sketches by Major Pierce, a member 
for Georgia, of his colleagues in the Convention, forming a curious 
interpolation in the book. 
C. E. BUCKLAND. 
1 Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, reported by James Madison, edited 
by Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, New York, Oxford University Press, American Branch, London, etc., 1920. 
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THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE. 
THE first edition of Mr. Hall's book,1 published a few months before the 
outbreak of the Great War, was mainly intended to supply naval officers 
with a short statement of the rules of maritime law in time of war. 
The present edition is similar in scope and arrangement, but it has been 
considerably enlarged and revised as a result " of the development of 
modern warfare and the abundance of problems to which the war gave 
rise." 
The book seems to be well adapted to the purpose for which it has 
been written, though some of the author's conclusions are untechnical 
and, in a few instances, inaccurate. 
Thus, at p. 42 Mr. Hall tells us: 
Since it is no longer lawful [after the Declaration of Paris] to capture 
a neutral ship for carriage of enemy goods except contraband of war, it is 
no longer lawful to do so in a case where the goods are in British or Allied 
ownership, but in the same position as enemy goods, owing to their enemy 
origin or destination. If, however, a neutral vessel with such a cargo on 
board comes into British ports or waters, as in the case of the Panariellos 
which put into Newport, the cargo can then be seized and will be liable 
to condemnation. 
The author is mistaken when he asserts that goods (non-contraband 
of war) of enemy origin or destination, on board a neutral vessel, can be 
condemned when the neutral vessel which carries them comes into a 
British port. The cargo on the Panariellos was confiscated on the 
ground of illegal commercial intercourse with the enemy, and it is 
difficult to understand how the nationality of the ship or the Declaration 
of Paris could have affected these goods. Certainly none of these 
questions was raised in this case.2 
In dealing with submarine cables (p. 132), Mr. Hall bases his argu­
ments on the rules drawn up by the Institute of International Law in 
1902, but fails to state that the final resolutions of the Institute on 
this subject were adopted at the Oxford Session, 1913, and are embodied 
in Article 54 of the Oxford Manual of Naval War} 
The author, quite inappropriately, refers to Judge Story as " Lord 
Stowell's prototype " (p. 20). Story first took his seat as an Associate 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1811, when Lord Stowell's 
great judicial work on prize law had already been accomplished. 
On the other hand, there are points in Mr. Hall's book on which a 
somewhat fuller treatment and some modification of method would 
have been desirable and helpful. One example will suffice. The 
much-controverted doctrine of infection under which innocent goods 
are contaminated by the contraband goods found on the same vessel, 
and belonging to the same owner, is disposed of by the author in one 
1 The Law of Naval Warfare. By J. A. Hall, LL.M. Second edition, 1921. 
(London : Chapman & Hall, Ltd.) 
8 31 & 32 T.R.L., pp. 326, 459. 
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single line, without any argument or discussion (p. 223). Nor does he 
appear to be aware of the several and important decisions delivered on 
this matter by the British Prize Courts during the recent war: the 
Kronprinsessan Margareta (1917) ; the Posteiro (1917) ; the Parana 
(1919) ; the Antwerpen (1919) ; the Hilding (1920).2 
The unrestricted use of mines by the Central Powers is the object 
of Mr. Hall's severe and justified criticism (p. 67). The means which 
he proposes for ensuring " a very fair security for commercial traffic 
without seriously restricting the utility of mining operations " are both 
judicious and commendable, though perhaps difficult of application. 
On the question of submarines, the author is of opinion that they 
should be subjected to the same rules of sea law as all the other types 
of war vessels. As he rightly says (p. 69), the fact that they would 
thus be exposed to possible attacks from the enemy ships is no more 
justification for them to disregard the principles of international law 
than for armed trawlers or any other small craft. 
C. J. COLOMBOS. 
1 Annuaire de I'Institut de droit international, vol. xxvi, p. 657. 
2 British and Colonial Prize Cases, vol. ii, p. 409 ; vol. iii, pp. 275, 482, 486 note ; 
37 T.L.R., p. 199. 
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